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Abstract
This dissertation presents improved techniques for analyzing network- 
connected (NCF), 2-connected (2CF), task-based (TBF), and subcube (SF) func­
tionality measures in a hypercube multiprocessor with faulty processing elements 
(PE) and/or communication elements (CE). These measures help study system-level 
fault tolerance issues and relate to various application modes in the hypercube. 
Solutions discussed in the text fall into probabilistic and deterministic models. The 
probabilistic measure assumes a stochastic graph of the hypercube where PE’s 
and/or CE’s may fail with certain probabilities, while the deterministic model con­
siders that some system components are already failed and aims to determine the 
system functionality. For probabilistic model, MIL-HDBK-217F is used to predict 
PE and CE failure rates for an Intel iPSC system.
First, a technique called CAREL is presented. A proof of its correctness is 
included in an appendix. Using the shelling ordering concept, CAREL is shown to 
solve the exact probabilistic NCF measure for a hypercube in time polynomial in 
the number of spanning trees. However, this number increases exponentially in the 
hypercube dimension. This dissertation, then, aims to more efficiently obtain lower 
and upper bounds on the measures. Algorithms, presented in the text, generate 
tighter bounds than had been obtained previously and run in time polynomial in the 
cube dimension. The proposed algorithms for probabilistic 2CF measure consider 
PE and/or CE failures.
In attempting to evaluate deterministic measures, a hybrid method for fault 
tolerant broadcasting in the hypercube is proposed. This method combines the 
favorable features of redundant and non-redundant techniques. A generalized result 
on the deterministic TBF measure for the hypercube is then described. Two distri­
buted algorithms are proposed to identify the largest operational subcubes in a 
hypercube Cn with faulty PE’s. Method 1, called LOS1, requires a list of faulty 
components and utilizes the CMB operator of CAREL to solve the problem. In case 
the number of unavailable nodes (faulty or busy) increases, an alternative distri­
buted approach, called LOS2, processes m available nodes in 0 (m n )  time. The 
proposed techniques are simple and efficient.
x
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Reliability is a critical function of computer systems in today’s computer- 
dependent world. The consequences of computer failure are of significant economic 
impact and are sometimes even matters of life and death for military, industry, 
aerospace, and communications applications. Thus, it is imperative that computer 
designers and system users understand the advantages and limitations of the state- 
of-the-art in reliability design. Refer to [73] for the details on existing fault- 
avoidance, fault detection, and redundancy techniques.
For parallel computation, several architectures are suggested in the literature 
[51]. One of the popular architectures is a hypercube, also known as the Boolean 
n -cube [34,35,68,71]. Because of its appealing properties, a hypercube architecture 
is the topology implemented in several multiprocessor systems such as Intel iPSC, 
JPL Mark III, Ametek System/14, and nCube 2S. A hypercube multiprocessor sys­
tem offers node and link symmetry, logarithmic diameter, and an ability to host 
some widely used interconnection networks such as tree, ring, and linear array. To 
meet the demands for high performance systems, larger sized multiprocessor sys­
tems (MPS’s) are built, such as the nCube 2S which offers a maximum of 8,192 
custom designed processors for its configuration. As the size of the system 
increases, it is more likely to be less reliable [30]. Thus, reliability metrics are also 
important aspects for performance evaluation of large MPS’s.
1
2Reliability aspects of a multiprocessor system are generally analyzed for 
system-level fault tolerance in which the faults to be tolerated are processing ele­
ment (PE) and/or communication element (CE) failures. When there is a faulty 
component, the following steps are usually carried out in the system:
1) Fault detection - The faulty component is identified by the system.
2) Reconfiguration - If a fault is detected and a permanent failure is located, the 
system may be able to reconfigure its components to replace the failed com­
ponent or to isolate it from the rest of the system.
3) Recovery - When the failed PE or CE is repaired, it must be automatically 
integrated back into the system.
See [73] for the details on the above three steps.
The system-level reliability measures of a hypercube, which are discussed in 
the literature, fall into one of the following two categories: probabilistic fault 
tolerant measure (PFTM) and deterministic fault tolerant measure (DFTM). The 
probabilistic measure assumes a stochastic graph of the n-cube where PE’s and/or 
CE’s fail with certain probabilities. The PFTM also evaluates the probability of the 
hypercube being functional. Existing methods for evaluating probabilistic measures 
in general networks are exponential in nature; however, for certain structures, 
efficient techniques have been obtained. The structural property of a hypercube is 
utilized to solve reliability measures in this dissertation. Also, polynomial time algo­
rithms to generate tighter lower bounds on PFTM are described. These parameters 
are computed using PE and/or CE failure probabilities which, in turn, are obtained 
considering the node structure of a typical existing hypercube, namely the Intel 
iPSC system.
In the deterministic measure, the minimum number of component failures that 
can be tolerated without resulting in system failure is taken as the figure of merit
3for the system. For example, in real time applications or when repairs are hardly 
available, such as in phased-mission systems, it is imperative to know how vulner­
able the system is to failing components. Notice that a deterministic measure 
assumes that some PE’s and/or CE’s in the hypercube have already failed. The 
DFTM, then, aims to determine the hypercube functionality by using measures 
involving diameter properties or by the requirement set by the users of the system. 
The existing techniques solve these problems in time exponential in the size of the 
cube. As demands for larger hypercube systems are increasing, it is obvious that 
better approaches to these problems are also needed. This dissertation provides 
efficient heuristics for the evaluation of deterministic measures in hypercubes and 
compares the techniques with existing methods to illustrate their advantages.
The remainder of this chapter contains description of salient features of mul­
tiprocessor systems and a discusssion of some popular architectures. Some func­
tionality criteria are introduced which are used for system-level reliability models of 
hypercube architecture. An outline of the dissertation can be found at the end of 
this chapter.
1.1 Multiprocessor Systems
A multiprocessor system consists of a group of N  autonomous PE’s intercon­
nected by certain network topology. Figure 1.1 shows an MPS in which each PE 
has its own local memory. Here, PE’s communicate with each other by exchanging 
messages. A message may have to go through some intermediate PE’s in the inter­
connection network before reaching its destination. This type of MPS has been 
referred to as a message-based parallel processing system [69,71]. Another type of 
MPS called shared-memory multiprocessor system (Figure 1.2) has PE’s communi­
cating through a globally shared memory. Two or more processors needing to use
Interconnection
Network
Figure 1.1. M essage-based Multiprocessor System
Interconnection
Network
Figure 1.2. Shared-memory Multiprocessor System
5the same memory address at the same time should have hardware or software arbi­
tration protocols. Furthermore, memory references are a very large portion of any 
program’s flow, and thus the access time to the global memory has to be kept small 
to prevent degrading performance and/or speed of the system. This bottleneck on 
the global memory limits the number of processors which can economically be 
implemented on the shared-memory multiprocessor system.
On the other hand, a message-based multiprocessor system has each of its pro­
cessors own a local memory unit. For applications in which each processor has 
most of the data it needs, the number of messages exchanged in the system is rela­
tively small. This allows more processors to be used in the message-based multipro­
cessor system. Since messages between processors may have to pass through inter­
mediate processors, applications that need extensive intercommunication should be 
placed in the neighboring processors. This requires that the processors be intercon­
nected in a network topology which, on the average, has a small interprocessor 
communication time at a reasonable cost. Thus, the network topology (refer to Fig­
ures 1.3 through 1.5) for a multiprocessor system plays an important role in deter­
mining the performance of the system. If the network does not provide adequate 
performance, most of the attached processors will frequently be forced to wait for 
data to arrive. In this dissertation, MPS is used to refer to a message-based mul­
tiprocessor system.
A single shared bus shown in Figure 1.3 provides the simplest network topol­
ogy. However, this topology is inadequate for large multiprocessor systems since 
the bus unit would be the bottleneck of the system as the number of interprocessor 
communications increases. Figure 1.4 shows a fully connected network topology for 
N = 6. This topology offers the fastest interprocessor communication for the mul­
tiprocessor system since each processor is directly connected to every other
Shared bus
©  © ©
Figure 1.3. A Shared Bus Connecting N  Processors
Figure 1.4. A Fully Connected Network with N = 6
(a) Simple Ring (b) X-tree
o  <>— ------- (>----------- i >
i )---------- \
O---------- 1>-----------i t-----------(i
(c) Mesh (d) 3-cube
(e) De Bruijn Network 
Figure 1.5. Alternative Topologies for Multiprocessor System s
8processor. However, the topology is impractical for large N  since each PE must 
have N-1 input/output ports. Thus, an N  node multiprocessor system interconnected 
in a fully connected network topology would require 0 (N 2) communication ele­
ments. Several network topologies such as ring, X-tree, mesh, hypercube, and De 
Bruijn graph offer alternatives for the shared bus and fully connected network topo­
logies (refer to Figure 1.5). Mesh, hypercube, and De Bruijn architectures are useful 
for solving various classes of problems because they embed many popular topolo­
gies such as ring, array, tree, etc. The interprocessor communication time through 
these topologies is faster than the time in the shared bus, but not as fast as that in 
the fully connected network. On the other hand, for the N  processing elements con­
nected to any of these topologies, each needs only up to log2N  communication ele­
ments, and thus the overall cost is 0(N log2N ) communication elements.
1.2 Performance and Reliability Models
Several performance parameters of a multiprocessor system such as connec­
tivity, diameter, mean internode distance, communication link visit ratios, and net­
work expansion increment have been discussed in the literature [13,69]. Connec­
tivity measures the network’s resilience and its ability to continue operation despite 
some component failures. Network diameter, which is also referred to as a max­
imum internode distance, gives the lower bound on the delay required to propagate 
information throughout the network. The mean intemode distance, on the other 
hand, is the expected number of nodes a typical message will need to reach its des­
tination. This paramater depends on the message routing distribution that provides 
the probability that different network nodes exchange messages, which, in turn, 
depends on the communication requirements of the application and system programs 
as well as the mapping of these programs onto the network. While the
9communication link visit ratio helps locating bottleneck devices in a network that 
limit the network performance, the network expansion increment gives a measure 
for the network’s expandability with additional nodes.
As the size and complexity of a system increases, the greater number of com­
ponents makes the failure of some components increasing likely. Consequently, reli­
ability analysis increases in importance to determine if the system can maintain a 
desired functionality and needs to be included in the performance analysis of the 
system. Reliability models use several functionality criteria taken as figures of merit 
for the system. The functionality of a system can be maintained by using system- 
wide redundancy and by system reconfiguration. The following functionality meas­
ures are generally computed for a hypercube system [2,3,9,15,20,21,27,50,55].
1) 2-connected functionality (2CF): The system works as long as two specified 
nodes in the system are working and connected.
2) Network-connected functionality (NCF): The system works as long as all nodes 
in the system are working and connected.
3) K-connected functionality (KCF): The system works as long as all nodes in a 
set £ of nodes are working and connected, where I £ I = K.
4) Task-based functionality (TBF): The system works as long as some minimum 
number of connected nodes are available on the system for task execution.
5) Subcube functionality (SF): The system works as long as some functional 
minimum degree subcube exists.
In the hypercube structures, the 2CF, NCF, and KCF measures are useful for 
packet-switching applications because they verify the sturdiness of the topology and 
depict the probability of succesful flooding (for route setup or packet transmission). 
The TBF and SF measures incorporate graceful degradation into reliability metrics.
10
The TBF model is particularly applicable to a large scale multiprocessor system that 
is used to execute concurrent programs that are insensitive to infrequent changes in 
the topology of the system. Measure 5) is important because many hypercube algo­
rithms can be executed on various sizes of hypercubes by setting parameters 
approriately [51,59]. Largest operational subcube (LOS) deals with the identification 
of the largest size operational subcube so that the system can be reconfigured 
accordingly. Note, LOS is an extension of a deterministic case of SF. Table 1.1 
summarizes the applications of the measures for the probabilistic and deterministic 
models.
1.3 Layout of the Dissertation
The dissertation addresses efficient algorithms for analyzing both probabilistic 
and deterministic measures with 2CF, NCF, KCF, SF, and TBF criteria. Chapter 2 
provides background material needed for later chapters. Section 2.1 presents the 
properties of the hypercube architecture including definitions, notations, and 
assumptions. Section 2.2 includes the description of the node structures of some 
existing hypercube multiprocessor systems such as Intel iPSC, JPL Mark III, and 
Ametek’s System/14. The section uses the MIL-HDBK-217F to predict the com­
ponent failure rates for the node structure of the Intel iPSC system.
In Chapter 3, the probabilistic fault tolerant measures for hypercube systems 
are discussed. First, the literature on the topic is reviewed and then an efficient 
Computer Aided Reliability EvaLuator (CAREL), which obtains an exact reliability 
measure, is presented. The notion of shelling orderings for the hypercube topology 
is also discussed in this chapter. However, CAREL is not advisable for analyzing 
the reliability measures of large hypercubes because two solution approaches, one 
using a basic path concept and the other considering preprocessing based on
Table 1.1
Reliability Measures for the Hypercube
Measures Probabilistic Model Deterministic Model
2CF Terminal reliability Reliable routing1
NCF Network reliability Reliable broadcasting, gossiping1
KCF K-terminal reliability1 Reliable broadcasting, multicasting1
TBF Task-based reliability -
SF Functional subcube reliability1 Largest operational subcube
1 Measures not discussed in the text.
shelling, do not help generate results efficiently. The computational complexity of 
the approach using CAREL is, although, polynomial in the order of the number of 
spanning trees of the n -cube, is still exponential in the order of the dimension of 
the cube. Keeping this in view, we aim to obtain lower and upper bounds on the 
probabilistic measures with the lower bound being of greater interest since it shows 
that the system is at least this reliable.
Chapter 4 proposes polynomial-time algorithms utilizing the structural proper­
ties of the hypercube to obtain tighter bounds on its probabilistic fault tolerant 
measures. Our NCF and 2CF bounds result in significant improvements over the 
results obtained using previous techniques. Our proposed algorithms for the 2CF 
model consider PE and/or CE failure cases. The chapter also includes a method to 
compute the upper bounds on TBF measure.
Chapter 5 includes a discussion on the deterministic fault tolerant measures for 
the n -cube, Cn, systems which begins by focusing on the fault tolerant broadcast­
ing, a problem that belongs to the deterministic NCF or KCF model. Next, the dis­
cussion focuses on a fault tolerant broadcasting algorithm that combines the favor­
able features of the existing methods. We show that when failed components do not 
isolate any C l or its subsets, a Cn tolerates up to 3n -6  node failures. This chapter 
also describes improved approaches for solving the deterministic model with SF 
measures. We propose two efficient distributed algorithms to identify largest opera­
tional subcubes (LOS’s) in a hypercube having failed PE’s. The distributed algo­
rithms contrast with the centralized approaches in which the algorithms run in a 
host / manager node of the hypercube. One of the proposed algorithms, LOS1, 
requires as its input a list of failed components, while the other proposed algorithm, 
LOS2, needs a list of available components as its input. For an n -cube, procedure 
LOS1 is empirically shown to run in polynomial time when only n nodes fail. This
13
method uses CAREL operators to obtain faster computational time than that given 
by previous techniques. Algorithm LOS2 utilizes the properties of the hypercube to 
ignore some components which will not be included in the available largest opera­
tional subcube.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with some suggestions for future 
work. The appendices provide the proofs of correctness for CAREL and Lemmas
4.1 and 4.2.
Chapter 2 
Hypercube Node Reliability
This chapter provides background, notations, definitions, and assumptions that 
are used throughout the dissertation. It also describes the node structures of some 
existing commercial hypercube systems, namely Intel iPSC, Ametek System/14, and 
JPL Mark-Ill. Several different structures of hypercube architecture such as folded 
hypercube, cube connected cycles, and generalized hypercube are discussed in the 
literature [13,47,57], but we concentrate on the most common hypercube structure, 
the binary /z-cube. For system-level reliability models, it is important to know the 
failure rates of the components. As an example, we consider the Intel iPSC system 
[68,69] and use MIL-HDBK-217F [19,52] to compute the component failure rates. 
The handbook gives consistent and uniform information for reliability predictions 
during the design phase of electronic systems. Reference [52] provides extensive 
discussion on the role of reliability prediction for reliability modeling, and also 
discusses part count and part stress methods to help calculate component level 
failure rates. The part count analysis requires only limited information, however, it 
should be used only during bid proposal and early design stages when sufficient 
information is not available for practicing the part stress method. The part stress 
method is applicable when most of the design is completed and a detailed parts list, 
including its part stresses, is available. The dissertation uses the part stress method.
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2.1 Background
A hypercube of dimension n, C„, is a graph with 2" nodes (PE’s) and n-2n~l 
links (CE’s), where each node is labeled with w-bit binary string such that two 
nodes whose labels differ in exactly one bit position have a link connecting them. 
In this dissertation, the terms node (link) and PE (CE) are used interchangeably. A 
Cn is also defined recursively in terms of the graph product operation X as [22]:
Cn — Cy X C„_j.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the n-cube topology for n < 4. References [32,70] discuss the 
topological properties of the hypercube. Consider that each node has labels 
bn„ibn _2 • • • b Q, where bt e  [0, 1}, and / e  [0, 1, • • • , n -1}  refers to the zth 
dimension of the cube. We use H ( v , w )  to denote the Hamming distance [53] of 
the processors v and w . The antipodal of a node v in an n -cube is a node u which 
is located farthest from v, i.e., H { v , u )  = n.
Let G = (V, E)  represent a stochastic graph model for Cn, where V denotes 
the set of nodes, and E defines the set of edges/links in the Cn. The degree of a 
node v is given as the number of its neighbors. Each node in a Cn has degree n . 
The distance between nodes v and w is the length of a shortest path between the 
two nodes. The diameter of a network G is defined as the maximum distance over 
all the pairs of nodes in the network; a Cn has diameter n . A subcube is a subset of 
a hypercube which preserves the properties of the hypercube.
An (s,t)-path is a set of nodes and links in G that provides a connection from 
a given source node s to a given terminal node t in G. The (s ,r)-path is minimal 
when any proper subset of it does not result in a path between s and t. It is also 
termed as simple path. On the other hand, a basic path between -y and t is defined 
as a path in which two nodes that are not adjacent in the path are not adjacent in
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Figure 2.1. Hypercube Topology with Dimension n < 4
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G. Note, set of basic paths is a subset of all minimal paths. Without loss of gen­
erality, let the addresses of s and t be 0 and 2 " - l ,  respectively in Cn. These nodes 
are at diameter distance n . There are n ! simple paths in a C„, each of which 
traverses n links (n+1 nodes). Of the n ! paths, n of these are nodes and links dis­
joint. An all -path is defined as a set of nodes and links in G that provides a path 
between every pair of nodes in G. Thus, a minimal all-path is a spanning tree. 
References [32,88] give the total number of spanning trees, ST in), in a Cn as
ST(n) = 2~nY l(2 j ) lJJ. (2.1)
M
A cut is a disconnecting set. A minimal cut (all-cut) corresponds to a minimal 
set of links in G whose failure ensures that no communication exists between a 
given (every) s ,t node pair.
Assumptions
a) Nodes (links) are statistically identical and have the same failure rate yit) (kit)).
b) Node (link) failures are statistically independent and exponentially distributed. 
One can compute node reliability r ( t ) and link reliability p i t )  as functions of
t t
time as: r(t)  = exp(-[ JV(x)Jx ]) and p i t )  = exp(-[ jA,(x)dx ]). For constant yit)
o o
(kit)), r = exp(^yr) ip = exp(-Xr)). The independence assumption makes the 
reliability problem mathematically tractable.
c) Each node (link) has two states: good (up) or bad (down).
2.2 Reliability Prediction
To help determine the PE and CE reliabilities, one may use Intel Components 
Quality and Reliability [39], the Bellcore's ARPP (Automated Reliability Prediction
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Procedure) [10], or the AT&T Reliability Manual [44]. In this dissertation, a relia­
bility prediction method is presented based on the military standard handbook 
[19,52]. The handbook provides a mathematical framework for electronic com­
ponent (IC) failure rate derived from the Arrhenius function. This function is used 
to compute predicted failure rates for IC components. This model has been modified 
several times based on field data in subsequent releases of the handbook. But for 
our discussion, we use the latest release on the standard, the MIL-HDBK-217F [52], 
which includes several multiplicative adjustment factors reflecting device technol­
ogy, packaging, screening / testing level, environment, operating voltage, process / 
design maturity, etc. An Arrhenius function applicable for microcircuits, gate / logic 
arrays, and microprocessors is given as [52]:
xd = iooo * + K2nE)nQnL f i t s ,  (2.2)
where rk d represents the device failure rate, is the circuit complexity factor 
based on bit count, I iT is the temperature acceleration factor based on technology, 
K 2 is the package complexity factor, YlE is the application environment factor, YIq 
is the screening / testing level factor, YlL is the device learning (process /  design 
maturity) factor, and the unit FITS represents part failures per million per thousand 
hours. In what follows, we apply this reliability prediction method to compute the 
failure rates for PE and CE of the Intel iPSC system.
2.2.1 Node and Link Failures
Figure 2.2 shows a node model in a multiprocessor system. Each node has a 
processing unit (PU), a memory unit (MU), and a hardware support for the inter­
node communication unit (CU). Table 2.1 provides the group of components that 
belong to MU, PU, and CU for an Intel iPSC, an Ametek System/14, and a JPL 
Mark-in hypercube system. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a node architecture for
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Figure 2.2. Structure of a Node in Hypercube
Table 2.1
A PE Model for Some Existing Hypercube Systems
Systems Memory Unit Processing Unit Communication Unit
Intel iPSC
64K PROM 
512K DRAM
Intel 80286 
Intel 80287 
Intel 82586
Intel 82586
Ametek/14
16K PROM 
1M DRAM
Intel 80286 
Intel 80287 
Intel 80186
2 Intel 8237
JPL Mark-DI 4M DRAM
2 M-68020 
M-68881
8 bit link drivers 
FIFO buffers
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Figure 2.3. Intel iPSC Node Organization.
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the Intel iPSC [34,35] hypercube. Each node in the Intel iPSC contains a micropro­
cessor (Intel 80286), a floating point coprocessor (Intel 80287), 512K bytes of 
dual-ported DRAM, 64K bytes of PROM, n Ethernet controllers (Intel 82586), and 
one additional Intel 82586 used for I/O purposes. Notice that each controllers 82586 
is connected to its respective neighbor. Any failure in the controller chip destroys 
the communication path from the node to the corresponding neighboring node. For 
our case, link (CE) reliability is computed from a series structure consisting of two 
Intel 82586 chips and the physical link between them. Figure 2.4a depicts a reliabil­
ity block diagram illustrating these concepts. Let failures be statistically independent 
and px represent the reliability of a component x .  The PE reliability parameter is 
obtained from the failures in the MU, the last Intel 82586 (I/O) chip, and 80286 and 
80287 processor chips. A reliability block diagram to compute PE vulnerability is 
given in Figure 2.4b.
2.2.2 Failure Rate Computation
In example 2.1, we use Equation (2.2) to predict failure rates for the com­
ponents used in the Intel iPSC computer system, i.e., the Intel 80286, Intel 80287, 
DRAM, PROM, and the Ethernet controller 82586. Example 2.2, on the other hand, 
shows how to predict the failure rates for the PE and CE of the Intel hypercube sys­
tem.
Example 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the failure rate calculation for an Intel 80286 
microprocessor using Equation (2.2). We assume that the system is used in an air 
conditioned, non-mobile, benign environment such as a computer laboratory or 
office. We obtain the package thermal specifications for the Intel chips from refer­
ences [37,38]. Using Equation (2.2), we compute the failure rate for Intel 80286 as
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Figure 2.4. Reliability Block Diagram 
for (a) CE , (b) PE in Intel iPSC System
Table 2.2
Failure Rate Calculation for Intel 80286 Microprocessor
Parameter Value Specifications
*1 0.28 16-bit HMOS III microprocessor
k 2 0.027 68 active pins
n l 1 > 2 years in production
UQ 10 unknown screening levels
n £ 0.5
nonmobile, temperature and humidity 
controlled environment.
n r 0.35
T j = T c + P *  QJC
dJC = 5.5 C/W (68 lead PGA).
Power dissipation = 3.3 Watts (Max). 
Tc = 35° C (environment as in n £ ).
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8^0286 = 1000 * (0.28*0.35 + 0.027*0.5) * 10 * 1 = 1115 FITS.
By similar calculations, we obtain the failure rates for a 256K x 1 DRAM chip, 
^ dram = 49.5 FITS, and the one for a 64K x 8 PROM chip, Aeprom -  99.3 FITS. 
Considering the failure rates for Intel 80287 coprocessor chip and Intel Ethernet 
82586 chip as A80287 = 916 FITS and A82586 = 383 FITS, respectively, we are able 
to compute the failure rates for the PE and CE of the Intel iPSC.
Example 2.2. A PE of the Intel iPSC system consists of 64K bytes EPROM, 512K 
bytes DRAM, an Intel 80286, an Intel 80287, and an Intel 82586 (see Table 2.1). 
For the memory units, an Intel EPROM 27C512 and 18 - 256K x 1 Intel DRAM 
27256 chips, forming the 512K bytes RAM, are assumed to be used. We consider 
that the system uses 1 parity bit for each byte of its memory units. Assuming 
exponential distribution for failure rates, we obtain the reliability of the Intel 80286, 
the Intel 80287, the 512K bytes RAM, the 64K bytes EPROM, and the Intel 82586 
chips. Following the reliability block diagram for a PE shown in Figure 2.4b, the 
reliability of a PE is given as pPE = e~3AT, where T  is time in billion hours. Simi­
larly, we compute the reliability of the CE of the system to be p CE = e~°11T.
The PE and CE require logic circuits to combine the PE and CE components. 
We have excluded the failure rate factors of these circuits from reliability expres­
sions for the PE and CE. We can, though, include these failure rates either by con­
sidering them as a function of time t or by using a multiplicative factor incorporated 
in the final results of the pPE and p CE. In this dissertation, we have used the latter 
approach. However, in either case, the circuit failure rate for a PE should be larger 
than that of a CE since a PE uses more complex circuits than does a CE. Let c x 
and c2 be the circuit reliability parameters for the PE and CE, respectively, for 
c j < c 2 < 1. Thus, the reliability expressions for the PE and CE are given a spPE =
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ci e~3AT and p CE = c 2 e~°11T, respectively. Table 2.3 illustrates the reliability 
predictions for the PE and CE for t from 1000 hours to 100,000 hours, and with c 1 
= 0.95 and c 2 = 0.99, respectively.
Table 2.3
Component Reliabilities for Intel iPSC
Time (hours) PPE PCE
1000 0.94678 0.98924
5000 0.93398 0.98620
10000 0.91824 0.98241
20000 0.88755 0.97487
30000 0.85788 0.96739
40000 0.82920 0.95997
50000 0.80148 0.95261
60000 0.77469 0.94530
70000 0.74879 0.93805
80000 0.72376 0.93086
90000 0.69957 0.92372
100000 0.67618 0.91663
Chapter 3 
Probabilistic Fault Tolerant Measures
Probabilistic fault tolerant measures (PFTM) for the hypercube multiprocessor 
system, addressed in the literature [2,15,42,47,54], are useful for packet-switching 
applications because they verify the sturdiness of the topology and depict the proba­
bility of succesful flooding (for route setup or packet transmission). We discuss 
exact evaluation methodologies for the measures with NCF, 2CF, and SF criteria.
An exact probabilistic measure for the hypercube is computed by, first, 
enumerating the success (failure) terms of the cube. Each success (failure) term is 
treated as a product term of Boolean variables, and, thus, the set of success (failure) 
terms is represented as a sum-of-products expression. Next, we use a sum-of- 
disjoint-product (SDP) technique [20,60] to transform the sum-of-product expression 
into an analogous reliability expression. This chapter presents an efficient SDP algo­
rithm called Computer Aided Reliability EvaLuator (CAREL) [74]. CAREL has 
been succesfully utilized to evaluate reliability performances of general distributed 
networks [63,74,75,76]. It is shown that the technique outperforms existing sum-of- 
disjoint-products methods in terms of solution time [74]. We apply the algorithm to 
obtain exact values for the probabilistic model with NCF, 2CF, and SF measures for 
the hypercube.
In our analysis, it is assumed that node and link failures are statistically 
independent. This assumption is useful since the reliability problem is
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mathematically intractable. Nevertheless, for hypercubes, this assumption is 
justifiable since each node (link) in the system is controlled by different and 
independent processors (controllers). [Refer to Section 2.2.1]. With perfect links and 
failing nodes, the computation for NCF measure is straightforward; it is just the 
product of node reliabilities. Since link failures are assumed to be independent from 
node failures, the NCF metric for the case when both links and nodes can fail is 
computed by taking the product of the measures for the separate link and node 
failure cases. This chapter discusses NCF measure only for the link failure assump­
tion. The 2CF measure is also considered for link failure case because the 2CF 
measure with node failure case can be solved similarly. The chapter, however, con­
siders the SF model for the node failure case.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: We, first, provide background material 
on the SDP techniques. To help discuss CAREL we, then, introduce four operators: 
COM, RED, CMB, and GEN. Some examples for solving the probabilistic model 
with different functionality criteria are illustrated. The chapter also discusses the 
shelling property [8] of spanning trees in the hypercube and shows that CAREL 
evaluates the probabilistic NCF for a hypercube in time polynomial in the order of 
the number of spanning trees in the cube. We have also included a proof for the 
correctness of CAREL in Appendix A.
3.1 Background
Several algorithms for exact computation of network reliability are proposed in 
the literature. These methods are classified as state enumeration, decomposition, 
inclusion-exclusion, factoring, and sum-of-disjoint products techniques. State 
enumeration generates the favorable events by examining all possible states and is 
the simplest method. It is not practical for large networks, however, since the
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number of states to be examined increases rapidly. The decomposition technique 
divides a network into smaller networks whose reliability can be directly computed, 
but algorithms based on this approach do not produce compact reliability expres­
sions. Both inclusion-exclusion and factoring techniques have similar disadvantages 
for evaluating large networks. References [20,62] provide extensive discussions on 
these methods, including their relative merits and demerits.
The sum-of-disjoint-products technique utilizes Boolean concepts to convert a 
sum-of-product expression for minimal paths or minimal cuts into an equivalent 
expression of exclusive and mutually disjoint (e.m.d.) terms or an SDP expression 
[20]. In this form, a logical success (failure) state of a component x  is replaced by 
component reliability (unreliability), and the Boolean sum (product) is replaced by 
the arithmetic sum (product) to generate the reliability. In other words, the SDP 
expression is interpreted directly as an equivalent probability expression for network 
reliability. A drawback of most algorithms based on the manipulation of Boolean 
sum-of-products or implicants is in the iterative applications of certain operations. 
The fact that the Boolean function changes at every step may make the method 
clumsy. Moreover, the algorithms simplify Boolean function using absorption rules 
[53] and, thus, require a considerable computational effort [31]. Therefore, most 
SDP techniques are applicable only to small or moderate sized networks. However, 
with a sharp ($) operator, Grnarov et al. [31] present an SDP technique, PROB, 
which avoids the previously mentioned drawbacks. In the algorithm PROB, a 
minimal path is represented by a particular binary string (a path identifier), thus, 
only logical operations need to be performed. Furthermore, the algorithm utilizes 
the multiple variable inversion (MVI) concept, discussed in Section 3.2, to produce 
a concise resultant for the final SDP expression.
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To further help reduce the overall e.m.d. terms, the minimal paths or minimal 
cuts are preprocessed (ordered) using some preprocessing techniques. Reference 
[75] considers cardinality- , lexicographic - , and Hamming distance- ordering 
methods, and their combinations; it also compares the effect of preprocessing on the 
performance of the SDP technique with respect to the overall e.m.d. terms gen­
erated by the algorithm. Experimentally, the reference shows that cardinality-based 
ordering is worthwhile doing since it significantly reduces the number of disjoint 
terms generated (compared to that using a randomly ordered input) and, hence, 
reduces the CPU time. In the following, our analysis uses minimal paths, however, 
this is not a limitation since a similar analysis may be presented with minimal cuts. 
We assume that the minimal paths or minimal cuts of the networks are already 
available. The minimal Cs,f)-paths can be derived by algorithms such as the one 
proposed by Tarjan [81]. For minimal (s,O-cuts, reference [84] provides an algo­
rithm that enumerates all minimal (s ,0 -cuts of a network in linear time per minimal 
cut, and references [61,72] discuss methods to obtain the minimal cuts from the 
minimal paths.
Let F, denote the event that minimal path Pt is operational. The event F  that 
at least one minimal path works is given by
m
F = u F it (3.1)
i=i
where m denotes the number of minimal paths in the network. Let Bt be the 
Boolean product term corresponding to F,-, that is, the product of Boolean variables 
corresponding to each component in P,-. Then
m
B = £  B, (3.2)
i=i
is the Boolean expression corresponding to F . Equation (3.2) is modified either
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canonically or conservatively to generate the equivalent SDP expression, 
B(disjoint). The conservative modification is usually preferred since it is more 
efficient than canonical modification in which, for I components in the network, 2l 
terms are required to determine disjoint terms in B. Most methods consider the 
single-variable inversion (SVI, discussed in Section 3.2) concept and generate 
equivalent e.m.d. terms for Equation (3.2) as
B l + B 2 B l + B 3 B l B 2 + + B m B 1B 2 Bm_l , (3.3)
where Bt is a Boolean product term corresponding to the event that P, is not opera­
tional. The ith term B, B 2 • • • B,_i can be evaluated using conditional proba­
bility and standard Boolean operations as
P r(P ,) * P r (F\ r 2 • • • P“ 7 |P i)  = P r(P i )-Pr( £ 1 P 2 • • • E ^ ) ,  (3.4)
where Py- denotes the event that minimal path Pj is down, and Ej represents a con­
ditional event Fj | P t- [53] and defines an event that Pj is down given that minimal 
path P{ is operational. The probability, Pr(P,-), can be directly computed as the pro­
duct of the reliabilities of nodes and/or links in path Pt since component failures 
are assumed to be statistically independent. The second term of Equation (3.4) is
»-i
solves as P r ^  P 2 ' ' ' P ;-i) = I l P r  (Ej) if the Ej's  represent independent
j =i
events. However, the Py’s are, in general, not independent [20,62]. Computing 
P r(P 1 E 2 • • Ei_i) is the most time consuming process in the SDP technique.
Various researchers [20,62] have worked on this philosophy and have proposed 
methods to generate disjoint expressions for (P,-, Fj) pairs, and also to solve 
P r(p ! E 2 • • • £,_!) in Equation (3.4). The following three propositions, P J  
through P_HI, convert P  into F(disjoint). These propositions state the basic princi­
ples behind most SDP methods in the literature.
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Proposition P_I. Define intermediate term(s) 7} as:
* '-i
— \each literal of F,—>1 » (3.5)
7=1
where F 1 = F x and F l -  Fi OPl Tt . Here, F ‘ refers to the equivalent e.m.d. 
term(s) for F; . The operation 'O P {  is a necessary disjointing operator. (Table 3.1 
lists various operators.) The F(disjoint) expression is, then, given by
F(disjoint) = FF  (3.6)
j
Algorithms in [58,64] and method 1 in [74] make use of proposition P_I.
Proposition P_3I. For each term Ff, 1 < * < m , 7} is defined as the union of all 
predecessor terms F lt F 2, • • • , F,-! in which any literal that is present in both F,- 
and any of the predecessor terms is deleted from those predecessor terms, i.e.,
/—i
Fj | each literal of Fj— (3.7)
; = i
Consider F 1 = F lf and define F l = F,- OP2 F(. Equation (3.6), then, obtains the 
equivalent F(disjoint) expression. Hariri and Raghavendra [33], Rai and Aggarwal 
[60], Bennetts [11], and Soh and Rai (with method 2) [74] have based their tech­
niques on proposition P_II.
Proposition P i l l .  For 1 < j  < m , use operation ‘O P3’ to perform
F J = ( • • • ((Fj OP3 F j) OP3 F 2) OP3 • * • ) OP3 Fy_j. (3.8)
Equation (3.8) obtains a set of disjoint terms corresponding to Fj. Note, F 1 = F j, 
and OP3 represents an appropriate disjointing operator. The F(disjoint) expression 
is given by Equation (3.6). Abraham [1], Grnarov et al. [31], and Tiwari and
Table 3.1.
OP i through OP ^  Used with Boolean Algebraic Techniques 
(++ Proposed Algorithm)
Operator Function Reference
OP, X -operator [58]u r  i Method 1, CMB ( * ) operator ++
Relative complement and Procedure 1 [11]
OP 2
Cutset Disjoint Procedure [33]
E-operator [60]
Method 2, CMB ( * ) operator ++
COMPARE() function [1]
OP*
$ operator [15]
kjt 3
Boolean negation [82]
Modified $ operator [85]
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Verma [82] have proposed their methods using the P_III concept. F(disjoint) 
expressions obtained from different propositions should be identical when expanded.
3.2 Existing SDP Techniques - A Comparison
The problem of computing the probability in Equation (3.4) to obtain 
F(disjoint) of Equation (3.6) is known to be NP-hard [8]. Hence, for comparing 
different SDP algorithms, researchers have often used parameters such as the 
number of terms in the resulting SDP expression, the amount of storage needed, and 
the execution times of programs in computing specific problems. Use of multiple- 
variable inversion (MVI), in addition to preprocessing the sum of product terms 
(see Section 3.1), further reduces the overall number of resulting disjoint terms [86]. 
This concept is illustrated in the example which follows. Typically, an SDP tech­
nique uses a complemented Boolean variable, xt (indicating a failed component i), 
and an uncomplemented variable, xi (denoting a functional component i). This 
Boolean representation is called single-variable inversion (SVI). Thus, in the SVI 
form, a Boolean expression representing five components, with components 2 and 5 
in a don’t care state, component 4 in a functional state, and components 1 or 3 in a 
failed state, would be represented by an expression x 4(xx + x 3). On the other hand, 
an equivalent but more concise Boolean expression for the example is given in MVI 
form as x 4x \x3. Reference [86] reviews and discusses the relative merits and dem­
erits of the following four sum-of-disjoint products techniques that have used MVI 
concept: PROB [31], GKT-VT [85], KDH88 [36], and CAREL [74]. The GKT-VT 
is efficient compared to PROB [85] and is able to solve large networks; however, it 
obtains the terminal reliability of a network with 425 minimal (y ,0-paths in 46.3 
CPU hours. Obviously, we still need an efficient algorithm (on the application of 
Boolean algebra) to solve reliability problems for large networks. CAREL [74]
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provides a solution in this direction since it computes the terminal reliability param­
eter for the network of Figure 19 in [74] (with 780 minimal (j,r)-paths) in less than 
a minute of CPU time. Note, the network used in [85] (with 425 paths) is a reduced 
form of the network of Figure 19 in [74].
Propositions P_I through P_m maintain the minimal paths or minimal cuts list 
in memory (Equation (3.1)). Consider a "1" for an operative component and a "0" 
for don’t care, and utilize the bit representation technique [4]. The memory require­
ment is, then, fllw\ words per minimal path (cut), where I is the number of com­
ponents in the network G = (V , E), and w is the word size. Proposition P I makes
/ - i  . ; - i
F( disjoint with respect to ( j P ,  while propositions P_H and P_in utilize F j .
j =t j =i
Should we have similar operations to implement Equations (3.5) and (3.7), the pro­
position P_I would require more operations than that needed for P_II. Generally, an 
Fi generates more than one e.m.d. term for F ' , and, hence, the number of terms
involved in is larger than that in Fj. Note, in proposition P_I, the gen-
j  j
erated e.m.d. terms must be kept in the memory to implement Equation (3.5) which 
is not the case for P_II or P_m. This makes proposition P J  sequential. Moreover, 
P_I demands a huge memory space to evaluate a large network. On the other hand, 
P_II and P in  have implicit parallelism, making it easier for the programmers to 
implement them on parallel systems. Overall, the propositions P_II and P_III pro­
vide advantages in comparison with P_I.
An analysis of performance comparison between a typical example of proposi­
tions P_II and P_III is discussed in [33]. SYREL [33], an implementation technique 
for the E-operator [60], is shown to have better performance in comparison with the 
^-operator [31]. It means proposition P I  I outperforms PI I I .  Moreover, proposi­
tion P_II offers a faster implementation approach than that in P I or P III. The bit
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vector implementation of Fj makes the realization of Equation (3.7) w (word
j
size) times faster than generating Equation (3.5) based on proposition P_I. The fol­
lowing section presents CAREL [74].
3.3 Computer Aided Reliability EvaLuator (CAREL)
CAREL is a sum-of-disjoint products network reliability algorithm. CAREL is 
more efficient than existing techniques since it uses conditional probability to 
significantly reduce the number of terms involved in Equation (3.4) [74]. Comput­
ing P r(E iE 2 ’ • • Ei_i) in Equation (3.4) is the most time consuming process in 
the SDP technique, and, hence, fewer terms involved in the process results in 
reduced CPU time. Furthermore, CAREL utilizes the MVI concept to obtain a 
more concise expression for the final e.m.d. terms. CAREL obtains a symbolic reli­
ability expression for the network. The resultant network reliability is computed by 
substituting a logical success (failure) in the expression by a given component relia­
bility (unreliability). Generating a symbolic reliability expression is advantageous 
for two main reasons. Firstly, many networks have a fixed topology while the relia­
bility of their components changes with time. Thus, reliability reevaluation is 
simpler with symbolic expressions. Furthermore, the sensitivity to changes in com­
ponent reliabilities can be readily determined by utilizing symbolic expression. 
Secondly, in some applications, it is desired to improve the reliability of a network 
under a given cost constraint. A symbolic reliability expression can be used to help 
identify the critical components to optimize the reliability. In other words, the sym­
bolic reliability expression can be readily used to help design (synthesize) optimal 
networks with certain costs and/or reliability constraints. In Section 3.3.1, we dis­
cuss a notational concept that is useful to describe CAREL. Section 3.3.2 describes 
four operators: COM, RED, CMB, and GEN, which form the basis for CAREL.
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3.3.1 Notation
For a network G = (V, E), consider a set of minimal paths P j’s. A path 
identifier Fj identifies Pj in a cubical notation [53] using a string of symbols from 
(0, 1}. Thus, an operative component in Pj is represented by a "1" in Fj, while a 
don't care state is represented by a "0". An F1 denotes the e.m.d. term(s) and is 
generated for an Fj. To help obtain F*, conditional events E j’s (defined later) are 
utilized. An F* uses {-P7, 0, 1}, while an Ej is composed of complemented and 
absent variables and requires {-P7, 0 } symbols [64], The P represents a positive 
integer, and I  e  {0, 1, • • • } is a superscript or index. We use a superscripted 
negative integer to represent a complemented variable (failed state of a component). 
Note the following :
a) An uncomplemented, or complemented, or absent variable is replaced by "1", 
"-P7", or "0" in the position of the variable, respectively.
b) A "-P7" represents complements of P number of variables which are grouped 
together, and the index I  represents the least significant bit position among the 
P variables, [a "-1" signifies a single variable complement. Use of index is 
optional with "-1".]
To help illustrate the concept of this new notation, a term xj,x 2x iXq is represented 
as (-22 -22 1 -1°). Similarly, a product term x^x^c^ x 4x 2x 0 is denoted as (-33 -33 
-22 - 33 -22 0 1 ). The need of a superscript or index is illustrated with the exam­
ple of a Boolean term x 5x 4 x^x2 represented as (-24 -24 -22 -22 -2° -2°). If 
the indices are not used, a notation of (-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2) for this example, in all 
likelihood, would be wrongly interpreted. The advantage of (-P7, 0, 1) notation lies 
in its uniqueness in handling complemented variables that are grouped together 
[31,64,85].
3.3.2 CAREL Operators
Given a set of path identifiers [^jF{, we want to generate the e.m.d. terms F'
?=1
generated from the F, for all i. The COM operator generates a set of conditional 
events Ej, j  = 1, • • • , z-1 for an F , . The conditional event set F; ’s describes the 
events that a minimal path identified by F, is operational, while minimal paths P 
for each j  = 1,2, • • • , / - I  fail. The RED operator, on the other hand, is used to 
remove the redundant conditional event from the generated set £  ■’ s. We call the 
non-redundant events minimal conditional events (MCE). If we have only one term 
in the MCE set or if the events are mutually independent among themselves, we 
generate the disjoint tenns F ' directly. But, in general, the MCE’s are not mutually 
independent, and therefore we need the CMB operator to compute 
P r(F 1F 2 ' ‘ ‘ F,_i)- Refer to Equation (3.4). Finally, the last operator, GEN, gives 
the disjoint terms F ' .
COM ( \  ) operator: The COM1 (COM2) version follows proposition P I (P_II). 
For P I, consider Fk = ( at_j • • • a 1 a 0 ) and F ; = ( bt_j • • • b 1 b0 ), where 
a, e  {0, 1}, and b, e  { -p7, 0, 1 }. The COM1 ( \ ) is, then, defined as
Ft \F J  =1
0 . if  a ,=1 in all those P positions where b, 's are ~P1.
It shows that Fk and F 7 are mutually disjoint.
Ek otherwise
where the conditional set Ek is ( ct_i • • • Cj Cq )• A c, ( = \ b f ) is obtained 
using following table: ^
a,
-p7 0 1
0 0 0 -a/
1 0 0 0
Here, an a  represents the total number of places where a (0, 1) pair in (Fk, F y)
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occurs. For example, consider Ft  as ( 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 ), and F* as (1 -24 -24 -21 1 
-21 0 ). The COM1 operator obtains Ek as given below:
Fk 0 1 0  1 0  0 1
Fj  1 .24 -24 -2* 1 -21 0
Ek -22 0 0 0 -22 0 0 .
Notice that a  = 2, as two (0, 1) pairs are present. On the other hand, the ( \ ) 
operation with FJ (1 -23 -21 -23 1 -21 0) is shown to be null (0).
Fk 0 1 0  1 0  0 1
Fj  1 -23 -21 -23 1 -21 0
Ek null set (0 ) .
For proposition P_II, the COM ( \ ) operator requires the two path identifiers
Fk = ( at_j • • • f l ^ o )  and Fj = ( bt_i • • • b l b 0 ) where both ait bt e  {0, 1}.
The COM2 is defined in a straightforward manner as Ek = Fk \  Fj =
Fk pi Fj d f  Fk ; where pi and d f  are set operators. For operands Fk , Fj <= {0, 1},
the operators pi and d f  are bitwise or and xor, respectively. Let a  be the total
number of l ’s present with Ek. Replace l ’s in Ek by -a 7 to generate the conditional
event Ek. For example, consider pi and d f  operators for Fk and Fj given below:
Fk 0 1 0  1 0  1 0
Fj 0 1 0  0 1 0  1 ; use pi (bitwise or) operation
0 1 0  1 1 1 1  
Fk 0 1 0  1 0  1 0  ; use d f  (bitwise xor) operation
Ek 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 .
The conditional event Ek is, then, obtained from Ek by replacing "1" by -27 in the 
positions of "1". Thus, Ek = 0 0 0 0 -2° 0 -2°. The COM1 operator detects and
eliminates some of the redundant terms while other redundancies are deleted by the
RED operator. The COM2 operator does not check redundancy. Nonetheless, the 
COM2 operator is bit implementable and offers a great advantage over COM1 from 
the aspects of computer memory and speed.
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RED ( /  ) operator: Consider two conditional events Ej = ( ct_i • • • Cj c0 ), and 
Ek = ( • • • di d 0 ), where cit dt e  { -P7, 0 }. For a 7, &K e  P7, the RED ( /
) operation is given by
E j ; if  Ci = - a 7 in all those a  positions where d{ = -5 K and 8 > a.
Ej/Ek = \ Ek \ if  dt = -b K in all those 8 positions where c; = - a 7 and a  > 8.
E*; otherwise.
Observe that, by REDucing either Ej or Ek , we remove redundant events. Hen­
ceforth, the remaining non-redundant E f s  are said to form a minimal conditional 
event (MCE). The following examples illustrate the RED operation:
(i) Ej 0 -21 0 -21 0 (ii) Ej 0 -21 0 -21 0
Ek 0 -31 -31 -31 0 Ek -32 -32 -32 0 0
Ej 0 -21 0 -21 0 Retain both Ej and Ek .
For (i), -a7 = -2l , -8^ = -31, and 8 > a. Moreover, both ^ ’s are in the positions 
where -3l5s are present. Thus, Ek is redundant, and the result is Ej. A similar 
explanation follows for (ii). The RED operator, defined above, is suitable for P_I. 
For notational simplicity, let us call it RED1. With proposition P_n, a simpler ver­
sion (RED2) is adopted. The COM2 operation generates event Ek which contains 
only 0’s and l ’s. Using Ek s, the redundancy checking required in RED2 operator is 
brought down to set theoretic operations pi and d f  (see [74]). This observation will 
help make RED2 implementation faster than that for RED1. Using RED2, the 
examples (i) and (ii) can be solved as
(i) Ej 0 1 0  1 0
Ek 0 1 1 1 0  ; pi (or operation)
0 1 1 1 0  
Ek 0 1 1 1 0  ; d f  (xor operation)
0 0 0 0 0 ; means Ek is redundant
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(ii) E- 0 1 0  1 0
Ek 1 1 1 0  0 ; pi (or operation)
1 1 1 1 0  
Ek 1 1 1 0  0 ; d f  (xor operation)
0 0 0 1 0 ; non null means retain both terms .
CMB ( * ) operator: The CMB ( * ) operator processes MCE E, ’s as its operands. 
Before applying CMB, partition the set of E f  s into independent (IG) and dependent 
(DG) groups. The MCE’s that belong to IG are already mutually independent 
among themselves. Thus, generating the disjoint terms F l from IG is straightfor­
ward. It has been observed in [33] that most minimal (s ,t )-paths in large computer 
networks (which are of the loosely connected type) do not have common elements 
among themselves. The partitioning of E f  s into IG and DG can be embedded in the 
implementation of the RED ( /  ) operation (refer to Section 3.4.2), which avoids an 
unnecessary taxing of the implementation of the CMB ( * ) operator. Moreover, the 
processing cost (as will be clear later in this section) for IG is far less than that for 
DG, and, hence, the overall improvement in the performance of the algorithm is 
obvious.
Definition. Consider MCE’s Ej and Ek whose elements c,-, dx e  {~P/ , 0}. For 
1 < i < I, if there exists at least one (cit dt ) pair for cf , d( *  0, the Ej and Ek are 
said to form a dependent group (DG).
As an example assume Ej as (-24 0 -24 0 0 0 0) and Ek as (-32 0 0 -32 -32 0 0). 
Here, Ej and Ek belong to DG since they have a common element in position 6. 
Use this definition to select DG’s from non-redundant MCE ’s. The remaining la­
terals form IG’s. The (Ej, Ek) entry in IG has no common elements among them­
selves. Thus, the (c; , dt ) pair will always be of the types (0,0), (-aJ ,0), and (0, 
-8^); therefore, terms such as (0 -21 0 0 0 -21 0) and (0 0 0 0 0 0 -1) belong to IG. 
These terms are independent with both Ej and Ek considered above. For notational
43
simplicity, we denote the elements of independent (dependent) group by IGt (DGX). 
For I MCE I = r ,  I IG I = rj, and I DG I = y, r\ + y  = r.  An element £,• belongs to
either IG or DG. The CMB operator differentiates our algorithm CAREL from
[33,60,64]. The following two cases define CMB; CASE 1 is used for the indepen­
dent group, and CASE 2 is used for the dependent group.
CASE 1. [CMB for independent group]. For 1 < j  <r\, the CMB operates itera­
tively as
IGj * IGj+l -> IGj+l, (3.9)
where **’ is a pi operation such that 0 pi 0 = 0, 0 pi -d K = - $ K, and
-a7 pi 0 = - a 7. Equation (3.9) states that we will eventually get one term IGn.
Example 3.1. Consider four IG ,’s: IG X (00-24-240000), IG2 (-10000000),
IG3 (O ^O O ^O ^O ), and IG4 (00000-2°0-2°). IGn is derived as follows:
IG i 0 0 -24 -24 0 0 0 0
i g 2 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i g 2 -1 0 -24 -24 0 0 0 0
i g 3 0 -31 0 0 -31 0 -31 0
i g 3 -1 -31 -24 -24 -31 0 -31 0
i g 4 0 0 0 0 0 -2° 0 -2°
/G n -1 -31 -24 -24 -31 -2° -31 -2°
CASE 2. [CMB for dependent group]. In this case, the CMB operator is quite 
involved. To define this operator, use Steps 1 and 2 below.
Step 1. D G ]l * DG 2 generates the two terms TG1 and TG2. The term TGl has 
-07 in those 0 positions where entries in D G 1 and DG2 are both negative, while the 
other contents of TGX are 0’s. TG2 has ‘1’ in all the 0 positions, while its remain­
ing entries are generated from D G X and DG2 using 0 pi x J = x J pi  0 = x J ; x J e 
{-p7, 0}. Before applying the pi  operation, update variable x  by adding 0 to x .  The
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entries in TG ’s belong to {~(37, 0, 1}.
Step 2. Consider TGj = ( f i_y • • • f  \ f o )  and DG,- = ( dt_x • • ♦ d \  d 0)‘, where
f i  e  {-<xJ , 0, 1}, d, e  {-8^,0} and a?, 8K e  { P7}. The following substeps gen­
erates TGi’s.
for (all DG,-) begin /* i = 3, • • • */
for(all TGj) begin /* j  = 1, • • • */
call DG (7Gy-, DG,, TG '); /* 7G' is the result */
j  = j  + i;
end;
TG -  TG ', /* we create new TGj list */
end;
Step 2 needs a procedure DG to obtain various TG-, ’s. An algorithm for DG (TGj, 
DG,, TG ) is as follows :
/* To make the algorithm easier to follow, we provide an example for each case (a) 
to (f) in Boolean expression. Note, X  is any Boolean expression */
while (true) begin /* forever, exit only by return  */ 
delta = Number of (1,-8^) pairs; 
alpha = Number of (-aJ ,-8K) pairs;
/* Consider the following cases of (delta,alpha) */
(delta == 8, alpha == don't care) : /* case (a) */
begin /* (abcX) (abc) = 0  */
return; 
end;
(delta > 0, alpha == don't care) : /* case (b) */
begin /* (abX)(abcde) = (abX)(cde) */
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for(& =0 to / - l )  begin 
if(DG,[£] == -8*) begin 
it(TGj[k] == 1)
DGi[k] = 0; 
else
DGi[k] = DGi[k] + delta; 
end; 
end; 
end;
(delta == 0, alpha == 0) : /* case (c) */
begin /* CMB for independent group */
TGj = TGj pi DGp, /* (abX)(cd)= ab cdX */ 
append TGj to TG ; 
return; 
end;
(delta == 0, alpha == a) : /* case (d) */
begin /* (JSF) (JFX) = */
append 7Gy to TG'; 
return; 
end;
== 0, alpha -= 8) : I* case (e) */
begin /* (abcX) (ab) = abX */
TGj = DGi pi  (the rest of elements in TGj other than -a 7); 
append TGj to TG'; 
return; 
end;
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OTHERWISE : /* case (f) */
/* (abeX) (abed) = abX + (ab eX)(cd) */
/* note, the first term above is one of the final result */ 
begin
for(& =0 to / - l )  begin 
if(DGi[k]  == -8K) begin 
if(7G, [Jfc] == V )  begin 
TGj[k] = -alpha',
TGjVc] = 1;
DGdk] = 0; 
end;
else begin
TGj[k] = TGj[k];
DGi[k] = £>G,[&i + alpha - delta; 
end; 
end;
else if(7G; [£] == -a 7) begin 
TG-[k] = 0;
TGj[k] = TGj[k] + alpha; 
end; 
else
TGjlk] = TGj[k];
end;
append TGj to TG;  
end;
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Cases (a) through (f) are obtained from Theorems A.l and A.2 in Appendix A. A 
proof on the correctness of the CMB operator is also given in the appendix.
Example 3.2. Assume D G X (-360-36-36000000), DG2 (-4o0-4o0-4o0000-4°), DG3 (- 
340-3400-340000) and DG4 (-4300-430-43-43000), where DGt e  DG for 1 < / ^  4. 
Step 1. We generate the two terms TGX and TG2 as follows :
DGi  -36 0 -36 -36 0 0 0 0 0 0
DG2 -4° 0 -4° 0 -4° 0 0 0 0 -4°
rG x -27 0 -27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG2 1 0 1 -1 -2° 0 0 0 0 -2°
Step 2. Consider TGl * DG3 and TG2 * DG3. Using procedure DG, TG[ = TGX 
since TGX * DG3 is of case (d) (refer to the procedure). The TG2 * DG3 is com­
puted as follows :
TG2 1 0 1 -1 -2°0 0 0 0 -2°
DG3 -34 0 -34 0 0 -34 0 0 0 0 ; case (b), delta = 2
TG2 1 0 1 -1 -2° 0 0 0 0 -2° ; keep TG2
DG3 0 0 0 0 0  -1 0 0 0 0  ; update DG3
TG2 1 0  1 -1 -2°-l 0 0 0 -2° ; case (c)
Thus, new TG^s  are : TGX (-270-270000000) and TG2 (101-1-2°-1000-2°). They 
are further CoMBined with DG4.
TGX * DG4 :
TGX -27 0 -27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DG4 -43 0 0 -43 0 -43 -43 0 0 0 ; case (f)
TG[ -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ; TGX * DG4 generates
TG2 1 0 -1 -33 0 -33 -33 0 0 0 ; two terms TG [ and TG '2
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TG2 * DG4 :
TG2 1 0  1 -1 -2° -1 0 0 0 -2°
DG4 -43 0 0 -43 0 -43 -43 0 0 0 ; case (b)
TG2 1 0  1 -1 -2° -1 0 0 0-2° ; keep TG2
DG4 0 0 0 -33 0 -33 -33 0 0 0 ; case (d)
TG'3 1 0  1 -1 -2° -1 0 0 0-2° ; the result
Three TG.’s are produced: TGX (-1000000000), TG2 (10-l-330-33-33000), and TG3
(101- l-2°-l 000-2°).
To clarify these steps, we provide a step by step computation using Boolean 
notation. The four DGt ’s are equivalent to *9*7* 6, xgx7x 5x 0, * 9X7X4, and * 9* 6*4*3. 
We have assumed that a DG{ is a function of Boolean variables ‘x 0’ through ‘x 9\  
The CMB operator determines
( * 9* 7* 6)  ( * 9 * 7* 5* 0 ) ( * 9 * 7 * 4 )  (* £ > * 6 * 4 * 3 )
=  ( * 9 * 7  +  * 9 * 7  * 6  * 5 * 0 )  ( -* 9 * 7 * 4 )  ( * 9 * 6 *  4 * 3 )
=  ( * 9 * 7  * 9 * 7 * 4  +  * 9 * 7  * 6  * 5 * 0  * 9 * 7 * 4 )  ( * 9 * 6 * 4* 3 )
=  ( * 9 * 7  +  ( * 9 * 7  * 7 * 5* o )  ( * 4 ) )  ( * 9* 6* 4* 3 )
=  ( * 9 * 7  +  * 9 * 7  * 6  * 4  * 5 * 0 )  ( * 9 * 6 * 4 * 3 )
=  ( * 9 * 7  * 9 * 6* 4 * 3  +  * 9 * 7  * 6  * 4  * 5 * 0  * 9 * 6 * 4 * 3 )
=  * 9  +  * 9  * 7  * 6 * 4 * 3  +  * 9 * 7  * 6  * 4  * 5 * 0  •
The above example is solved using following Boolean identities [53] :
( x + y ) ( x + f ) = x + y " f ;  x . xy = x ; xy = (x + xy)
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GEN ( ©  ) operator: Consider the path identifier Fj (at_x • • • a x a 0), the terms 
generated from CASE 1 and CASE 2 of the CMB operator as 7Gn 
(ex_x • • • e x e0), and TGk ( f t_x • • • f x f 0) where at e  {0, 1}, e  {-p7, 0}, 
and f i  e  {-p7, 0, 1}. The GEN (©  ) operator, then, obtains 
FJ = Fj © 7Gn © TGk
As an example, assume Fj, 7Gn, and TGk . FJ is computed as
Fj 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7Gn -28 -28 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
TGk 0 0 0 0 1 -22 0 -22 1 0
FJ -28 - 28 1 1 1 -22 -1 -22 1 0 .
For bt € FJ, obtain bt = a,- © ex © The bitwise operation © is shown below :
0 © 0 © 0 = 0
1 © 0 © 0 = 1
0  ©  -p7 ©  0  =  -p 7 
0 © 0 © 1 = 1 
0 ©  0  ©  -p 7 = -p 7 
In the above, we have considered only those five (out of 12) combinations which 
are feasible.
Theorem 3.1. The combinations (0, 1, 0) and (-p7, 0, 0) are not possible.
Proof: Using the definition of 7G^, it is easy to show that the occurrence of (0, 1, 
0) is not possible. Moreover, Fj represents a path identifier defined over {0, 1}. 
Thus, a ‘-P7 ’ entry in Fj does not appear with Fj . j-j
Theorem 3.2. More than one occurrence of "1" or -P7 in position i for the terms 
(Fj, /G n, TGk ) is not feasible.
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Proof: A multiple occurrence of "1" in position i confirms the presence of an 
uncomplemented variable with (Fj, TGk) combination. The terms IG^ and TGk 
represent disjoint expression and are generated for a path identifier Fj. Thus, the 
possibility of having two l ’s in position i does not arise. A similar argument fol­
lows for multiple -P7 or (1, -P7) combinations. □
3.4 CAREL: Algorithm and Analysis
3.4.1 Algorithm
The steps of the proposed algorithm are shown below:
CAREL:
begin
Sort Fj in ascending cardinality ; /* refer to [75] for its advantages */
F l = F l ;
for (all minimal paths F;) begin /* i = 2 ,  • • • */
COM (Fj,Fj) ; /* j  = 1, • • • , i-1 ; we get E;'s *1
RED s) ; /* return irredundant IG’s and DG’s */
CMB (IG; , DG;) ; /* produce IG^ and TG; */
GEN (Fh IGa, TG;) ; /* get F h s */
end;
Compute the reliability (unreliability) value ;
end.
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Consider COM1 and RED1 (COM2 and RED2) operations while using 
CAREL with Proposition P I (P_H). Thus, CAREL applies equally for P I and 
P_n. To compute the reliability (unreliability) parameter, we have developed a 
function called ‘re_num’ which accepts the output from GEN (Fit I G T G :). For 
given values of component reliability, re_num produces a numerical value for the 
reliability. One may use any other software package, such as ‘vaxima’ [85], to 
evaluate the reliability or unreliability expression.
Lemma 3.1. [33] Given cardinality ordered minimal (^,r)-paths of a network 
G = (V , E)  for 2CF measure, the e.m.d. term for any (I V 1 - 1 )  sized minimal 
Cs,f)-path Pt , is obtained directly by intersecting the complements of the remaining 
{I E I — (I V 1 — 1)} links of G with P ,. n
This observation (first made in [60]) further reduces the computation time for 
algorithms based on SDP concepts. Lemma 3.1 is applicable only for the 2CF 
measure using minimal paths as the input For 2CF with minimal paths, CAREL 
uses its four operators only for paths smaller than I V 1 - 1 .
3.4.2 Analysis
This section describes an implementation of CAREL for proposition P_H. It is 
based on bit operations. The implementation of CAREL P I is similar and will not 
be discussed. Both CAREL P I and P_II are written in C. In what follows, we con­
sider four macros which define bit operations. The cost for each macro call is also 
given. We also discuss the complexity issues involved in each of four operators 
described in Section 3.4.1.
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a. SetUnion (sl,s2,s) ; /* s = si s2 */ 
co s t: 17/16] assignment operations .
b. SetDif (sl,s2,s) ; /* s = s i -  s2 */
co s t: [7/16] xor operations .
c. SetCompare (sl,s2) ; /* return true if s i == s2 */
c o s t: < r//16l (/'statements .
d. SubSet (sl,s2) ; /* return true if si c  s2 */
c o s t: 1 SetUnion ( )  + 1 SetCompare ( )  calls .
In a through d, / represents the number of components of the network, and a word
w is of 16 bits. These four bit operations are used to implement CAREL operators.
COM ( \ ) Operator:
A procedure COM (Fit Fj) is implemented as follows : 
for ( j=1 to i - 1) begin 
SetUnion (Fif Fj, s); /* s is temporary result */
SetDif (s, Fi, Ei'); /* E- is the result, append it to E- list */
end;
For a network with m minimal paths (cuts), the computation of COM operator is of
the order of 0 ( m 2) since the operator is used 1 + 2  + • • •  + (m -1) = —~  —
&
times.
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RED ( /  ) Operator:
The COM ( \ ) operator produces Ej. The Ej  and bit operations obtain non- 
redundant MCE’s. The implementation of the RED operator is shown below: 
for (all E/ ’s) begin /* i = 1, • • • . Each E( is in IG or DG group */ 
if (SubSet(E/, Ej,)) begin /* Ej  is reducible by Ej */ 
dispose Ej; break; 
end;
else if (SubSetfE*, E j ) ) /* Ej  is reducible by E j  */ 
dispose Ej;
end;
if (Ej was not disposed)
Put Ej  in IG or DG group;
Notice that the nonredundant E /’s are in bit form (having 0’s and l ’s only). The 
MCE E /’s are generated from E/ ’s by replacing ‘1’ with -a1 in the positions of ‘1’ 
where a  e  p* (refer to Section 3.3.2). The number of RED function calls is m 
times in a network with m minimal paths (cuts). The number of loopings inside the 
RED function depends on the network type and also on the path identifier E,. In 
the worst case, RED for E/ needs i loopings, for i = 1, 2, • • • , m - 1, and hence 
the computation of the RED operator is of the order 0 ( m 2).
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CMB ( * ) Operator:
The CMB ( * ) operator is the most time consuming operator of all the four 
operators we have used in our method. The implementation of CMB for the 
independent group is straightforward and is shown first.
for (all 7Gf) begin /* i = 1, • • • r j - l  */ 
for (j = 0 to / - l )  begin 
if(/G,[/] *  0)
IGi+l[j] = IG M l,
end;
end;
The implementation of CMB for the dependent group is expensive; each DGt con­
tains (-P7, 0, 1). Here, we do not utilize bit operations for the CMB operator. To 
update the contents of the CMB operands, DG,- and TGj, as well as to generate 
TGj, we trace the contents of the operands element by element. The computation 
time is highly data dependent. But, in any case ( refer to cases (a) through (f) in the 
procedure considered in Section 3.3.2), the order of computation time of the DG 
function is O il2), where I is the number of components. In our program, Step 1 of 
the algorithm falls into case (f). The maximum number of DG,’s is k for generating
e.m.d. term(s) for Fk . Let g,- be the number of TG,- ’s created for a DG,. Thus, the
k
DG function is used times. On the average, let us assume that gt is equal to
i=l
the number of e.m.d. terms generated for Fk . Then, the complexity of the CMB 
operator is 0 ( k '  I F k I) of DG calls.
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GEN (©  ) Operator:
This operator is processed by sequentially tracing the contents of Ff and IG^ 
for generating F ' term(s). The procedure GEN (Ff, IG^, TGk) implements the © 
operator:
for (all TGk ’s) begin /* k = 1, • • • */ 
for (j = 0 to 1-1) begin 
if(Fi l j ]  *  0)
F i [jl = Fi [j]; 
else if(/Gn[/] * 0)
F i U ] = I G n[ j l
else
end;
end;
For a path identifier F; , we get disjoint term(s) F ‘ . The time complexity involved
in GEN for a network depends on the number of the generated e.m.d. terms F 7 ’s.
If the maximum number of e.m.d. terms is M ,  the worst case complexity is of the 
order 0(mM).
3.5 Illustrating Examples
Example 3.3. Consider Figure 3.1 with its minimal (s,r)-paths x 3x 2 , x 4 x 3x 0 , 
and x^Xqx j. The minimal paths are encoded as path identifiers F; ’s (1 < i < 4) and 
are sorted in their ascending cardinality as
F x (0000000000000011) F 3 (0000000000011001)
F 2 (0000000000001100) F 4 (0000000000010110)
Following the algorithm given in Section 3.4.1, F 1 = F x. To generate e.m.d. term(s)
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for F 3, we start with COM (F3,FX) and COM (F3,F2) which give 
E[ (0000000000000010) and E 2 (0000000000000100), respectively. RED (E; ) 
retains both E/s and puts them into IG with an empty DG group. CMB operation 
obtains IGn as 0000000000000-1-10. Finally, GEN (F3, IG^, 0 )  gives F 3 as 
(00000000000011-1-11), which can be interpreted in an intermediate form as 
*4* 3*2 *i*o- This resultant expression has one to one correspondent with the proba­
bility expression. F 2 and F4 can be obtained in a similar manner as in the F 3. The 
various e.m.d. terms are
F{disjoint) = XjXq + x 3x 2 * 1 * 0  +  * 4* 3 * 2  * 1*0  +  * 4 * 3  * 2* 1* 0 -
Example 3.4. Consider a 3-cube shown in Figure 3.2 and its six diameter distance 
minimal (  ^,0-paths, xgx5x 0, * 10X3X2, x n X(pc3, x &x 7x 6, and x 8x5x4. Their
path identifiers are
F x (0000010000000011) F 2 (0000001000100001) F 3 (0000010000001100)
F a (0000100001001000) F5 (0000000111000000) F 6 (0000000100110000).
The e.m.d. term(s) for F 4 is (are) generated using the steps mentioned in the algo­
rithm. The details are shown below :
For 1 < /<  3, COM(F4, F,-) obtains E[ (0000010000000011), E 2
(0000001000100001), and E 3 (0000010000000100). The RED operation fails to
remove any s because there is no redundant terms. The RED classifies these 
terms into DG with an empty IG set. Thus, the CMB operator obtains IG^ as
000000000000000. Using Step 1, the elements in DG are used to generate TGX and 
TG2 as follows:
D G X 0 0 0 0 0 -3° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3°-3°
E>G2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3°0  0 0 -3 °0  0 0 0 -3°
TGX 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -1 
TG2 0 0 0 0 0 -21 -25 0 0 0 -25 0 0 0 -21 1 .
Using Step 2 and DG, we have DG{TGh DG3, TG') and DG(TG2, DG3, TG').
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The first DG is computed as follows:
TGX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1
D G  $ 0 0 0 0 0 - 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 22 0 0
TGi 0 0 0 0 0 -22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -22 0 -1 .
The second DG obtains:
TG2 0 0 0 0 0 -21 -25 0 0 0 -25 0 0 0 -21 1
D G 3  0 0 0 0 0 -22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -22 0 0
T G {  0 0 0 0 0 -1 -25 0 0 0 -25 0 0 0 0 1
TG3' 0 0 0 0 0 1 -25 0 0 0 -25 0 0 -1 -1 1 .
Finally, GEN(F4, IG^, TGj’s) generates F 4 as (00001-220001001-220-l), (00001-
1-25001-2501001), (000011-25001-2501-1-11), which can be interpreted as
* 11* 6 * 3  ( * 10*2  * o  + * i o  * 9* 5 * 0  + * 10* 9 * 5  * 2  * i* o ) -  The remaining e.m.d. terms for
this example are obtained similarly, and we generate the disjoint expression as
F { d i s j o i n t )  =  * 10* 1*0  +  * 9* 5 * 0  ( * 10* 1) +  x  1 0X 3X 2  ( * 0  +  * 9 * 5  * 1* 0)
+  * n * 6 * 3 (* 1 0 * 2  * 0  +  * 1 0  * 9 * 5 * 0  +  * 1 0 * 9 * 5  * 2  * l * o )
+  X 8 X 7X 6 ( x J * 7  +  * 7 7 * 3 * 1 0 * 2  * 0  +  * 1 0  * 9 * 7 * 1 1 * 3 * 0
+  * 10* 9 * 5  X 3  X iX o +  * 1 1 * 1 0 * 9 * 5 * 3 * 2  * l * o )
+  * 8* 5* 4(X ^ *7* 7 * 7  +  *7*3*10*2 * 0  +  * l 7 *7*6*3*10*2  * 0
+  * 1 0  * 7 * 6 * 0  +  * 1 0  * 9  * 7 * 6 * 1 1 * 3 * 0  +  * 1 0 * 7 * 7 * 6  * 7 * 7 * 0
+  * !0*9  * 6 * 3 * 2  * 1 * 0  +  * 11*10*9  * 7 * 6 * 3 * 2  * l* o ) -
Example 3.5. In this example, we show how to compute the probabilistic k-  
subcube for the hypercube system, where the system is said to be functional as long 
as a k -subcube is operational. Consider a 3-cube shown in Figure 3.2. The 3-cube 
contains six 2-cubes: {0, 1, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 4, 5}, {0, 2, 4, 6}, {1, 3, 5, 7}, {2, 3, 6, 
7}, and {4, 5, 6, 7}. We are interested in obtaining the probability that there exists 
at least one 2-cube in the 3-cube given that nodes fail with probability q . Let
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Boolean variable *,• denote a node i . Using this information as the input to CAREL 
and considering q = 0.1, we obtain the mutually disjoint terms for the probabilistic
2-subcube functionality measure as
F{disjoint) = * 3*2* 1*0 + x 5x 4x ix0(x3x 2) + x 6x4x 2Xq(x 1 + x 5 x 3x{)
+  X 7X ^ X 3X i ( X q  +  X 4  X & q)  +  X 7X 6X 3X 2 (  * 5 * 1  X q  +  X 4  J C ^ q )
+ X - j X ^ s X ^  * Q + * 3 * 2 * 7 * 0 + * 2  X i X q).
Substituting probability of x  (x) with 0.9 (0.1), we find the measure as 0.955216.
3.6 Shellahle Systems
This section discusses a class of structures whose reliability is computed in 
time polynomial in the order of the number of their minimal paths. To begin, we 
present some definitions that will be used throughout our discussion. Let OC (FC) 
represent the set of operative (failed) components; AC = OC FC gives the 
entire system components. Note, OC ^  FC = 0 .
Definition. A system is a coherent binary system [14] if:
1. Each component of the system can be in either of two states: operative or failed.
2. The system takes on the two states (operative or failed) as a function of its com­
ponent states.
3. When the system has failed, no component failure restores the system to opera­
tive state.
4. When the system is operative, no component repair causes the system to fail.
5. Failure (operation) of all system components leads to system failure (operation). 
Let Q denote the set of all the paths for the problem under consideration. A 
coherent binary system (AC, Q) is a rank d matroid [20] if all elements of i i  have 
cardinality d and for each P , , Pj <= Q. and each a  e P, -  Pj there exists a
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P e Pj -  Pi such that Pj {a} -  (P) e  £2. For a connected graph G = (V, E), 
for AC (Q) as the set of links (spanning trees) in G , a coherent binary system (AC, 
Q) is a rank I V 1-1 matroid. Note, the network reliability problem computes the 
probability that at least one spanning tree exists in the system. A simple product is 
defined as
[OC ,FC] = p i  xj p  *j-
jeO C j e  FC
Assuming that components fail independently, the probability of the simple product 
is given as
P r ([OC ,FC ]) = Y l P j  I I  (1 ~Pj)>
j e OC jeFC
where pj is the reliability of component j .
Consider the disjoint product concept discussed in Subsection (3.1), in particu­
lar, Equation (3.3). The reliability contribution of the ith  term of the equation, i.e.,
P r (FiF l • • • Ff.j), is given in Equation (3.4) as
P r(F i ) . P r ( E 1E 2 • • •  E ^ ) .  (3.9)
The efficiency of the Boolean technique depends on the efficiency of computing 
Expression (3.9). Assuming the independence of component failures,
P r(F i) = P r([F i ,0 ] )=  n  Pj-
j^F i
Unfortunately, computing P r ( F ^  * * ’ 1) is not as straightforward. In general,
these Ei ’s are not mutually independent and hence,
P r (F 1F 2 • • •  £ H ) ^ n P r ( £ y). (3.10)
j =i
However, the equality for Equation (3.10) is guaranteed if (Ej, Ek ) pair is mutually 
independent for j ,  k = 1, 2, • • • , i - l .
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Definition. A shelling [20] is a coherent binary system in which there is an order­
ing of minimal paths P lt P 2, • • • , Pm so that for each Pit setting Pr(Ej) = Pr(Fy 
| Ff), for each 1 < j  ^  i-1 , we obtain equality for Equation (3.10).
Definition. A coherent binary system (AC, £2) is shellable if there exists a shelling 
ordering for £2.
The problem of testing if a given ordering of £2 is a shelling can be done in 
polynomial time in the size of £2. However, obtaining the shelling ordering for a 
given set £2 is still an open problem [8]. Ball and Provan [8] show that a matroid is 
a shellable system. The probabilistic NCF problem for the hypercube corresponds to 
the coherent binary system (AC, £2) in which AC (£2) is the set of links (spanning 
trees). For hypercube, (AC, £2) is a rank N - I  matroid.
Example 3.6. Consider the network shown in Figure 3.3 with its sixteen minimal 
all-paths given as (0 1 2), (0 1 4), (1 3 5), (2 3 4), (0 4 5), (0 1 3), (0 2 3), (0 2 4), 
(0 2 5), (1 2 3), (1 2 5), (1 3 4), (1 4 5), (0 3 5), (3 4 5), and (2 4 5). For AC = 
(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and £2 as the set of these sixteen spanning trees, (AC, £2) 
represents a rank 3 matroid and hence is shellable. However, the paths are not in a 
shelling ordering; there are eighteen e.m.d. terms generated for the input.
Example 3.7. In this example, we preprocess the sixteen minimal all-paths into the 
following ordering: (1 3 5), (0 1 2), (0 1 4), (0 4 5), (2 4 5), (1 2 5), (0 3 5), (3 4 
5), (2 3 4), (1 2 3), (0 1 3), (1 3 4), (1 4 5), (0 2 3), (0 2 4), and (0 2 5). For this 
input, we obtain exactly sixteen e.m.d. terms which indicate that the minimal paths 
are in shelling ordering. A lexicographic ordering of the minimal paths is another 
shelling ordering.
Figure 3.3. An Example Network
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Lemma 3.2. Given a shelling ordering of minimal paths in £2, CAREL computes 
the reliability of the coherent binary system (AC, £2) in time polynomial in the 
order of I f t I.
Proof: A matroid is shellable [8]. By definition of a shellable system, a shelling 
ordering of the minimal paths in £2 will obtain mutually independent E /’s, and, 
thus, all of these Et ’s belong to the IG group (refer to the CMB operator discussed 
in Section 3.3.2). Obviously, minimal paths preprocessed in shelling ordering can be 
transformed into mutually disjoint terms by CAREL in time polynomial in the order 
of the number of minimal paths. □
To obtain a shelling ordering for the minimal all-paths of a 3-cube, we lexico­
graphically order the 384 spanning trees of the C3. Then, we use CAREL to obtain 
the mutually disjoint terms for the ordered minimal paths. CAREL generates exactly 
384 e.m.d. terms for the ordered input set. Thus, the lexicographic ordering of the 
minimal paths of C3 is a shelling ordering. We do not generate the same experi­
ment on the 4- or higher dimension cubes since the number of minimal all-paths for 
these cubes are in the order larger than 1010 (refer to Equation (2.1)). Since a 
hypercube is regularly structured, we conjecture that lexicographic ordering of the 
minimal all-paths of a cube with any dimension will give the shelling ordering, and, 
hence, CAREL solves the probabilistic NCF measure for the hypercube in time 
polynomial in the number of its spanning trees.
3.7 Conclusion
We have presented an efficient algorithm called CAREL which computes the 
terminal reliability or unreliability of moderate to large sized networks with modest 
memory and time requirements [74,75]. The algorithm has been implemented in C
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and was run on an Encore MULTIMAX 320 system. The performance of a program 
is usually based on the algorithm, the data structure and the language used, the 
computer on which the program is run, and, last but not least, the coding of the 
program [4]. Since different programmers produce different codings for an algo­
rithm, the human factor (in want of sufficient data) is inappropriate while compar­
ing various techniques. A better implementation or a faster machine would increase 
the performance of a program but only to a constant factor [4]. CAREL is faster 
than other existing Boolean algorithms [74], and this is obvious from the CPU time 
requirement for solving the terminal reliability / unreliability of various computer 
networks (see Reference [74]). An earlier version of CAREL has successfully been 
applied to solve reliability problems in one type of redundant path multistage inter­
connection network [64]. All exact reliability evaluation problems are known to be 
computationally intractable or NP-hard, which makes comparing the techniques 
from the aspect of complexity difficult [8,11,20,62].
CAREL is shown to run in time polynomial in the order of the number of 
minimal paths for shellable systems, such as the probabilistic model with NCF 
measure in the hypercube. In a hypercube system, the number of spanning trees 
increases superexponentially in the order of the cube dimensions (see Equation
(2.1)). Thus, CAREL is not suggested for use in evaluating the probabilistic NCF 
measure for cubes of large dimensions. For general networks, the total number of 
basic (s ,t )-paths are much less than that of minimal (s ,0-paths [40], and, therefore, 
reliability computation from basic paths is much more efficient than that from 
minimal paths. However, in the hypercube, there are exactly n ! of either diameter- 
distance basic (s ,0-paths or minimal (s ,0-paths. It is obvious that the basic path 
concept does not help reduce the time complexity of the 2CF reliability problem for 
the hypercube. In Chapter 4, we present lower bounds values for the probabilistic
model with NCF and 2CF measures and also show that the proposed methods 
polynomial in the order of cube dimensions.
Chapter 4
Reliability Bounds for Hypercube Networks
As the size of the hypercube network increases, exact reliability modeling for 
the network becomes more complex. The general problem of computing probabilis­
tic measures is NP-hard [20,29,62], and, thus, analyzing large hypercubes will 
require an unreasonable amount of computation time. This leads to the development 
of methods for approximating the reliabilities using lower and upper bounds, 
between which the exact measure is guaranteed to exist. Methods for generating the 
bounds are of particular interest as they are computed efficiently. The lower bound 
on the system reliability is quite appealing because it provides the probability that 
Cn will be at least this reliable. If the lower bound indicates that a system will be 
operational over the time interval of interests, then it is unnecessary to obtain an 
exact reliability measure. The upper bound, on the other hand, provides an optimis­
tic assurance of the system functionality. Any approximation reliability results 
which give more favorable reliability figures compared to those of the upper bound 
are impossible and are discarded. Thus, the upper bounds on reliability are used to 
check the accuracy of the approximation results. Moreover, when the lower and 
upper bounds on reliability are tight, the results give a better indication of the exact 
reliability (compared to knowing only the lower bound reliability figure). In this 
chapter, we present efficient techniques to obtain the lower and/or upper bounds on 
probabilistic models with NCF, 2CF, and TBF measures.
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To obtain bounds on the probabilistic network-connected functionality (NCF) 
measure for a hypercube, we first consider the reliability polynomial concept [20]. 
The reliability polynomial is a graph invariant which is of interest in cases where 
graphs are used as models of systems such as computer networks. A method based 
on this concept runs in time polynomial in the number of CE’s and is exponential 
in the dimension of the n-cube. Furthermore, as will be shown later, such bounds 
are not tight. Yang et a l  [88] described a lower bound on the NCF measure by 
obtaining the number of spanning trees in Cn and then weighted each spanning tree 
by considering its (2” - l )  links as operational and the rest of the link set as failed. 
Their bound is acceptable if the link reliability, p , is very small [88]. Bulka and 
Dugan [15] computed a lower bound on the NCF measure for an n-cube starting 
from a lower bound on the measure for an (n-l)-cube, which in turn is obtained 
from that of an (n-2)-cube, and so on, until the cube is small enough to be a base 
cube whose NCF parameter is evaluated directly. Their method uses a C2 as the 
base cube for which the exact NCF reliability measure is given as
NCF(2 ,p)  = 4p3( l - p ) + p 4.
Reference [15] also provides an efficient method which runs in time exponential in 
the order of n . In this chapter, we first review the recursive technique by Bulka and 
Dugan [15] (henceforth called the BD approach), then modify it to speed up its 
evaluation. It is shown that the modified technique is computable in time polyno­
mial in the order of n . We next establish a recursive method that further utilizes the 
structural properties of the hypercube to produce a tighter lower bound. A method 
in [26] can be used to obtain the upper bound on NCF reliability.
A lower bound on the probabilistic 2-connected functionality (2CF) measure is 
discussed in the literature. For 2CF, let the specified nodes s and t be at distance n 
in a w -cube, where n < w . Without loss of generality, consider t as an antipodal
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node to s in an n -subcube. Thus s and t represent farthest nodes and the shortest 
path between them is of length n . We will lower bound 2CF measure by examining 
only fixed-distance paths of length n between s and t. Previous attempts to bound 
2CF metric have also assumed fixed-distance paths. Assuming CE failures only, 
Latifi [47] derived a lower bound on 2CF measure by considering w disjoint paths 
in the Cw comprising n paths of length n and w - n  paths of length n+2. The result 
does not provide a tight bound with large n . Ahmed and Trahan [3] considered all 
n ! shortest paths, but the method requires excessive time. In this chapter, we intro­
duce a method that efficiently evaluates 0 ( n 2) shortest paths, providing a 
significantly improved bound than that obtained in reference [47], while still com­
putable in reasonable time. An alternative approach, based on a two-cube (TC) 
model of an n-cube, is also introduced. It is shown that the TC technique performs 
well with smaller r i p ), where r ip )  is the probability of working of a node (link) in 
a hypercube. Our approach for tighter bound computation derives the results from 
these two methods.
This chapter also describes a method for task-based functionality (TBF) relia­
bility evaluation in hypercube with failing nodes. Najjar and Gaudiot [54,55] 
presented a model for a hypercube with up to 50% system degradation. Their 
method starts with PE disconnection probability which in turn is used to approxi­
mate the reliability metric. Kim et a l  [42] offered an approach based on a decom­
position technique where a large hypercube is recursively divided into smaller cubes 
until a cube can be evaluated for its exact reliability. Both Najjar-Gaudiot’s and 
Kim et al. ’s methods run in exponential time in the order of the cube dimension. 
In this chapter, we present an efficient technique to obtain an upper bound on TBF 
for an n -cube and compare our bounds with those obtained by the methods 
presented in [42,54].
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The subcube functionality (SF) metric is important because many hypercube 
algorithms are executed on various sizes of subcubes by setting parameters 
appropriately [51,59]. Bounds on probabilistic SF measure are also described in the 
literature. Abraham and Padmanabhan [2] studied the probability of the existence of 
disjoint functional subcubes of different sizes when all faulty PE’s and/or CE’s are 
contained in a subcube. This model, in essence, is a probabilistic model with SF 
criteria. Das and Kim [21] discuss a generalized approach for the model, but this 
dissertation does not address this measure.
4.1 Reliability Polynomial Concept
Let Nj  be the number of paths having exactly j  operating links in the network 
G = (V , E). The reliability polynomial, R el(G ,p ) ,  of a network G with L links is 
expressed as [20]
R e l ( G , p ) = j t N jP j q L-J, (4.1)
;=o
where p  denotes the link reliability and p+q = 1. Alternatively, the network cuts 
are used to express the reliability polynomial. Let Qj be the number of cuts with 
exactly j  links. Using cuts, we have
R e l (G ,p )  = l - X Q j q j p L-j.
j =o
We define f-set c  E to denote a set of links whose complement is a path. Using the 
f-set concept, the reliability polynomial is given as
R e l ( G , p ) = j £ F j q j p L-j ,
7 = 0
where Fj represents the number of f-sets having j  links. The polynomial representa­
tion translates the reliability concept into a problem of enumerating the number of
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paths, cuts, or f-sets of a network. In general, this problem is of exponential com­
plexity in the size of the network. In what follows, we consider an application of 
the polynomial representation for the bounds on the probabilistic NCF measure with 
CE failures only.
Let S c  E  be a set of CE’s in the network G. If E - S  is a path, then S is an
L
f-set; otherwise, S represents a cut. Thus, F, + Qt = [20]. For the number of
minimal cuts in G as Qc, Fc = -  Qc . The number Qc is computed in polyno­
mial time [20] and, hence, Fc is also obtainable in polynomial time. Since c is the 
cardinality of the minimal cut, the network G would not have any cut of size less
L
than c, i.e., £>, = 0 for all i < c . Thus, F; = for i < c . Let I be the cardinal­
ity of the minimal path for G , and let d = L — I. In other words, d  is the max­
imum number of CE’s that can be removed from G without disconnecting G, and 
the set of the remaining CE’s is the minimal path in G. Thus, if we remove more 
than d  CE’s from E,  there is no spanning tree in G , i.e., F ; = 0 for i > d.  Fd is 
the number of spanning trees in G and is computable in polynomial time. The 
remaining F, ’s that need to be computed are Fc+1, Fc+2, • • • , Fd_2, Fd_v
Each Fj is evaluated by some approximation technique that makes use of the 
hereditary structure of the f-set family [20]. A family of sets is said to be heredi­
tary if and only if for every set S in the family, all subsets of S are also members 
of the family. For the f-set family, every subset of an f-set is itself an f-set (by the 
definition of the f-set), and, therefore, f-set family is hereditary. Lower and upper 
bound values for the unknown F,- ’s are computed using Sperner or Kruskal-Katona 
bounds. Reference [20] provides an extensive discussion on these bounds for gen­
eral networks.
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4.2 NCF Bounds - A Review
In this section we present a review on previous techniques to compute the 
bounds on NCF measure for the hypercube. First, Sperner and Kruskal-Katona’s 
theorems are used with the polynomial representation to compute lower and upper 
bounds on the NCF measures. Then, Bulka-Dugan approach is presented.
4.2.1 Bounds Using Polynomial Representation
A. Sperner bounds are given as [20]
Fi-1 ^ — : — f .L - i + 1 * (4.2)
Equation (4.2) can be used to compute bounds on the probabilistic NCF meas­
ures. For an n-cube, N  = 2 n, L = n-2"-1, and d -  L -N + l .  A lower bound on the 
NCF measure is computed starting from Fd, which is the number of spanning trees, 
ST(n),  of the n-cube. We recursively apply Equation (4.2) to get Fd_x from Fd, 
Fd- 2 fr°m Fd- 1, and so on, until Fn+l, the values of which are used to compute the 
lower bound of the NCF measure. Thus, an expression for the lower bound on NCF 
reliability of a hypercube is given as
N C F ( n ,p ) £
j =o
p L- ‘ q i  + F np L-"q« + £  Fd
j=n+1
-pL- i q i . (4.3)
Similarly, we derive an expression for the upper bound reliability on NCF
L
using (4.2) and starting from Fi_x = Fn , which is given as 2". F„ is used to
compute Fn+l which, in turn, is utilized to compute Fn+2, and so on, until Fd_x is 
obtained. The upper bound, then, is given as
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N C F ( n , p ) < X
j -o
p L~iqi + X F n 
j-n
d - 1
,L j q j  + Fdp N 1q d (4.4)
Example 4.1. Consider a 3-cube in which L = 12, F s = 384 and F 3 = 212. Using
(4.2), the lower and upper bounds of F 4 are computed as 240 and 522, respec­
tively. The exact value for F4 of a 3-cube is 408. Using Equations (4.3), (4.4) and 
CE reliability p  = 0.9, the lower and upper bounds on NCF for the 3-cube are com­
puted as 0.9834310 and 0.9936331, respectively.
B. Kruskal-Katona bounds use the concept of f-vector[20] and hereditary family 
(refer to Section 4.1), and are given as [20]:
F*_i * F f" 1*, 0 < * < d  , (4.5)
where (F0, F lf • • • , Fd) represent the f-vector for a hereditary family. Note,
*■ •*
—
k - i  ^
+
.k ~ 2 .
+  • • • +
0  ^
(4.6)
where (ak ,a k_ lf • • • , a{) is defined as the fc-canonical form of Fk . This fc- 
canonical form is computed as
Ft =
<*k a*-i
» *
a\
+ + • • • +
k k-1 1
For a given Fk , the fc-canonical form is generated, and an Fk llk is the lower bound
for F,k—i'
The Kruskal-Katona lower and upper bounds on the probabilistic NCF measure 
for a Cn can be derived from (4.5) as
N C F ( n , p ) >  X
7 = 0
p L~jqj  + F np L~nq n + X  F j ' V ' V  (4.7)
j=n+1
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N C F ( n , p ) < n^
7=0
d -1
P L~j q j  + Z Fl lnp L' j q j  +  Fdp N~lq d-
j=ti
(4.8)
Example 4.2. Consider a C3 where F 5 = 384. We use Kruskal-Katona lower bound 
to obtain F 4. The 5-canonical form of F5 is given as (a5=10, a 4=9, a 3=4, a 2=2, 
a 2=1); F 4/5 is 303, and, hence, the lower bound F 4 = 303. Note, the exact value 
for F 4 is 408. Using Equation (4.7) and p  = 0.9, we compute the lower bound on 
NCF for the C3 as 0.9861430.
Similarly, given Fc , we are able to generate the upper bound of Fc+X since
c+1 < Fj?+1/C. Consider F* = 212 with its 3-canonical form as
(a3=11, a 2=10, a 2=1 ). F 34/3 
the upper bound value for F 4. Note, for i < j  we define
•  ^
i t 10
r
2
is computed as
4
+
3
+
1
= 450, which gives 
= 0. Using Equation
(4.8) with p  = 0.9, we obtain the upper bound on NCF for the 3-cube as 
0.9925879.
In general, the Kruskal-Katona’s bounds are tighter than the Spemer’s bounds 
[20]. However, both approaches fail to give tight bounds on NCF for n -cubes with 
n > 4. Using CE reliability p  = 0.9, the lower bounds on NCF computed by either 
method deteriorate rapidly to zero and the upper bounds move close to 1. Obvi­
ously, a better approach for evaluating tighter bounds on NCF is needed. Further­
more, the methods based on polynomial expression are polynomial only in the order 
of the number of CE’s, and, thus, are exponential in the order of the cube dimen­
sion.
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4.2.2 Bulka-Dugan Approach
Bulka and Dugan [15] presented a lower bound on the NCF measure of an n- 
cube recursively computed from a lower bound on the reliability of two component 
(n-l)-cubes. They used a C 2 as the base cube. In the following, a Cn is said to be 
decomposed into two congruent Cn_i& such that each node on one Cn_x is linked 
to its congruent node on the other Cn_v  All 2""1 links connecting two Cn_{s are 
termed as exterior links, and the links within each Cn_l as interior links. The BD 
algorithm [15], given below, computes a lower bound on NCF measure of a Cn by 
computing the probability of three disjoint cases of working and failed congruent 
(n-l)-cubes and exterior links.
Case 1. Both (n-l)-cubes are operating and i exterior CE’s operate, for 
1 < / < 2”_1-2.
T l = N C F ( n - l , p ) 2 - 2X
i=i
2«-i
Case 2. At least one (n-l)-cube is operating, and one exterior CE is failed. The 
node at the end point of the failed link in the non-operating Cn__x is linked to at 
least one of its neighbors by an interior link.
T2 = [2 • N C F (n - l ,  p ) { l - q n~l) -  N C F ( n - l , p )2] • 2n- lp r ~'-lq 
Case 3. All 2n~l exterior CE’s operate.
T3 = N C F (n - 1, p 2+2pq) • p 2"~'
A lower bound on NCF reliability of an n -cube is obtained as
NCF(n , p )  = T l  + T 2 + T 3 .  (4.9)
Computing Case 1 takes exponential time in the dimension of the cube, and 
thus is useful only for small sized cubes. For large n , Bulka and Dugan introduced
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another approach in which an n-cube is viewed as a 1-cube with two (2”-1)- 
supemodes connected by one (2”- 1)-link. They next generalized the approach by 
considering the n-cube as a 2-cube whose four nodes are each (n-2)-cubes, or a 3- 
cube whose eight nodes are each (n -3)-cubes, and so on. In general, an n -cube is 
viewed as an (n-k)-cube whose 2”"* nodes are each it-cubes that are connected by 
(2fc)-links. Therefore, if the original link reliability is p ,  the new link reliability is
1-(1 - p ) 2\  which is the probability that at least one of the 2k links is operating. 
Using this approach, Bulka and Dugan [15] obtained another lower bound on the 
NCF measure of an n -cube as
NCF(n , p )  = NCF(k , p )2" * • NC F (n-k ,  l - ( l - p ) 2*). (4.10)
For large k and p (k >2  and p  > 0.9), the second term of the right hand side in 
Equation (4.10) is approximately equal to 1. Thus, a simplified version of Equation
(4.10) is given as
NCF (n , p ) =  NCF (k , p  )2"~\ ' (4.11)
Equation (4.9) provides a tighter bound compared to those obtained by Equations
(4.10) and (4.11) [15].
4.3 Polynomial-time Algorithm
4.3.1 Modified Bulka-Dugan Approach
In what follows, we suggest two improvements on Equation (4.9). First, the
p lq 2” 1-1 = 1 is used to express 71 as
71 = N C F (n - \ ,  p ) 2 • (1 -  q r ~l -  p T ~X -  2n- lp T ~l- lq ). (4.12)
Equation (4.12) can be computed in time polynomial in the dimension of the cube,
2» - \
combinatorial identity £
i=0
2B-l
J
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and hence, we need not use the inferior lower bounds obtained by Equations (4.10) 
or (4.11). Second, since Case 3 requires computation of NCF with different link 
reliability, this causes overall 0 ( n 2) recursive calls to be evaluated to compute 
NCF. We compute T  3', a lower bound on T 3, in such a way as to reduce the 
overall number of recursive calls to n .
Case 3'. At least one (n-l)-cube operates and all 2n~l exterior links operate.
T V  = [NCF(n-l ,  p ) 2 + 2 • N C F ( n - l , p )  • (1 -  N C F (n - l ,p ) ) ]  ’ P 2" '.
It is found that the resultant lower bound is still tight for cubes having moderate to 
large dimension sizes. The Bulka-Dugan approach and our modification to it, how­
ever, fail to give reasonably good results when the failure rate increases (over a 
period of concurrent use-time of the system). In what follows, we present a new 
algorithm which is not only computationally efficient but also provides a tighter 
bound on NCF measure as compared to existing techniques.
4.3.2 An Efficient Technique for NCF Bound
Let us consider a Cn as two (w-l)-cubes connected by 2”-1 CE’s. We evalu­
ate the lower bound on NCF reliability of a Cn from the known lower bound on 
NCF reliability of a Cn__v The proposed algorithm divides the problem into three 
mutually disjoint cases. In addition, the events in each case are also mutually dis­
joint among themselves. Thus, the lower bound on NCF reliability can be calculated 
as the sum of the lower bounds on NCF reliability obtained from the following 
three cases.
CASE 1: Both (n-l)-cubes and at least one exterior link operate.
The graph model for CASE 1 is shown in Figure 4.1. Since both C ^ ’s operate, 
only one good exterior CE is needed to make the two subcubes combine into a
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(n-1 )-cu b e (n - l) -c u b e
Figure 4.1 An n-cube with One Healthy Exterior Link
8
Figure 4.2 A 3-cube with Al! Its Labeled Components
Figure 4.3 A 3-cube with All Healthy Exterior Links
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connected Cn . The disjoint expression of CASE 1 is given as:
NCF (n - l ,  p f  • (1 -  q T ~ \  (4.13)
For CASE 1, a spanning tree is constructed from two spanning trees, one from each 
of the two C„_1’s, connected by an exterior link. Each of the two (n-l)-cubes has 
S T ( n - 1) spanning trees, and there are 2"-1 exterior links. Thus, CASE 1 includes 
STCASEl(n) = 2”-1 • S T ( n - 1) • ST(n~  1) spanning trees, where STX(n ) refers to the 
number of spanning trees used in CASE x .
CASE 2. All 2"-1 exterior links operate and at least one (n-l)-cube fails.
When all exterior links are good, the congruent nodes in the two Cn_ { s can be 
combined to form an (n-l)-cube, C'n_lf in which each pair of adjacent nodes is 
connected by double links. Consider the C 3 shown in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 gives 
the graph representation for CASE 2 in which the congruent nodes are combined. 
The reliability of the C n _ x is given as the lower bound on the reliability of a Cn_l 
with link reliability p' = p 2 + 2pq (= 1 -  q 2), since the C n _ x is connected when it 
contains at least one working spanning tree, which may have links from either or 
both Cn_i s. Thus, we have the following expression.
p r ~l • (NCF (n - l ,  p )  -  N C F (n- l ,  p ) 2) (4.14)
The events considered in NCF (n - l ,  p ')  include the possibilities that both subcubes 
operate, so we subtract NCF ( n - l ,  p ) 2 to make CASE 2 disjoint from CASE 1. For 
CASE 2, a spanning tree is constructed from all the exterior links and a spanning 
tree in the C'n_v  Since links in the C n_x are from links of the two (n-l)-cubes, 
there are ST ( n - l )  2(2" ,-1) possible spanning trees in the C'n_i and, thus, the 
number of spanning trees used in CASE 2, STCASE2(n), is S T (n -l) 2(2” '-1).
80
CASE 3. 2 < i < 2”_1-1 exterior links and one (n-l)-cube operate.
CASE 3 is intractable for large n , so we compute a lower bound on reliability.
CASE 3A for i = 2”"1- !
Figure 4.4a depicts the graph representation of CASE 3A for a C 3. As an 
example, the figure shows an event in which links 8, 9, and 10 operate while link 
11 fails. Let an isolated node be defined as a node in a disconnected subcube Cn_x 
that has a failed exterior link as one of its links. The C 3 is connected if one C 2 
cube operates and the isolated node (in the other C 2) is connected by at least one of 
its interior links (links 6 and 7). There are two possibilities for the working Cn_x 
and 2"_1 possibilities for the failed exterior link. The probability that at least one 
interior link incident on the isolated node is working is 1 -  q n~l. We have included 
the event in which the two (n-l)-cubes operate. To make this case disjoint with 
CASE 1, we subtract N C F (n- l ,  p ) 2. The reliability contribution for this case is 
then given as:
2 • 2"-1 • p r ~l~l • q - (N C F (n - l ,p )  • (1 - q n~l) -  N C F (n - l ,  p ) 2). (4.15)
For CASE 3A, a spanning tree is constructed from a spanning tree in (n-l)-cube, 
2n-1- l  exterior links, and any one of (n - l)  interior links connecting the isolated 
node to one of its neighbors. There are two possibilities for the working Cn_i, 2n~l 
possibilities for the working 2n-1- l  exterior links, and (n - l )  possibilities for inte­
rior links of the isolated node. Thus, CASE 3A considers STCASE3A(n) = 
ST ( n - l )  • ( n - l )  ’ 2" spanning trees.
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3
3
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.4 A C3 with (a) A Faulty Exterior Link,
(b) Two Isolated 1-distant PE's, and
(c) Two Isolated PE's Different than that Given in (b)
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CASE 3B for i = 2w~1-2
In CASE 3B, the disconnected C„_x includes two isolated nodes which can be 
at distance one or more. We consider the reliability expression for this case in two 
subcases based on the distance between the isolated nodes.
The two nodes are at distance 1: Figure 4.4b presents the graph model of this 
case for C 3 showing the event in which links 8 and 9 operate, while links 10 and 
11 fail. Since the two isolated nodes are at distance 1, there is a link connecting 
them. First, consider the link operational. Thus, the two nodes can be merged into a 
node X. The Cn is connected if node X is connected by at least one of its interior 
links. This event has probability 1 -  ^ 2(w-1>“2. Second, consider the connecting link 
as failed. In this case, each of the two nodes should individually be connected by at 
least one of its interior links. This event has probability (1 -  q n~2)2. Again, we 
have included the event in which both Cn_{s operate, so we subtract 
NCF ( n - l ,  p ) 2 to make this case disjoint from CASE 1. There are again two possi­
bilities for the working C„_1. The lower bound expression for this case is:
2-L'-p2" l~2-q2-(NCF(n-l ,  p ) - ( l - q 2^n~l ~^2)-p
+q-( l-qn-2)2) -  NCF (n - l ,  p ) 2)), (4.16)
where L' is the number of possibilities that any two nodes are at distance 1 (which 
is given by the number of links in a Cn_{). For this case, a spanning tree is con­
structed from a spanning tree of an (n-l)-cube, 2”-1-2  exterior links, and an inte­
rior link connecting the two isolated nodes to one of their neighbors when the nodes 
are connected or two interior links connecting the nodes to their neighbors when the 
nodes are not connected. There are two possibilities for the working Cn_x, 
(n-l)-2n~2 possibilities of the working 2"~1-2  links, 2( n - l )-2  possibilities for inte­
rior links connecting the two nodes to their neighbors when the nodes are
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connected, and ( n - l )2 possibilities for links connecting the isolated nodes to their 
neighbors when the nodes are not connected. Thus, this case considers 
S T {n - l )  (n3-3 n 2+2n) 2"-1 spanning trees.
The two nodes are at a distance o f  more than 1: Figure 4.4c presents the graph 
model of this case for C 3, showing the event in which links 8 and 10 operate, while 
links 9 and 11 fail. When the two isolated nodes are at distance of more than one 
from each other, the n-cube is connected when each of them is connected by at 
least one of its interior links. The probability of this event is (1 -  q n~1)2. Again, we 
have considered the case in which both (n-l)-cubes operate so we subtract 
NCF ( n - l ,  p ) 2. Again, there are two possibilities for the working Cn_v  The lower 
bound expression for this case is:
2 • (
2n-l 
2"-1—2
- L ' )  • p r ~~2 • q 2 • (NCF(n-l ,  p )  •
(I-*?"-1)2 -  NCF ( n - l ,  p ) 2), (4.17)
where ( -L ' )  is the number of choices of two nodes at distance more than 1.
2 » - i  
2» - 1 _ 2
For this case, a spanning tree is constructed from a spanning tree of an (n-l)-cube,
2”-1-2  exterior links, and an interior link for each of the two isolated nodes. There
2--1 
2n_1-2
working exterior links, and ( n - l )2 possibilities for interior links connecting the two 
nodes to their neighbors, so the number of spanning trees considered in this case is 
ST ( n - l )  ( n - l ) 2 (2n~l- n )  2n~l. Thus, overall, CASE 3B uses STCASE3B(n) = 
-ST(n-l) 2M-1(2”_1(n2-2 n + l) -n 2+n) spanning trees.
are two possibilities for the working C„_1, ( ~L') possibilities for the 2" l-2
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CASE 3C for 2 < i < 2”~1-3
The problem of obtaining an exact expression for this case becomes intract­
able, especially for large n . One can get a lower bound on the reliability contribu­
tion of this case, however, by considering the number of spanning trees that have 
not been included in the reliability evaluated so far, and take a lower bound on reli­
ability for each of them, that is, multiply the number by p N~l-qd , where 
d -  L -N + l .  Thus, a lower bound on reliability expression for CASE 3C is:
p " -1 • q d-(ST(n) -  [SrCi4S£1(n) + • • • + STa s E , B(n)]). (4.18)
Combining all cases,
NCF(n , p ) >  (4.13) +(4.14) + (4.15) + (4.16) + (4.17) + (4.18). (4.19)
Theorem 4.3. Equation (4.19) provides a lower bound on the NCF measure of an 
n -dimensional cube that may be evaluated in 0 { n 2) time.
Proof: The discussion in Section 4.3.2 above establishes how Equation (4.19) gives 
a lower bound on NCF.
For the time complexity, observe that to compute NC F (n ,p ) ,  we must com­
pute NCF (n - l ,  p),  NCF ( n - l ,  1 - q 2), and p  and q raised to various powers, 
including q r  \  p 2"~\ and q n~l . To evaluate these terms, we must compute 
NCF(n-2,  p) ,  NCF(n-2,  1 - q 2), NCF(n-2,  1 - q 4), and p  and q raised to various 
powers. Continuing, we see that at the ith level of recursion, we must compute i+ l 
terms of the form N C F (n - i , y), where y e  {p, 1 - q 2, 1 - q 4, • • • , 1 - q 2' '}. Given 
the NCF’s from the previous level of recursion, we find that we can compute the 
powers of p  and q in 0 ( n - i ) time and the i+ l NCF terms in 0 ( i )  time, leading 
to O (n) time to compute the terms at the i th level of recursion. Overall, this leads 
to an O (n2) time complexity to compute NCF(n , p ). □
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4.3.3 Discussion
To show the efficiency of the proposed technique, we use the technique to 
solve NCF for hypercubes of dimensions 3 through 16 (containing 12 through 219 
links). The results show that the proposed technique generates tighter lower bounds 
on NCF compared to the previous method. Table 4.1 shows the comparisons of the 
exact reliability of C 3 (for the cases described) obtained by CAREL [74] and the 
lower bound results produced by the proposed algorithm. The new technique gen­
erates a tight lower bound on NCF for C3. Table 4.2 presents the comparisons of 
the best known lower bounds on NCF obtained in [15] with the new lower bounds 
generated by our proposed technique for n = 3, 4, • • • , 16. Notice that the BD 
technique does not generate a tight bound even for a C 3. As shown in the table, our 
lower bounds are tighter than the BD bounds, especially for n > 10 and p  < 0.9. 
The table shows the sturdiness of the hypercube structure, particularly, when link 
reliability p  > 0.95. Observe that for smaller values of p  and larger values of n , the 
bounds deteriorate rapidly. To explain this we need to consider that NCF relates to 
the magnitude of p  and the number of spanning trees, 8T(n). In particular, the reli­
ability contribution of each spanning tree is weighted by p N~l. Thus, for increasing 
values of n and smaller values of p ,  the reliability contribution of each spanning 
tree decreases rapidly since N  = 2n. On the other hand, ST(n ) increases superex- 
ponentially in the order of n . Thus, the NCF for n-cube can be larger or smaller 
than that of w -cube, for n < w , depending on the tradeoff between the reliability 
contribution of each spanning tree and ST (n). The lower bounds on NCF computed 
by our method show this characteristic.
Table 4.1
NCF Measure for C3 - Exact vs. Lower Bound for p  = 0.9
CASE
#Spanning Trees NCF Reliability*
Exact Lower Bound Exact Lower Bound
1 64 64 0.898045 0.898045
2 32 32 0.066445 0.066445
3a 64 64 0.023380 0.023379
3b 160 160 0.002488 0.002487
3c 64 64 0.000306 0.000306
The exact reliability is 0.990664, and the lower bound obtained is 0.990662
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Table 4.2 
Lower Bounds on NCF for Cn
n -cube
Link Reliability = 0.9 Link Reliability = 0.95
Bulka-Dugan New Bound Bulka-Dugan New Bound
3 9.878696e-01 9.906629e-01 9.986941e-01 9.989089e-01
4 9.946773e-01 9.978844e-01 9.997803e-01 9.998912e-01
5 9.947729e-01 9.98931 le-01 9.999122e-01 9.999824e-01
6 9.911984e-01 9.986355e-01 9.999155e-01 9.999919e-01
7 9.826412e-01 9.973788e-01 9.998587e-01 9.999899e-01
8 9.655845e-01 9.947654e-01 9.997205e-01 9.999806e-01
9 9.323534e-01 9.895581e-01 9.99441 le-01 9.999612e-01
10 8.692828e-01 9.792253e-01 9.988826e-01 9.999223e-01
11 7.556526e-01 9.588822e-01 9.977664e-01 9.998446e-01
12 5.710109e-01 9.194552e-01 9.955378e-01 9.996893e-01
13 3.260535e-01 8.453978e-01 9.910955e-01 9.993787e-01
14 1.063109e-01 7.146974e-01 9.822703e-01 9.987578e-01
15 1.130200e-02 5.107924e-01 9.648550e-01 9.97517 le-01
16 1.277352e-04 2.609089e-01 9.30945 le-01 9.950403e-01
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4.4 Methods for Bounding the Probabilistic 2CF Measure
4.4.1 An Overview
The lower bound on the probabilistic 2CF measure is obtained by using the 
reliability polynomial concepts discussed in Section 4.1. However, the method is 
only polynomial in the order of the number of components of the n -cube, and, 
hence, exponential in the order of cube dimension n.  Furthermore, reliability 
bounds generated by polynomial-based algorithms are not tight. In what follows, 
methods to obtain the lower bounds on 2CF are discussed using shortest length 
paths.
We first discuss a lower bound on 2CF measure using shortest paths. Let (s , t) 
be a pair of nodes at distance n in a w -cube, where n < w.  We will consider only 
shortest paths between s and t to obtain a lower bound, so we need only discuss 
the n -subcube containing s and t. To simplify the discussion, consider s and t as 
nodes at diameter distance in an n -cube, Cn. Without loss of generality, consider 
the addresses for s and t to be 0 and 2 " - l ,  respectively. Cn contains n ! ( s , t) 
paths [70], each of which traverses n+1 nodes and n links. For 2CF under the node 
failure model, we assume that nodes s and t are always perfect 2CF measure can 
be computed by first enumerating the n ! (s , t)  paths, treating each path description 
as a product term of Boolean variables, and then use any SDP technique 
[20,33,74,85] to transform the sum-of-product terms into the analogous reliability 
expression. The number of paths for the cube grows superpolynomially with the 
number of nodes and links in Cn ; hence, it is not efficient to compute 2CF measure 
for large n using the above method. Alternatively, computing a lower bound on 
2CF measure offers the possibility of obtaining an important insight into the value 
of 2CF at a much better computational cost.
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Of the n ! (5 , t)  paths, n of these are node and link disjoint; this is true for any 
(s, t) pair because Cn is both node and link symmetric. A lower bound on 2CF is 
easily computed by considering the n disjoint paths utilizing a method used to 
obtain the reliability of a series-parallel system [20]. Let 2CF1(n, r , p )  be the 
lower bound on 2CF for a Cn with node (link) reliability r  (p ) by considering only 
its n disjoint paths. Then, for perfect source and terminal nodes we obtain:
2 CFiin, r , p ) =  1 -  (1 -  r n~lp nf . (4.20)
The model is straightforward, but the accuracy rapidly deteriorates as n increases.
Latifi [47] derived a lower bound on 2CF by considering nodes s and t to be 
at distance n <,w. They used w disjoint paths in the Cw comprising n paths of 
length n and w - n  paths of length n+ 2, and assumed that the nodes are perfect. 
Ahmed and Trahan [3] provided a technique to approximate 2CF for the node 
failure case (perfect links) by considering all shortest paths. Their method runs in 
time exponential in the distance of the (s, t) nodes, however, and so is not efficient. 
In Section 4.4.2, we provide a polynomial time algorithm which obtains a tighter 
bound on terminal reliability for an n -cube compared with Equation (4.20).
4.4.2 Proposed Bounds on 2CF
This section develops two methods, namely, a Boolean technique and a two- 
cube (TC) approach, for evaluating lower bounds on 2CF. The methods consider 
node and/or link failures. Subsection 4.4.2.1 discusses a Boolean algebraic approach 
for a lower bound on 2CF for larger values of node reliability r and link reliability 
p , while Subsection 4.4.2.2 presents the TC approach that offers a tighter bound for 
smaller values of r and p .
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4.4.2.1 Boolean Approach
To improve the lower bounds on 2CF given in Equation (4.20), we consider 
a n  shortest paths (where oc = [n /2 - ll  or n -2 ; refer to Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2), 
selected and ordered using a path generation algorithm described below, and then 
use a Boolean related disjoint products technique to compute the reliability values. 
The a  n selected paths include the n disjoint paths used for generating Equation
(4.20), so our lower bounds are tighter. Furthermore, the proposed method uses the 
paths to analytically calculate the reliability without enumerating them. Consider the 
a n  paths to be in a  groups, each comprising n paths. For i = 1, 2, • • • , a, let Gf 
= i P , j ) j  = 1.2,  ,» }  denote the ith group of paths. In the following, we
present an algorithm that enumerates the a n  paths in Cn that satisfy certain proper­
ties which will be useful for reliability evaluation.
A. Path Generation Algorithm
Any shortest path from node 0 to node 2” - l  traverses n links in n different 
dimensions. Number the dimensions by 0 to n -1 . Let Pjy- = d 0d l • • •  dn_lt 
where {d0, d v  - - - , dn_x) = {0, 1, • • • , n - 1}, denote the path from node 0 to 
node 2" - l  obtained by first traversing a link in dimension d 0, then traversing a link 
in dimension d u • • • , then traversing a link in dimension dn_v
Algorithm PG
1) P u  = 0  1 2 3 4 • • • (n-1) 
for j=  2 to n do begin
Generate path P lj  by traversing dimensions in the order given by a left 
rotate by one position of P ij - i -  
end;
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2) for i = 2 to a  do begin
for j  = 1 to n do begin
Set the first traversed dimension of Pitj  to be the same as that of P l y-.
Set the last i - 1 traversed dimensions of Pt j  to be the same as those in 
Pi-i j -  Generate the remaining n - i  dimensions (that is, the 2nd to 
(n-i+\)th  traversed dimensions) by a left rotate by one position of the 
dimensions in the same positions in . 
end; 
end;
Lemma 4.1. For a  = \n!2-l"|, Algorithm PG generates \nl2 - lT n  paths satisfying 
the following properties, where 1 < / ,  k < \n!2 - l l  and 1 < j ,  I < n and terminal 
nodes s and t are excluded.
Property Nl.  Paths Ptj  and Pt i are node and link disjoint, for j  *  I.
Property N2. Paths P( y- and Pk j  have (i+ l) common nodes and links, for i < k.  
Property N3. Paths Pt j  and Pk l are node and link disjoint, for j  *  I.
Proof: Given in Appendix B. □
Note: For n even, we can add a set of n l2 paths, G'a+l = 
iPn/2,1’ Pn/2,2’ ’ ’ ’ » Pni2,nii)> ^ at satisfy a similar list of properties. These pro­
perties (/V4 - N6) are stated and proved in Appendix B. We will include this extra 
half-size group of paths for computing 2CF for the node failure case and the node 
and link failure case, though we do not explicitly refer to these paths in the follow­
ing sections.
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Lemma 4.2. For a  = n -2 ,  Algorithm PG generates (n-2)-n paths satisfying the 
following properties, where 1 < *, k < n - 2  and 1 < j ,  I < n.
Property LI. Paths P(j  and P, j  are link disjoint, for j  *  I.
Property L2. Paths Ptj  and Pk j  have O'+l) common links, for i < k.
Properly L3. Paths Ptj  and Pkj  are link disjoint, for j  *  I.
Proof: Given in Appendix B. □
Lemma 4.1 applies to the paths evaluated for cases in which both nodes and 
links may fail or in which only nodes may fail and links are perfectly reliable. 
Lemma 4.2 applies to the paths evaluated for the case in which only links may fail 
and nodes are perfectly reliable.
Example 4.3. To illustrate Algorithm PG and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, consider a C6 
with source and terminal nodes s = 0 and t = 63, respectively. Algorithm PG pro­
duces a -n paths grouped and ordered as shown in Table 4.3. We label the nodes by 
their decimal equivalent numbers. Paths P{j  are shown using dimensions, node 
labels, and links. A link ( i , j ) refers to the link between nodes i and j . For Lemma 
4.1 (Lemma 4.2), a  = 2 (a  = 4), so paths P 1X through P 3 3 (groups G x, G 2, and 
half of G3) illustrate Lemma 4.1, while paths P u  through P 46 (groups G 1 through 
G4) illustrate Lemma 4.2.
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B. Generalized Lower Bound Expression
Let j  denote the event that path is operational. The event F  that at 
least one ( s , t) path out of a n  works is given by:
where 1 < i < a  and \ < j  < n.  Assume Bt j  is a Boolean product term 
corresponding to Ft j .  Then,
• J
where 1 < i < a  and 1 < j  < n ,  is the Boolean expression corresponding to F . By 
conservative modification, the SDP form for Equation (4.21) is obtained as:
(Term Bt j  corresponds to the event Ft j  that path P i y- is not operational.) Note, the 
i th n terms in Equation (4.22) correspond to the event that some path in group Gf 
is working and all paths in groups G lf • • • , G,.^ are failed. Use any Boolean 
technique to generate an equivalent exclusive and mutually disjoint expression for 
Equation (4.22). In this form, a logical expression has a one-to-one correspondence 
with the probability expression. For node (link) reliability r (p), let Rt (n, r ,  p)  
denote the reliability contribution of G, corresponding to the i th n terms in Equa­
tion (4.22). Rt and Rj describe the probability of disjoint events for i *  j .  The reli­
ability contribution of the a n  paths, 2CF2(n, r , p ) ,  is then given as:
(4.21)
B(disjoint) = B hl + B 12B hl + • • • + [Bhn B hl • • • B i>w_i] +
(4.22)
a
2CF2(n, r , p ) = ' £  R ^ n ,  r , p) . (4.23)
i=i
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We now describe the computation of the s, starting with R h
(a) For i = 1
Since node failures are independent from link failures, we obtain the probabil­
ity that a path P 1j  is operational as P r(F 1 ;) = r "-1 • p n because all nodes and 
links in P 1j  must be up. By Property ATI, the reliability contribution of the n paths 
in group G j is
The result for R 1 is the same as that given for 2CF1 in Equation (4.20). It is, thus, 
obvious that the bound generated by Equation (4.23) is always tighter as it contains 
Equation (4.20).
(b) For 2 < i < a
The reliability contribution of the j'th path in the i th group of n terms in
since RPt j  and RPi k describe the probability of disjoint events for j  *  k.  By pro­
perties N l  through N 3, Equation (4.24) is evaluated by taking the product of sub­
terms given in expressions (4.26) through (4.29) below.
R l( n , r , p ) = l - ( l - r n- l-pn)n .
Equation (4.22), [fllV(£ u  • • • B ljn) • • • (£(_ u  ‘ * * * B i j - 1)3. is
computed as:
Equation (4.24) specifies the reliability contribution of a path Pt Note,
n
R i ( n , r , p )  = X RPi,j(n ’ r ’ P )’ (4.25)
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Observe that expression (4.26) corresponds to path P{j  up, expression (4.27) 
corresponds to path Pkj  down, where 1 < k < i - l ,  given that P/ ;- is up, expression 
(4.28) corresponds to path Pkd down, where I < k < i , 1 <, I < j ~ l ,  given that Pi y- 
is up, and expression (4.29) corresponds to path Pk l down, where 1 ^  k < i - 1, 
7+1 < I < n,  given that Px -} is up. By property N 3, each Fkd in expressions (4.28) 
and (4.29) has no elements in common with Pj y-, so these conditional probabilities 
can be replaced by unconditional probabilities. For b & d, Fa b and Fc d in expres­
sions (4.28) and (4.29) have no common elements. In the following, we evaluate 
expressions (4.26) through (4.29).
Expression (4.26): Expression (4.26) is directly computed as
P r (Fi J ) = r n~l - p n. (4.30)
Expression (4.27): To help compute expression (4.27), let Pa b -  Pcd  denote the
portion of path Pa b remaining after any nodes and links in common with Pc d are 
removed. For any k,  I < i and k * I, Pk j  -  PX j  and PZ ;- -  Pf • are node and link 
disjoint, so expression (4.27) is computed as:
• • •  VrtiFflFij)-
By property N 2 and for v = 1, 2, * * * , / —1, each F ~ h a s  v+1 common nodes and 
links with Fx y. Thus,
Pr(F“ |F jV) = 1 -  r " -2 -v ./- i-v .
Solving all terms of the expression for v =1, 2, • • * , i - l ,  the reliability contribu­
tion of expression (4.27) is given as:
n  ( 1 -  r n~2~v • p n~l~v ). (4.31)
V = 1
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Expression(4.28): Let MG/(fc, r , p ) denote the fcth probability term in the uncon­
ditional probability corresponding to expression (4.28) with node (link) reliability r 
(p ), that is
MGi(k, r , p )  = P r ( F ) J F ~ ^  • • • F ^ )
for 1 < k < j - 1. By properties N l  through N 3, MG;(k, r , p )  = MGi(g , r , p )  for 
1 ^  k,  g £ j - l ,  so for simplicity, we let M G,(r, p )  denote MG/(k , r ,  p )  for any 
1 < k < j - 1. Consequently, expression (4.28) is equal to
(MGi(r, p )Y~ l . (4.32)
For i = 1, we directly compute M G /(r ,p )  = P r (F 1A). Thus, letting ®g( r , p )  =
(1 - r * " V ) ,
M G i(r , p )  = Ow(r ,p ) .
When i = 2, MG2(r, p )  = P r(F / * F 2&). By Property N 2, F 1Jt and F 2i* have two 
nodes (links) in common. Hence, using a Boolean identity abA abB = ab + 
oM  B, and letting = (1 -  **),
MG2( r , p )  = 0 2(rp) + (rp)20„_2( r , p )2.
For i > 2, we use Property AT 2 and recursively utilize the Boolean identity
aM  a&B = ab + abA B to obtain:
MGf ( r , p ) = 0 2(rp ) + (rp)2®n- 2(r , p ) (0 / (rp) + rp<&n_3(r , p ) ( • • •
(©i(rp) + rp O n ^ /.i^ r , p )  (0 /(rp ) + rp<E>„_/(rp)2)) • • • ) ) •  (4.33)
Expression (4.29): Expression (4.29) is computed similarly as
(MG/_i(r, p ) )n~j. (4.34)
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Taking the product of expressions (4.30), (4.31), (4.32), and (4.34) to express the 
product of expressions (4.26) through (4.29), the reliability contribution of a path 
P jj  described in Equation (4.24) may be taken as:
RPij ( r f p )  = rn~1T n n ( l - r * - ^ / - ^  )
V = 1
CMGi ( r , p  )y-! • , p ))”~J. (4.35)
Thus, by Equation (4.25), the reliability contribution of the n paths in group G( is 
obtained as:
R , ( n , r , p )  = r n- V n ( l  ~ r n-2~v‘P n~l~v )
V = 1
X K M G ^ r.p ))'-1 p))n~^]. (4.36)
j = i
Similarly, the reliability contribution of the n/2 paths in group G 'a+1, for n 
even, is computed as:
* a +l(« . r , p )  = r n- V  n  (1 -  rn- 2- v-pn~l-v )
V = 1
n il
^[(A fG a+1( r , p W ~ l iMGa( r ,p ) ) n- j ]. 
j= i
Theorem 4.4. Equation (4.23) obtains a lower bound on the terminal reliability in 
a hypercube for a source and terminal node at distance n.  This bound may be 
evaluated in 0 ( n 2) time. Further, this bound is tighter than the bound based on dis­
joint shortest paths.
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Proof: Section 4.4.2.1 establishes how Equation (4.23) gives a lower bound on 
2CF, given that the paths have the properties described in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. 
Compared to the bound based on n disjoint shortest paths (Equation (4.20)), Equa­
tion (4.23) is clearly tighter as it incorporates these n paths in the a n  paths it 
evaluates.
For time complexity, Equation (4.23) prescribes a sum of F ^ n . r , / ? ) ,  
R 2(n, r,  p) ,  • • • , R a(n, r , p ) .  Consider Equation (4.36) for /?,(«, r , p ) .  We can 
precompute 4>*(r, /?), for all 1 < k < n , in 0 ( n )  time. Using these, we can com­
pute each M G i( r ,p ) in 0( i )  time, for 0 ( n 2) time for all M G ^r,  p ) ’s. Next, com­
pute (MGj (r , p  ))k , for all 1 < k < n , in 0 ( n )  time. Using these precomputed 
values, each /?,-(«, r , p )  can be computed in 0 ( n )  time. Since a  = O (n), Equation
(4.23) may be evaluated in 0 ( n 2) time. □
4.4.2.2 Two-cube Model
One can view a Cn as constructed of two C ^ ’s that are connected by 2n~l 
links. Call these links as exterior links, and the links within each C„_j as interior 
links. Let 2CF3(n , r , p )  denote a lower bound function on 2CF for a Cn with node 
(link) reliability r (p). We will compute 2CF3(n , r , p )  for a Cn from a recursive 
computation of a lower bound on the 2CF of its component C ^ ’s. Nodes 0 and 
2" -1 are the source and terminal nodes of the Cn . Let s t = 0 and t 1 = 2”~1-1 be 
the source and terminal nodes of one Cn_1, and s 2 = 2n~l and t 2 = 2 " - l  be the 
source and terminal nodes of the other Cn_l. For the recursive lower bound compu­
tation, recursively decompose Cn as follows. Let 2CF3(«-1 , r, p )  be the probabil­
ity of a working path in one Cn^i between s 1 and t h and also in the other Cn_x 
between s 2 and t 2. Note, and and 2^ and t 2 are at diameter distance n -1  in
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their corresponding C„_1’s. Connect s j and s 2 by an exterior link and t l and t 2 by 
an exterior link such that these links each have reliability p  (refer to Figure 4.5). 
We ignore the other 2n~l -2  exterior links in the lower bound computation. Let A 
(B) denote the event that there exists at least one working path between s j and t x 
(s 2 and t 2). Similarly, let C (D) denote the event that the link connecting nodes 
and (^i and 12) is working, and let E (F) denote the event that node t\  (s2) is 
working. Thus, (AED) or (CFB) represents the event in which a working (s lt t 2) 
path exists, the probability of which is given as:
P r (AED + CFB) = P r (AED) + P r (CFB) • (1 -P r (AED)). (4.37)
Since events A through F are independent, Pr(AED) = Pr(A)-Pr(E)-Pr(D). Simi­
larly, Pr(CFB) = Pr(C)-Pr(F)-Pr(B). Note, Pr(A) and Pr(B) are each 
2CF3(n - l ,  r , p ), and Pr(E) and Pr(F) (Pr(C) and Pr(D)) are the node reliability r 
(link reliability p ). Thus, the lower bound on 2CF for a Cn is obtained recursively 
from the bounds on 2CF for lower dimension cubes. As the base case for this recur­
sion, we use the exact 2CF for a 3-cube.
Theorem 4.5. For a Cn with node (link) reliability r (p),  a two-cube model based 
lower bound on 2CF is:
2CF3(n, r , p )  = 2rp • 2CF3(n - \ ,  r , p )  -  (rp2CF3( n - l ,  r , p ) ) 2. (4.38)
This expression may be evaluated in O (n) time.
Proof: From Equation (4.37) and the following discussion, substitute
2CF3(n - \ ,  r , p ) ,  link reliability p,  and node reliability r for Pr(A) and Pr(B), 
Pr(C) and Pr(D), and Pr(E) and Pr(F), respectively.
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2CF, (n-1, r, p) 2CF, (n-1, r, p)
Figure 4.5 A Two-cube (TC) Model of a Cn
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For the time complexity, 2CF3(n, r , p ) may be computed in constant time 
plus the time required to compute 2CF3(n - l ,  r , p ). Clearly, this leads to 0 ( n )  
time complexity. p
Corollary. A tighter lower bound on terminal reliability for Cn with node reliability 
r  and link reliability p ,  2CF(n , r, p),  is computed as:
2CF(n, r , p ) = max { 2CF2(n, r , p ) ,  2CF3(n, r ,  p)}. (4.39)
By Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, this bound may be computed in 0 ( n 2) time.
4.4.3 Illustrations
Example 4.4. This example shows how to compute a lower bound on 2CF for the 
link failure case, that is, nodes are perfect (r = 1). Consider a C 6 with link reliabil­
ity p  = 0.6 and a  = 4. We compute i?x(6, 1 , p )  = 1 -  (1 - p 6)6, p )  =
<t>6( l , p )  = 1 - p 6, and MG 2( l , p )  = 0 2(p) + P 2^ - ! ^ # ) 2 = (1 ~ P 2) + 
p 2( l - p 6~2)2. By Equation (4.33), we obtain: MG3( l , p )  = Q2(P) + 
p 20 6_2( l,/? )(( l-p )+ p <I,6_3( l , p ) 2), and MG4(1, p )  = 0 2(p) +
P 24>6-2(1» p)((l~p)+pd>6_3(l, p ) ( ( l -p )  + P ^ s-aG, p ) 2)). Utilizing Equation (4.36), 
we get the reliability contributions, /?, (6, 1, p),  as:
R 2(6, l , p ) = p 6n ( l - p 6- l- v) j : W G 2( \ , p ) y ~ l (MGX(1 ,p ))6-7].
v=l 7=1
r 3(6, i , p ) = p 6n ( i - p 6_1"v) j : w G 3{ \ , p ) y - 1 (m g 2(i , p ))6-7].
v=l 7=1
4—1 n
* 4(6, i , p ) = p 6n ( i~p > E [ (MG 4 (i,* )y -1 (m g 3(i , p ))6-7].
v=l 7=1
Substituting p =  0.6, one gets = 0.953344, MG2 = 0.912735, MG3 = 0.880897, 
and MG4 = 0.860521. We also obtain R x(6, 1, 0.6) = 0.249246, * 2(6, 1, 0.6) =
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0.172569, R 3(6, 1, 0.6) = 0.110934, and J?4(6, 1, 0.6) = 0.061212, and hence Equa­
tion (4.23) gives 2CF2(6, 1,0.6) = 0.593961. On the other hand, given 
2CF(5, 1, 0.9) = 0.639749, Equation (4.38) gives 2CF3(6, 1, 0.6) = 0.620358, thus,
the lower bound on 2CF is obtained by Equation (4.39) as 2CF(6, 1, 0.6) =
0.620358 which gives a tighter lower bound compared to 0.249246 computed by 
Equation (4.20).
Example 4.5. In this example, we show how to compute a lower bound on 2CF 
for the node and link failure case. Consider a C 6 with node reliability r = 0.9 and 
link reliability p  = 0.95, and a  = 2. Note, for even cube dimension, j?a+1 is also 
computed. We obtain R x(6, r,  p )  = I -  (I -  r5p 6)6, MG^(r, p )  = <I>6( r , p ), 
MG2( r , p ) = 0 2(rp) + (rp)20 6_2(^> P )2, and MG3( r , p )  = 0 2(rp) +
(r/7)20 6_2(r ,p )(( l- rp )+ r /7 0 6_3(r ,/? )2). Utilizing Equation (4.36), we get:
* 2(6, r , p )  = ( r V ) n ( l - r 6-2~vp 6- 1-v) £ [(M G 2(r, p ))'”1 (M Gx(r ,  p ))6-7].
V = 1  j = 1
* 3(6, r ,p)  = (r5p 6) n ( l - r 6"2-vp 6- 1-v) j^ [ (M G3( r , p W ~ l (MG2( r , p ))^'].
V = 1  J = 1
Substituting r = 0.9 and p  = 0.95 in Equation (4.23), one gets 2CF2(6, 0.9, 0.95) = 
0.997762. On the other hand, given 2CF(5, 0.9, 0.95) = 0.995640, Equation (4.38) 
gives 2CF3(6 ,0.9,0.95) = 0.977880 and hence, Equation (4.39) computes 
2CF(6, 0.9, 0.95) = 0.997762. Note, using Equation (4.20), the previous lower 
bound on 2CF is 0.967145.
4.4.4 Discussion
Table 4.4 shows the lower bound on 2CF obtained by Equation (4.39) com­
pared with the previous bound computed by Equation (4.20). The table assumes 
node failure rate y  = 250,000 FITS and perfect links. The table gives lower bounds
Table 4.4 
Lower Bounds on 2CF for Cn 
(PE Failure Rate y = 250,000 FITS).
t*
6-cube 10-cube 16-cube
Previous New Previous New Previous New
400 0.996289 0.999882 0.994584 0.999999 0.982398 1.0
800 0.936203 0.992947 0.835824 0.997336 0.558292 0.992547
1200 0.780169 0.946492 0.501277 0.923955 0.163675 0.878612
1600 0.582086 0.830946 0.241975 0.772962 0.038931 0.759296
2000 0.401843 0.679244 0.105698 0.612820 0.008813 0.586724
2400 0.263919 0.554084 0.044259 0.443028 0.001973 0.377941
2800 0.168044 0.431432 0.018212 0.286174 0.000440 0.189971
3200 0.104983 0.321827 0.007441 0.166126 0.000098 0.074191
3600 0.064830 0.231203 0.003031 0.088137 0.000022 0.023832
4000 0.039753 0.160902 0.001233 0.043622 0.000005 0.006747
* Time t is in hours.
105
for a 6-cube, 10-cube, and 16-cube for various mission times of the systems. The 
new lower bounds significantly improve on the previous bounds, especially for 
larger cubes and less reliable nodes (increased operation times). Table 4.5 presents 
the results allowing both node and link failures. We use a link failure rate, X, 
l/100th that of the node failure rate. Comparing Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we notice that 
for the given node and link failure rates, link failures in the system give 
insignificant reduction on the 2CF of the cubes. This observation is further sup­
ported by the results shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Figure 4.6 depicts the 2CF vs. 
dimension for cubes of dimensions up to 16 for node, and both node and link 
failure models with various working times. We have computed exact 2CF measure 
for 2-cube and 3-cube. Note, a lower bound on 2CF for Cn is computed from the 
selected a  n paths and their node and/or link reliabilities. On the one hand, for 
increasing values of n,  the reliability contribution of each path decreases. On the 
other hand, for increasing values of n , more paths are evaluated. Thus, a 2CF for a 
Ck can be larger or smaller than that of a Cg for k < g depending on the tradeoff 
between the number of paths and the reliability of each path for given node and/or 
link reliabilities. For t = 1000 hours, the 2CF of C 8 has the largest value. For t = 
2000 hours, on the other hand, larger cubes have less 2CF’s than smaller cubes. 
Figure 4.7 depicts the reliability performance vs. time for an 8-cube under node 
only, link only, and both node and link failure assumptions. As expected, for perfect 
nodes and link reliability p > 0.988, the 8-cube is very reliable. The figure also 
shows that the 2CF of an 8-cube in the node failure and node and link failure cases 
is closely dependent on the system mission time.
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Table 4.5 
Lower Bounds on 2CF for Cn 
(y = 250,000 FITS, and X = 2,500 FITS)
t*
6-cube 10-cube 16-cube
Previous New Previous New Previous New
400 0.996079 0.999873 0.994203 0.999999 0.981069 1.0
800 0.933499 0.992500 0.829271 0.997039 0.546485 0.991444
1200 0.773323 0.943684 0.490555 0.918417 0.156603 0.875661
1600 0.572693 0.823976 0.233585 0.766805 0.036560 0.753419
2000 0.392295 0.672836 0.100786 0.604436 0.008138 0.576824
2400 0.255699 0.546035 0.041731 0.432742 0.001792 0.365283
2800 0.161631 0.422562 0.016990 0.276109 0.000394 0.179132
3200 0.100277 0.313056 0.006871 0.158084 0.000086 0.068057
3600 0.061512 0.223267 0.002771 0.082687 0.000019 0.021302
4000 0.037474 0.154216 0.001116 0.040360 0.000004 0.005893
* Time t is in hours.
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4.5. Bounds on TBF Measure
4.5.1. Using a Markov Model
Najjar and Gaudiot [54,55] have proposed a method to approximate the task- 
based functionality (TBF) measure for an n -cube with failing nodes. Their method 
uses disconnection probability. A system is said to be disconnected if its graph 
topology has two or more disconnected components. A subset of k connected nodes 
is called a cluster, and a cluster is disconnected from the system if and only if all 
its neighbors have failed. Let
QN(i) = Pr{disconnection occurs at the ith PE failure |no disconnection occured at 
the ( i- l)s t  failure} and
QkN(i) = Pr{disconnection of a k PE cluster occurs at the ith PE failure | no 
disconnection occured at the ( i- l)s t  failure}.
The total disconnection probability is given by
QN( i ) = N^ Q kN(i). (4.40)
k= 0
Computing Equation (4.40) for all values of k is practically intractable and, thus, 
the reference [54] assumes that k is a power of 2. Furthermore, by using Monte- 
Carlo simulation, the authors [54,55] show that the probability of disconnecting a 
single PE, QiN(i) is the dominant component of QN(i) and thus suggest computing 
only QiN(i) for the QN(i). The conditional probability of disconnecting a single 
PE in the n-cube is given as [54]:
The TBF measure is, then, computed by using a general Markov model of failures
Nshown in Figure 4.8 with D < — . Given a node failure rate y, the rates of state
£
transitions, r|f- and jx,-, are expressed as a function of the single node failure rate as 
follows:
r\i =Ci(N - i ) y ;  \it = (1 -  Q)(N  - Oy.
Here, C, is a state-dependent coverage factor, which is given as
q  =c-( l -<2"(0) ,
where c is the coverage factor for the recovery scheme. The probability of being in 
state i ,  Pi(t)  is obtained as [54]:
f  «\
i-l N
Pi(t) = JJCj
l / = °  J N - i  _
(4.42)
where i is the number of failed nodes at time t. In the Markov model, the TBF 
metric, TBF(n, K , r ) ,  for n-cube with node reliability r = e~^ and requiring at 
least K  healthy nodes to be connected is simply the probability of being in one of 
the states 0 through D , for K = N - D . This is given as
T B F ( n , K , r ) = Y iPi (t). (4.43)
I l l
Figure 4.8. Markov Model for TBF Bounds
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Equation (4.42) is computable in a time or space polynomial in the order of i . 
Since the variable i used in (4.42) can potentially go up to N - 1, the time or space 
complexity involved in the equation is exponential in the order of the dimension of 
the cube. In what follows, we describe an alternative polynomial time algorithm 
utilizing the disconnection probabilities given by Equation (4.40).
4.5.2 Proposed Technique for TBF Bounds
In this section, we present a new algorithm to obtain the upper bound on the 
TBF measure for a hypercube. For a Cn with node reliability r , let us define
R(I ,  r)  = P r {Exactly I  healthy nodes are connected }, (4.44)
and thus,
TBF(n, K,  r)  = £ / ? ( / ,  r).
I= K
(4.45)
We divide the problem of computing Equation (4.45) into two cases: C l and C2. 
Case Cl computes exact R(I ,  r ) for /  > N - n .  On the other hand, Case C2 obtains 
bounds on the R(I ,  r)  for I  < N - n . In the following we present the computation of 
the two cases.
Case Cl: For N -  n < I  < N .
R ( I , r )
■ » *
N
J
I  » *>
N
(
I
r l (1 - r f ’1 
-  N ) r1 (1 - r f - 1
; for I  > N  -  n , 
; for I  = N  -  n (4.46)
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Note, Equation (4.46) obtains the exact reliability for R( l ,  r). When there are less 
than (n-1) node failures, the remaining operational nodes are still connected since 
the node connectivity of a C„ is n.  When exactly n nodes fail, all possible combi­
nations of the remaining nodes are connected except the N  combinations when the 
n failing nodes are the neighbors of a particular node.
Case C2: For I  < N - n .
This case computes the bounds on the R(I ,  r)  based on the disconnection probabil­
ity (discussed in Section 4.5.1). To obtain an upper bound on the /?(/, r), we first 
consider Equation (4.44) as
R(I ,  r)=Pr{Exactly /  nodes are healthy }-Pr {The /  nodes are connected} (4.47)
Then, the second term of Equation (4.47) is computed using the disconnection pro­
bability QN(i) as
Pr {The I  nodes are connected } = (1 -  Qn (N-I)).  (4.48)
Notice that QN ( N - I ) represents the probability that disconnection occurs at the 
( N - I )th node failure given no disconnection occured at the (N - /- l) th  failure. 
Thus, (1 -  QN ( N - I )) is the probability that there is no disconnection when (N- I )  
nodes fail. Following Najjar and Gaudiot’s suggestion [54,55], we compute the 
QN(i) using Equation (4.41), and thus,
R ( l , r )  =
114
Lemma 4.3. Equation (4.45) obtains an upper bound on the TBF measure.
Proof: Equation (4.47) computes the upper bound on the R(I  r)  since the events 
{Exactly I  nodes are healthy) and {The I  nodes are connected) are considered to be 
independent. Furthermore, we have used Q\N(i) for QN(i), where the former 
always has a smaller value than the latter. q
4.5.3 Discussion
Table 4.6 provides experimental results of the bounds on the TBF measure for 
some hypercubes with different system life times. The table compares the upper 
bound results (UB) obtained by our new method with the approximate values com­
puted by the techniques given by Najjar-Gauidiot (NG) [54,55] and Kim et al. 
[42]. Note, we are not able to write a program for the technique given in [42] since 
the reference does not provide complete steps. Thus, for Kim et al. ’s technique we
Nhave used the results provided in reference [42]. We consider only for K = — and 
N— . The results show that the Kim et al. method [42] always gives approximation
values which are higher than the upper bounds on the reliability. Table 4.7, on the 
other hand, shows that the results obtained by Najjar-Gaudiot [54,55] fluctuate 
above or below the upper bound results.
Table 4.6 
Bounds on TBF Measure for C7 
(y = 2,500 FITS )
time (ft)
K  = 64 K  = 32
NG Kira et al. UB NG Kim et al. UB
400 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
800 0.9995 1.0 0.9999 0.9995 1.0 0.9998
1200 0.9937 1.0 0.9986 0.9937 1.0 0.9986
1600 0.9679 1.0 0.9945 0.9679 1.0 0.9945
2000 0.8973 0.9943 0.9799 0.9005 1.0 0.9852
2400 0.7160 0.8844 0.8610 0.7773 1.0 0.9691
2800 0.3733 0.5043 0.4865 0.6081 1.0 0.9456
3200 0.1010 0.1438 0.1380 0.4254 1.0 0.9149
3600 0.0131 0.0020 0.0194 0.2654 0.9997 0.8787
4000 0.0010 0.0015 0.0015 0.1483 0.9954 0.8378
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Table 4.7
NBounds on TBF Measure for Cn, and K  = —
Cn 71 NG UB
0.1 0.9998 0.9990
0.2 0.9949 0.9896
4 0.3 0.9717 0.9607
0.4 0.9124 0.7964
0.5 0.8086 0.7964
0.1 0.9999 0.9998
0.2 0.9975 0.9972
5 0.3 0.9830 0.9870
0.4 0.9376 0.9562
0.5 0.8344 0.8736
0.3 0.9990 0.9999
0.4 0.9895 0.9997
10 0.5 0.9447 0.9986
0.7 0.2786 0.4223
0.8 0.0004 0.0006
0.4 0.9991 0.9999
16
0.5 0.9865 0.9999
0.6 0.8948 0.9994
0.7 0.0242 0.0405
Chapter 5 
Deterministic Fault Tolerant Measures
The deterministic model considers that system component(s) has (have) failed, 
and aims to determine the hypercube functionality using criteria such as NCF, TBF, 
SF, etc. Fault tolerant broadcasting in a hypercube is an important topic that 
belongs to the deterministic NCF model. The system is said to be functional if all 
working PE’s are connected. The need for broadcasting appears in distributed agree­
ment and clock synchronization [67]. Furthermore, a distributed hypercube 
reconfiguration method [48] assumes that each PE has component failure informa­
tion which is to be broadcast by the host/manager of the system. In the presence of 
faulty components, broadcasting is not straightforward since a faulty PE may omit, 
corrupt, reroute or alter the information passing through it. This dissertation pro­
vides an overview of literature on this topic. We present a hybrid approach to 
fault-tolerant broadcasting that uses the concepts of redundant and non-redundant 
methods. An issue related to reliable broadcasting is fault tolerant routing in which 
the system is considered to be operational if there exists at least one path between 
two given PE’s. The reliable routing problem belongs to the deterministic 2CF 
model. This topic has been addressed in reference [50] and will not be discussed in 
this dissertation.
Esfahanian [27] has shown that a hypercube Cn can tolerate up to 2n -3  node 
failures and can remain connected provided that the failed nodes do not isolate any
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operational PE in the system. In other words, there is no C 0 disconnection. His 
model can be considered a restricted class of the deterministic TBF criterion. For 
this model, it is assumed that either nodes or links are reliable and that a forbidden 
fault set exists. In [27], a forbidden fault set is defined as the faults that cause 
disconnection of a working 0-subcube, C0. This class of TBF model is particularly 
applicable to the large scale degradable hypercubes used to run concurrent algo­
rithms requiring at least K  connected processors. It is further assumed that the run­
ning algorithms are not sensitive to changes in the system topology. In this disserta­
tion, we show that a Cn can tolerate up to 3n~6  faulty PE’s and remain connected 
if neither C 2 nor its subsets are disconnected. This assumption is not impractical as 
researchers have studied the probabilities of disconnection and have shown that 
for C t the disconnection probability is very low [27,54].
Many parallel algorithms designed for a Cn can also be executed on a Ck 
(k < n )  with a slow-down factor of 2n~k [57]. When system components start fail­
ing, a degradable hypercube used for this class of programs is reconfigured to a 
smaller sized subcube. It is important, however, to obtain the largest operational 
subcube so that the degraded hypercube operates with minimal performance reduc­
tion. Several methods to identify the largest operational subcube (LOS) have 
recently been described in the literature [9,18,25,48,56,65,79]. These methods are 
classified into centralized and distributed categories. The centralized approach uses 
a processor (usually the supervisory PE of the system) to generate the LOS. The 
distributed approach, on the other hand, allows each processor v to identify the 
LOS which includes the processor v . The dissertation discusses the merits and dem­
erits of these approaches. In addition, we propose efficient distributed algorithms for 
the LOS identification problem. Our method uses the CMB operator of CAREL 
which includes the multiple variable inversion concept. In case the number of non
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available nodes (faulty or busy) increases, an alternative distributed approach 
processes m available nodes in O (mn ) time to solve the LOS problem in Cn. Note, 
the LOS identification problem belongs to the deterministic model with SF measure.
5.1 Deterministic NCF Model
Broadcasting is a process of transmitting information from a source PE to all 
other PE’s. Efficient broadcasting is required for the hypercube so that good perfor­
mance is achieved with the variety of algorithms including matrix multiplications, 
LU factorization, and database queries [41]. Most algorithms discussed in the litera­
ture [41,80] are applicable for the hypercube with non-faulty components. Fault 
tolerant broadcasting considers the faulty components and is of utmost importance. 
In what follows, we discuss a two-step broadcasting algorithm given in reference 
[80] (for fault free hypercube system) because most fault tolerant broadcasting algo­
rithms are based on this method.
In step 1 of this algorithm, the source sends the message and its weight to its 
n neighboring nodes. A message is given a weight i if it is transmitted through an 
i th neighbor. A PE, after receiving the message, checks the weight. If the weight is 
0, the PE merely keeps the message. Otherwise, as a second step, the message is 
sent to all the 0th, 1st, • • • , (weight-l)?ft neighbors. These two steps construct a 
broadcasting tree in which the root is the source PE, and the children are the 
remaining PE’s. The broadcasting algorithm is implemented as follows:
Step 1. for (i = 0 to n - 1) do 
send (message, i , i );
Step 2. for (i = 0 to weight-1) do 
send (message, i ,  i);
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The function send (message, i, j )  transmits the message with weight i to the j  th 
neighbor. To illustrate the algorithm, consider a C3 with PE (010) as the source. 
Figure 5.1 shows the resulting tree where the link label refers to the message 
weight. It is obvious that the algorithm does the broadcast in 0 ( n )  steps.
5.1.1. Fault Tolerant Broadcasting Algorithm - An Overview
Fault-tolerant broadcasting algorithms [17,28,50,67,87] are classified into two 
categories, namely, redundant and non-redundant types. Each of these methods con­
tains two major aspects to consider: the message transmission and reception. Reli­
able broadcasting based on the redundant approach can tolerate faulty components 
by sending multiple copies of the message through n disjoint paths. Thus, each PE 
receives more than one copy of a message. Non-redundant fault tolerant broadcast­
ing, on the other hand, avoids intermediate faulty components on the communica­
tion paths and makes each PE receive only one copy of the message. The perfor­
mance of a fault tolerant broadcasting algorithm is rated by its capability to tolerate 
the number of faulty components and by its speed to broadcast the message in 
terms of the number of transmission steps. The steps taken, in turn, depend on the 
node model used in the system. In a multi-channel node model, a PE can simultane­
ously receive and transmit messages in all of its incoming and outgoing links. On 
the other hand, a single-channel PE model allows each PE to send the message 
through, at most, one outgoing link at a time.
5.1.1.1 Using a Redundant Approach
Fault tolerant broadcasting based on the redundant approach is achieved by 
sending multiple copies of the message through n disjoint paths [67]. This class of 
broadcasting is simple since it does not require backtracking during the broadcast.
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Figure 5.1. A Fault-Free Broadcasting Tree
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The approach, to its advantage, does not need the faulty component information of 
the system. This advantage is especially important in critical real-time applications 
which cannot tolerate the time overhead to identify the faulty components. Message 
transmission in the redundant approach is trivial. The method requires the source 
PE to send the message to all its neighbors. Then, the neighbors use a coordinated 
recursive doubling to broadcast the message to all the PE’s. The recursive doubling 
is coordinated to ensure that each node gets the broadcast message through disjoint 
paths. For this step, we provide algorithm Redundantl which works the same as 
Algorithm A given in reference [67] presented more concisely. Redundantl is based 
on the coordinated recursive doubling method and is given as follows.
Algorithm Redundantl 
/* executed by the source PE */ 
for (i=0 to n-1) 
send (message, 0, i, /); 
for (l=x to n-1) 
send (message, Z+l, y,  (/+ l+y) mod n);
The function send (message, x,  y ,  z)  denotes that a PE receiving a message 
with parameter x  from ancestor y  sends the message to its neighbor z . The parame­
ter x  lets a PE transmit the message to its n - x  neighbors, and the parameter y 
denotes that the ancestor of the path to the PE is the y th neighbor of the source PE. 
The redundant broadcasting algorithm guarantees correct broadcast provided there 
are fewer than n faulty components since, otherwise, the faults may isolate a PE in 
the Cn . Redundantl completes the broadcast in n + 1 steps for the multi-channel PE 
model. The result is obvious since the diameter of a Cn is n , and, hence, any PE is 
at most n steps away from any other PE. The last step is taken by the last receiving 
PE to complete the message reception. Reference [28] proves that when using a
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multi-channel PE model with, at most, n -1  faulty PE’s, the broadcasting requires n 
+ 0 ( n )  steps, irrespective of the component fault models. However, for a single­
channel PE model, Redundantl takes a total of 2n steps. The sender needs n steps 
to send the message to its n neighbors, which start their coordinated recursive dou­
bling right after they receive the message. The last n steps are taken by the last 
neighbor to receive the message for its recursive doubling. Table 5.1 shows the dis­
joint paths to each PE for a C3 with PE (010) as the source, where the number in a 
parentheses represents the parameter x  of the received message. As the result, each 
PE receives more than one copy of the message. The receiving PE, thus, must be 
able to identify the correct data from the multiple copies of the message it has 
received since faulty components may omit, corrupt, reroute, or alter the message 
passing through them. When the hypercube is fault-free, each PE gets n identical 
copies of the message.
Reference [67] has discussed three component fault models, namely simple 
omission faults, non-Byzantine faults, and Byzantine faults. In a simple omission 
fault model, a faulty component either sends the message correctly or does not send 
any message at all. Since there is no corrupted data, a receiver does not identify the 
correctness of the message and, hence, Redundantl tolerates up to n -1  faulty com­
ponents. The non-Byzantine model considers a faulty component able to corrupt the 
message passing through it. Reference [67] suggests using majority voting to iden­
tify the correct data from the multiple copies of message. Using this approach, 
Redundantl tolerates up to Y n l l \  faults. The third fault model, Byzantine fault, 
considers a faulty PE able to omit, corrupt, reroute, and even lie [46]. For this fault 
model, one uses majority voting with at least f 2n /3 ] copies of received message
Table 5.1.
Redundant Broadcasting in C3, Source (010)
PE
Paths via the b th neighbor
b= 0, PE 3 b=l,  PE 0 b -2,  PE 6
0 2-3-1 (3) 2(0) 2-6-4 (3)
1 2-3 (1) 2-0 (2) 2-6-7-S
3 2(0) 2-0-1 (3) 2-6-7 (3)
4 2-3-1-5 (3) 2-0 (1) 2-6 (2)
5 2-3-1 (2) 2-0-4 (2) 2-6-7 (2)
6 2-3-7 (3) 2-0-4 (3) 2(0)
7 2-3 (2) 2-0-4-5 (3) 2-6 (1)
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as the quorum, and, thus, the Redundantl tolerates up to L n /3 J  faults. However, if 
the message is authenticated by an unforgeable digital signature, Redundantl 
tolerates up to n -1  faults irrespective of the fault models [67].
5.1.1.2 Using a Nan-Redundant Approach
Non-redundant fault tolerant broadcasting algorithms, described in the literature 
[5,17,87], rely on a construction of a spanning broadcasting tree. For that, the 
methods need local (global) fault information, in which each PE has a list of faulty 
neighbors (components in the system). Non-redundant broadcasting achieves fault 
tolerance by avoiding intermediate faulty components on the communication paths. 
As a result, each PE receives only one copy of the broadcast message, and, hence, 
the receiving nodes do not need any message identification mechanism like that 
used in the redundant approach. To construct a spanning broadcasting tree, Al- 
Dhelaan and Bose [5] modify the two-step algorithm given in [80]. Their method 
assumes that each PE has local fault information. Each message is given a weight 
such as that in [80]. However, when a PE identifies a faulty neighbor, the node 
sends the message, its weight, and the weight of the message that was supposedly 
for the faulty PE to another healthy neighbor. However, the algorithm is applicable 
only if there is one faulty PE, or if each PE is connected to at most one faulty PE. 
Thus, a better and more general approach for the broadcasting problem is needed.
Lee and Hayes [50] define an operational PE as unsafe if it has at least two 
unsafe or faulty neighboring nodes. Thus, a PE can be in one of three states: faulty, 
healthy, or unsafe. Furthermore, the authors define a Cn unsafe if the cube contains 
only unsafe or faulty PE’s. Figure 5.2 illustrates a C 3 with faulty PE’s (101) and 
(110) and with the unsafe PE’s. The notion of an unsafe state is important since it 
may lead to backtracking due to its proximity to faulty components. Based on this
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Figure 5.2. An Illustration for Unsafe PE
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concept, the authors have proposed an algorithm which can tolerate up to \  n!2 ]  
PE failures [50]. The algorithm assumes that each PE has local fault information 
and uses Find_unsafe routine to obtain the unsafe states. This step is completed in 
0 ( f 3) steps, where /  is the number of faults. Then, from the unsafe PE informa­
tion, a modified version of the broadcast algorithm given in reference [80] is used 
to generate a broadcasting tree. The modified method positions the unsafe PE’s as 
the last PE’s to receive the message, and, therefore, no unsafe PE’s must broadcast 
the message. Figure 5.3 shows the generated broadcasting tree for the C 3 given in 
Figure 5.2. Note, the link label denotes the step number of the message transmis­
sion. Provided that C„ is not an unsafe cube, the algorithm [50] runs in n steps in 
either single-channel or multi-channel PE models. It is shown in [50] that the least 
number of faults needed to make a Cn unsafe is \  n/2 + 11, and, hence, the given 
algorithm can tolerate up to \ nl2~\ faults. When there is no PE failures, this algo­
rithm reduces to the algorithm given in reference [80]. Wu and Fernandez [87] have 
improved Lee and Hayes’ algorithm to obtain a better method that can tolerate more 
PE failures. An unsafe PE is defined as a healthy PE with the following two proper­
ties [87]:
- There are at least two faulty neighbors, and
- There are at least three unsafe or faulty neighbors.
To generate the unsafe PE information, reference [87] uses a Global_status routine. 
Then, the modified unsafe PE information, in turn, is utilized in a fault tolerant 
broadcasting algorithm. Wu and Fernandez [87] conjecture that there is no assign­
ment of n -1  faulty PE’s that makes a Cn unsafe and then conclude that their algo­
rithm can tolerate up to n -1  faults.
128
010
000
100 001
Figure 5.3. Broadcasting Tree with Unsafe PE Information
129
5.1.2 Hybrid Technique
The redundant broadcasting algorithm is attractive for its simplicity. Further­
more, the algorithms based on this approach do not need fault information. The 
message transmission is simple since each PE merely sends the message through its 
outgoing CE’s. Since each PE receives multiple copies of message, however, the 
receiving PE’s must be able to identify the correct message. This requirement limits 
the fault tolerant capability of such approach to up to \_nl l \  and L n/3 J  faulty 
components for non-Byzantine and Byzantine fault models, respectively. The non- 
redundant broadcasting algorithms, on the other hand, require that each PE has at 
least limited fault information. The methods based on this approach start by con­
structing a broadcasting tree which requires the unsafe PE information. Obtaining 
the unsafe PE information is not a trivial task and requires 0 ( n 3) steps. However, 
once the broadcasting tree is available, the message transmission and reception are 
easy. The redundant broadcast outperforms the non-redundant method, especially for 
multi-channel PE model with simple omission faults. The former can tolerate up to 
n -1  faults (for the simple omission model), while the latter is conjectured (in refer­
ence [87]) to be able to tolerate the same number of faults. Furthermore, the redun­
dant approach needs 0 ( n ) steps compared to 0 ( n 3) steps required in the non- 
redundant method (including the algorithm to obtain unsafe PE information).
In this section, we propose a hybrid technique, Redundant2, which utilizes the 
advantages of the redundant and non-redundant approaches. On the one hand, 
Redundant2 uses the simple transmission step of the redundant approach and takes 
advantage of the 0 ( n ) broadcasting speed of Redundantl. On the other hand, the 
hybrid approach implements the feature used in the non-redundant approach, 
namely avoiding the faulty PE’s in the communication paths to improve the fault 
tolerant capability of the approach. In Redundant2, each PE sends the message only
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to its healthy neighbors, and, thus, only correct copies of messages are broadcast in 
the cube. Consequently, each node will receive only the set of correct messages, 
which makes the message identification mechanism used in [67] unnecessary. This 
step makes Redundant2 tolerate up to n -1  faults, irrespective of the component 
fault models. Furthermore, the message reception mechanism in each receiving PE 
is modified to recognize only the first arriving copy of the message and to ignore 
the rest of the copies. This technique further reduces the computer time for message 
reception (compared to that in Redundantl). Redundant2, however, requires each 
PE to have local fault information (like in non-redundant approach). This require­
ment, nevertheless, is not hard to implement since following the test method given 
in reference [7], each PE in the cube can test its neighbors simultaneously. In what 
follows, we provide Redundant2.
Algorithm Redundant2 /* Proposed Hybrid Approach */
/* executed by the source PE s */ 
for (i=0 to n-1) 
if (the i th neighbor is healthy) 
send (message, 0, i , /);
/* executed by each PE receiving message with parameter x  and ancestor y */ 
for (/ = x  to n-1) 
if (the {(/+l+y) mod n)}th neighbor is healthy) 
send (message, Z+l, y,  (/+l+y) mod n);
Table 5.2 provides the result obtained by algorithm Redundant2 for a C 3 with PE 
(010) as the source, and PE’s (101) and (110) as the faulty components.
Table 5.2.
Hybrid Broadcasting in C3, Source (010), and Faults (101) and (110)
PE
Paths via the foth neighbor
b =0, PE 3 b= 1, PE 0 b= 2, PE 6
0 2-3-1 (3) 2(0) -
1 2-3 (1) 2-0 (2) -
3 2(0) 2-0-1 (3) -
4 - 2-0 (1) -
5 - - -
6 - - -
7 2-3 (2) - -
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5.2 Deterministic TBF Model
Researchers have mainly used graph theoretic concepts, particularly the notion 
of connectivity, to develop the deterministic fault tolerant model. However, if the 
connectivity concept is applied as such, the measure lacks generality since it does 
not take into account the different types of disconnected hypercubes. This conven­
tional connectivity concept considers any disconnectivity as the result of removing 
n neighbors from a certain PE. It implies that the parameter does not consider the 
severity of the damage to the system caused by different PE failures, which makes 
the measure inaccurate for certain applications. To remedy this deficiency, 
Esfahanian [27] has suggested using generalized measures of connectedness, such 
as the notions of toughness and mean connectivity of a graph. The conventional 
connectivity concept assumes that any subset of nodes can potentially fail at the 
same time. However, when PE’s fail independently but with different probabilities, 
equal-size faulty sets may have different probability of failures. Esfahanian [27] 
defines a set of components which do not fail at the same time as a forbidden faulty 
set. One may consider a set of components with negligible probability of failures as 
forbidden faulty sets to find out what it takes to disrupt the functionality of the sys­
tem. The result leads to obtaining the upper bound on the reliability of the system. 
Reference [27] has used any node’s n neighbors as the forbidden faulty sets. Note, 
for a Cn , the total number of such sets is very small compared to all other possible
fi"
equal-size sets, i.e., 2” to . Thus, the author suggests ignoring these forbidden
faulty sets to obtain a reliability measure "beyond" that obtained by connectivity 
concept. Theorem 5.1 shows the result. To avoid trivial cases, assume that n > 4.
Theorem 5.1 [27]. A Cn can tolerate up to (2n -  3) PE failures and remains con­
nected provided that the failures do not disconnect any subcube C0.
Proof: Refer to [27] □
In what follows, we generalize Theorem 5.1 by extending the forbidden faulty sets. 
Here, we consider the neighbors of a C i belonging to the forbidden set. The result 
is given in Theorem 5.2. For the following discussion, we have used some notations 
given in [27]. In particular, let V(G ) denote the set of nodes in G , and A(G:v)  
represent a set of all nodes which are adjacent to node v in G . When network G is 
known from the context, A (G :v ) will be denoted by A (v).
Theorem 5.2. A Cn can tolerate up to (3n -  6) PE failures and remain connected 
provided that the failures do not disconnect any C ! or its subsets.
Proof: Let F  be the set of nodes which do not disconnect any C j or its subsets in 
Cn . Consider F as an arbitrary subset of V (Cn) such that IF I = 3 n -6  and for any 
two connected nodes u,v & F , either [A(u)  -  v } <± F or {A{v) - u )  <± F . By the 
definition of the set F , there must be a node w that is connected to u or v . Without 
loss of generality, consider w be connected to the node u , and let us define
S = [A(u) -  v -  w] (A(v) -  u] { j  (A(w) -  u).
Observe that IS I = (n-2) + (n-1) + (n—2) = 3«-5, and that network Cn -  S is 
disconnected. We now complete the proof by showing that Cn -  F  is connected.
Let us consider the Cn as composed of two congruent (n-l)-cubes such that 
each node on one (n-l)-cube is connected to its congruent node on the other 
(n-l)-cube. Let L denote the first (n-l)-cube, and R represent the other (n-1)- 
cube. All 2"-1 links connecting L and R are termed as external links, and the links 
within L  and R are called internal links. Define F^ = V(L) F and FR = 
V (R) F . The size of set F  and the fact that FL FR = 0  imply that either
IF J  < 3n~6 or IF* I < 3 n -6 . Without loss of generality, consider
lF „ l£ 3n-6
2
It means that network R -  FR is connected since R is a Cn_l,
and by Theorem 5.1 the network tolerates up to 2 (« -l)-3  = 2n -5  node failures. 
3n-6Note, 2n-5  > for n > 3. It remains to be shown that any node in network2
L -F l  is connected via a path to a node in network R -F R. Let uL be an arbitrary 
node in L - F l  and let (uL , uR) be its corresponding external link. If uR 4 FR we 
are done. So assume that uR e  FR. Since A(uL) d  F,  there exists a vertex wL in 
L —Fl  which is connected to uL. Let (wL ,wR) be the corresponding external link 
connecting node wL with a node wR in R -F R. Again, if wR 4 FR we are done. 
Therefore, assume wR e FR . This and the fact that {A(uL)-wL ) d F  or 
{A(wl )-ul  } d  F  imply that there is a node xL in L - F l  that is connected to either 
UL o r  W L  • Without loss of generality, consider be connected to wL , and let
X = {A (L :uL )-wL } {A(L:wl ) - ul } \j  {A (L:xl ) - wl },
and F' = F -  {uR ,wR }. Note that \X I = 3 n - l  since L is an (zi-l)-cube. For each 
node y,- e X , 1 < i < 3n -7 , let (y,- ,z,-) be its corresponding external link. This 
means that zi e V (R). Since IF'  I = 3n -8  and each node in F' can correspond to at 
most one such external link, there must exist an external link (yj,Z/) for some i 
such that nodes y,- ,zt- 4 F' (and consequently y,- ,zi 4 F).  This implies that in net­
work Cn -  F , node uL is connected to a node z(- e V(R -F R) via a path of length 
at most 4. Figure 5.4 illustrates the proof. □
Table 5.3 shows the comparisons of the sturdiness parameters of the Cn com­
puted by the conventional PE connectivity concept, the Esfahanian concept and our 
proposed forbidden faulty PE’s for n = 4, • • • ,16.
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Left (L) Right (R)
*  w
(n-1 )-cube (n-1 ) -cu b e
Figure 5.4. Illustration for the Proof of Theorem 5.2
Table 5.3.
A Deterministic TBF Measure for Hypercube
Cn
The Total Number of Tolerable Faults
Conventional Theorem 5.1 Theorem 5.2
4 3 5 6
5 4 7 9
6 5 9 12
7 6 11 15
8 7 13 18
9 8 15 21
10 9 17 24
11 10 19 27
12 11 21 30
13 12 23 33
14 13 25 36
15 14 27 39
16 15 29 42
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5.3 Deterministic SF Measure
5.3.1 Background
The performance of a hypercube system in a multiuser-multitasking environ­
ment depends on efficient subcube allocation for the incoming jobs. In a multiuser 
environment, some processing elements may have already been allocated for other 
tasks and therefore are unavailable for the new jobs. A subcube allocation method 
is used to obtain a cube of the requested size from the remaining available nodes. 
The method must fail only when the requested cube size does not exist. References 
[6,16,24,43] discuss some subcube allocation methods. The methods assume that the 
system components are reliable. In reality, however, the components are not fully 
reliable, and, therefore, the subcube allocation methods, for this case, are not appli­
cable.
A related and equally important issue is that of the largest operational subcube 
(LOS) identification. This topic considers the failed system components and aims to 
obtain the largest subcube from the remaining operational components. Obtaining 
the largest subcube is advantageous so that the hypercube can run in a degraded 
mode with a minimal performance reduction. Many parallel algorithms designed to 
run on an n-cube also run on a k-cube (k < n )  with a slowdown factor of 2n' k 
[57]. The LOS identification problem belongs to the deterministic SF measure. 
Information on either faulty or operational components is assumed to be available.
Algorithms for diagnosing faulty nodes and links have been addressed in refer­
ences [7,12,23]. The set of faulty nodes and links can be identified by the opera­
tional processors. Reference [23] provides a distributed fault diagnosis algorithm for 
total number of faulty components r < n . Once the faulty elements are identified, 
graceful degradation is achieved by reconfiguring the operational components and
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the parallel algorithms in the system. Most algorithms designed for hypercube are 
adaptable to cube dimension changes. The algorithms usually pass the dimension of 
the host hypercube as their parameters, and hence, reconfiguring parallel algorithms 
is trivial. Thus, the reconfiguration problem is reduced to finding the LOS.
Algorithms for LOS identification have recently been discussed in the litera­
ture. The algorithms can be classified into two categories: centralized and distri­
buted. The centralized approach uses a processor, like the supervisory or host of the 
cube, to run a LOS identification technique. It is assumed that the host has informa­
tion on faulty or operational components. The approach generates a maximum sized 
subcube which we call as a global LOS. In a distributed approach, a node v exe­
cutes a program to identify a K-subcube that includes the node v. We call the sub­
cube a K-cube of node v 0S'CK(v)) or local LOS. Note, a local LOS is not neces­
sarily as large as the global LOS. However, the maximum sized local LOS is a glo­
bal LOS. For some cases, a distributed approach is preferable since it relieves the 
host from having to communicate with all nodes to identify the LOS. The distri­
buted approach assumes that each node has a list of faulty or operational com­
ponents. If only the supervisory node has the information, it is broadcast using any 
reliable broadcast algorithms. Most distributed methods assume that there are less 
than n node failures in a faulty n-cube. Since reliable broadcasting algorithms for 
hypercubes tolerate up to n -1  component failures (refer to Section 5.1), the 
assumption is justified.
References [25,56,65,66] discuss centralized subcube identification algorithms 
for the n -cube in the presence of node and/or link failures. Ozguner and Aykanat 
[56] utilized the inclusion-exclusion principle [20] to obtain the cube dimension, k,  
and the total number of available global LOS. Their method generates the k-  
subcubes from the faulty component information. The algorithm, first, encodes each
139
) steps for the encoding-decoding phases [56].
faulty element by extracting (n - k ) bits of its address at a particular (n -k )  coordi­
nate positions. The (n -k )  bits, in turn, are used to compute where
{0,1 denotes the (n - k  )-bit binary number. Then, the method uses the logic or 
operation on the encoded 2n~k tuples. If the integer value of the resultant is 22<""*>, 
the encoding from the chosen (n -k )  positions fails to obtain the LOS, and the 
method has to select other combinations of the (n - k ) coordinate positions. When a 
suitable set of (n -k )  coordinate positions is found, the algorithm decodes it to 
obtain a k -subcube. The technique in [56] always identifies a global LOS. For an 
n-cube with r  faulty components, the method takes 0 (2 r log2r)  steps to find the
rt
largest dimension k and 0(rk
k
Thus, the algorithm is not efficient for use in large hypercubes. Rai and Trahan 
[65,66] propose an algebraic technique which has improved time complexity over 
that of the method in [56]. Nevertheless, their algorithm takes 0 ( n r) time. It is 
obvious that we need a better approach for the LOS identification problem.
Methods in [9,18,48] use faulty node information to generate the local LOS. 
Reference [48] considers the problem as a version of an NP-complete Hitting Set 
problem [29] and, hence, discusses a heuristic solution that generates a local LOS 
with high probability. For an n -cube with r  faulty nodes, this heuristic algorithm 
takes 0 ( n 2r 2) steps. The heuristic approach, however, requires exponential time to 
identify a global LOS since every healthy node has to carry out the algorithm, and 
0 ( 2 n- r )  nodes are involved. Chen and Tzeng [18] use reject regions for their dis­
tributed method. A reject region is the smallest subcube that contains the faulty 
node and the antipodal of the local node. Each reject region is represented in a 
Boolean expression. First, their algorithm [18] obtains all reject regions, denoted in 
sum of Boolean terms, R . Then, it uses distributive law for Boolean expression [53]
140
on P = R to obtain the local LOS. In an n -cube with r faulty nodes, the algorithm 
[18] is empirically shown to have time complexity of 0 ( n 2r 2). The distributed 
algorithm can also be utilized to identify a global LOS. The authors [18] use only 
the healthy neighbors of each faulty node as local nodes. These selected nodes are 
referred to as candidate nodes. For an n-cube with r faulty nodes, there are 0 ( n r ) 
candidate nodes, and, therefore, the total time complexity for identifying a global 
LOS is 0 ( n 3r 3).
In case the number of nan-available nodes (faulty or occupied by some other 
tasks) increases, it is preferable to generate the LOS from the available (residual) 
nodes information. The residual nodes are represented either by specifying each of 
their addresses or by using a set of subcube descriptors. Reference [49] presents a 
centralized and a distributed method for this problem. However, both approaches 
require time exponential in the number of residual nodes. Note, Sridhar and 
Raghavendra [79] have shown that the LOS identification problem from the set of 
subcube descriptors is NP-hard. Therefore, the authors proposed a centralized tech­
nique which runs in polynomial time in the number of residual nodes.
5.3.2 Algebraic Technique for LOS Identification
In this section, we present an efficient distributed algebraic method for the 
LOS identification problem. Our proposed method obtains more than one possible 
local LOS from the faulty nodes information. The results from this method are 
beneficial because they allow the system manager to have more flexibility in 
reconfiguring the faulty system. The proposed algorithm can be used to identify glo­
bal LOS. For an n -cube with r faulty nodes, we use 0 ( r )  candidate nodes to
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execute the algorithm and select the maximum sized local LOS as the global LOS. 
A modified CMB operator of CAREL (refer to Section 3.2) is used in the new 
approach.
5.3.2.1 Definitions and Notations
A subcube in a hypercube Cn is a subset of the n -cube that preserves the 
topological property of a hypercube structure. A A:-subcube can be represented 
either by a list of its 2k nodes or by its subcube descriptor. A subcube descriptor in 
a Cn is an n element string over symbols (0, 1, x}. The "0" and "1", and the "x" 
values in the descriptor are referred to as fixed or bound, and free coordinates, 
respectively. A k -subcube in a Cn has k free coordinates and n - k  fixed coordi­
nates. Note, the total number of free coordinates refers to the subcube dimension. 
As an example, a subcube descriptor (xxlOlx) represents a 3-subcube of a C6. The 
descriptor may also be denoted by the product of Boolean variables or product 
terms. A subcube descriptor is transformed into a product term by replacing a "1" 
("0") in the i th position of the descriptor with an xt (x{) and by ignoring the free 
coordinates. For example, the subcube (xxlOlx) is represented in a product term 
expression as *3* 2* i- Notice that a Cn has null product term expression.
A A:-cube of node v, SCk (v), is obtained by replacing any k bit positions of 
the address of v with* free coordinates. In other words, the cubes are generated by 
expanding v towards its k (out of n ) dimensional directions. Thus, each node v in
C„ has
k
A:-cubes. Let Ft represent a faulty node i and F£>, be a set of dimen­
sions which provides a path from v to Ft . In other words, when node v is 
expanded towards all dimensional directions in FDt , SCk(y) which contains Ff is 
obtained. Note, k = I FD, I for a A:-cube, and the generated subcube that includes
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at least one faulty node is referred to as a faulty subcube. On the other hand, a k-  
subcube that does not contain any faulty node is called an operational subcube 
(OS), and the operational subcube is a LOS if it is the largest possible OS. We use 
k to denote dimension of the local LOS. The set FDS is easily generated from the 
addresses of nodes v and F; . A dimension j  in FD{ refers to the j  th position in the 
addresses of v and F(- when the two bits are different. An FZ),- is generated by tak­
ing bitwise xor of the v address with Ff and considering a "1" in the j \h  bit posi­
tion of the resultant as a dimension j  in the FZ),-. The FD/’s are partitioned into 
independent and dependent groups. An FDi belongs to the independent group if 
FDi n  FDj = 0 ,  for any j .  Otherwise, it belongs to the dependent group.
Example 5.1. Consider Figure 5.5, where v = (001) and F 4 = (100). The bitwise 
xor of v with F 4 gives (101). The result is interpreted for FD4 as {0,2}. If node v 
is expanded towards dimensional directions "0" and "2", we obtain an SC2(v ) = 
(xOx) which includes F 4, and hence, is faulty.
In our proposed algorithm, the k -cubes of node v in Cn are represented in the 
Boolean expression as X l X 2 • • • Xn_k . For the new notation, each denotes the 
product of Boolean variables {x0, x v • • • , xn_l }, and for any pair of Xt and Xjf  
all variables in Xt are different than those in Xj. Here, we have used the multiple 
variable inversion (MVI) concept (discussed in Section 3.2) to represent the 
SCk(v)'s in concise notations. Let x a, xp, • • • , x^ be the variables in X h X 2,
• • • , Xn_k , respectively. For a local node v in C„, x^ x p  • • • represents an 
SCk (v) in Cn. For each xj el {xa, xp, • • • , x^}, a k -subcube is obtained by 
replacing each bit j  in the address of node v with a free coordinate "x".
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Figure 5.5. A 3-Cube of Node v
@  Faulty 
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Example 5.2. For v = (0011), = xjXq represents two 3-cubes: (xxxl) and
(xxlx). The jcjXo denotes the events that node v is not expanded towards dimen­
sional directions "0" or "1". On the other hand, x i x 0 x^x2 refers to four SC2(v)'s: 
(xOxl), (Oxxl), (xOlx), and (Oxlx).
5.3.2.2 Distributed Approach
Our proposed distributed method generates local LOS’s by avoiding all possi­
ble faulty subcubes. For an FDi , we use FBt to represent products of Boolean vari­
ables. A Boolean variable xj in FBt represents a dimension j  in FDt . As an exam­
ple, given FDi = {0,2,4}, the corresponding FB{ is obtained as (x4x2x0). An FBt is 
called an independent (dependent) FB if its corresponding FD, belongs to indepen­
dent (dependent) group. Note, an FB, has logical value "1" or true if the local node 
v is expanded towards all dimensional directions in FDi. Thus, the FBt is true 
when a faulty SCk (v) is generated from v and the dimensions in FD,. Obviously, 
non-faulty subcubes are generated when every FB{ is f a l s e . The result is stated for­
mally in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Given a set of faulty nodes F and a local node v, any generated 
SCk (v) does not contain any faulty nodes of set F if
n  (5-D
Fi e  F
Proof: By De Morgan’s rule, Equation (5.1) is transformed into FB, = 0. By
Fi e F
definition, FBt = 0 if v is not expanded towards all dimensional directions in FD{, 
and, hence, the generated SCk(v) does not contain Ft . Since Equation (5.1) consid­
ers all Fj ’s, the theorem is proved. r-i
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We use Equation (5.1) for our proposed distributed algorithm. First, the 
method generates an FD,- from a local node v and a faulty node F,- for all faulty 
nodes. Second, the technique removes any redundant FD,- and partitions the remain­
ing FD,-’s into independent and dependent groups. An FDy- is called redundant if 
an FD,- exists so that FD,- c  FDj . This step is used to reduce the overall time com­
plexity of the algorithm. These two steps generate non-redundant independent and 
dependent FB,-’s for use in Equation (5.1). Using Boolean identities, the equation 
can be solved to produce a sum-of-products expression [53] which represents the 
operational subcubes (OS) of node v . For our technique, we use a modified CMB 
operator (refer to Section 3.3.2), which we call CMB+ (discussed later). The CMB 
operator utilizes the multiple-variable inversion (MVI) concept (discussed in Section 
3.2), and therefore generates the results for Equation (5.1) faster and more con­
cisely. The operator generates the sum-of-disjoint products (SDP) expression for 
Equation (5.1) which means that the results may also be used to identify local dis­
joint subcubes. Here, a disjoint subcube is defined as a subcube which consists of 
different nodes than those of any other subcube. The disjoint subcube is generated 
from the local node v and a disjoint term in the SDP expression by complementing 
the i th bit in the address of v when the disjoint term contains an xt , and replacing 
some other bits in the address of v following the discussion in Section 5.3.2.1. 
However, one may use a simple transformation procedure given in [45] to interpret 
the SDP expression for sum-of-products expression. Note, in our description of the 
CMB operator, an independent (dependent) FB,- is represented as 7G, (DG,).
The CMB+ operator is different from the CMB operator only on Step 2 used 
in CASE 2 [CMB for dependent group] (refer to Section 3.3.2). Let .STG,- denote an 
element of a stack STG. Initially, the stack STG contains the two elements created 
in Step 1 of the CMB operator (refer to Section 3.3.2). An .STG,- contains a TG that
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has not been CoMBined with the DGk ’s, for i < k < p, where p is the total number 
of non-redundant D G ’s. Notice that the D G ’s are numbered from 1 through p. Step 
2 for CMB+ is shown as follows.
CASE 2 [CMB for dependent group] /* Step 2 for CMB+ */ 
while ( STG *  null ) begin 
pop (STG, );
DG (TG,-, DGj, STG'i+l);
/* STG'i+i may have more than one terms */ 
if (i < p )
push (STG'i+i); 
else begin /*we have obtained some local OS’s. */
Obtain local OS’s; /* include result from independent group */ 
if (the subcube size is sufficient) 
return;
end;
end;
The function DG is exactly the same as the one given in Section 3.3.2 except for 
the output STG'i+1 replacing TG '. When CMB+ is used exhaustively (until STG is 
empty), it gives exactly the same results as produced by the original CMB operator.
The proposed CMB+ provides two options for LOS identification. In the first 
option, the algorithm uses the operator exhaustively to generate local LOS(s). In the 
second option, the method utilizes the operator to identify some local OS(s) at each 
step. Here, the algorithm may stop searching for more local OS’s when the 
identified local OS is sufficient for system reconfiguration (even though the OS is 
not a LOS). Note, the CMB operator always provides exhaustive results and, hence,
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is less general than CMB+. In what follows, we present the proposed distributed 
LOS identification technique called LOS1. Links are assumed to be reliable; how­
ever, the algorithm may also be extended for unreliable links. The dependent ele­
ments of FB ,’s may be ordered by their increasing cardinality so that the operator 
can complete this step faster. Refer to reference [75] for a discussion on the advan­
tage of using this ordering.
Algorithm LOS1 /*Input F,-’s and local node v */ 
begin
/* This step generates non-redundant FD ,’s */ 
for (all F,-’s) begin 
Generate FD,- from v and F,-;
/* for all independent and dependent FDj’s */ 
if (FD, c  FDj)
Remove FDj ; /* FDj is a redundant term */
else if (FDj e  FD, )
Remove FD,-; /* FD,- is a redundant term */
else
Put FD,- in a independent or dependent FD list;
end;
Order the dependent group FD,- ’s; /* and hence, the FB,- ’s */
Use CMB+ operator on the FB,- ’s; /* independent and dependent */ 
end.
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53.2.3 Illustrating Examples
Example 5.3. Consider a C4, v = (0011), and a faulty node F 0. The LOS1 com­
putes FD0 = {0,1}, and hence, FB0 is (jcjXq). Since there is only one FBit the 
CMB operator is not needed for Equation (5.1). The node v and the FB0 give two 
local LOS’s as (xxxl) and (xxlx).
Example 5.4. Figure 5.6 shows a C4 with its local node v = (0000) and faulty 
nodes F 3 and F g. Using the information, we generate dependent FB3 = x i x 0 and 
FB9 = x3x 0. The CMB+ operator generates (xjXq) (x3x0) = x Q + x 3 x x^q. The SDP 
expression can be interpreted as such, to represent two disjoint subcubes (xxxO) and 
(0x01) (denoted by a "1" and a "3" in the figure). The expression, however, is 
transformed into the sum-of-products expression by deleting any non-inverted 
Boolean variables. For the example, two subcubes (xxxO) and (OxOx) (denoted by a 
"1" and a "2" in the figure) are generated. Note, the 3-subcube (xxxO) is a local 
LOS.
Example 5.5. Consider a C6 with its local node v = (110011) and its four faulty 
nodes (010011), (110110), (101111), and (100101). An independent FB 19 = i j ,  an^ 
dependent F B ’s as: x 2xq, x4x 3x 2, x 4x 2x l are obtained. Using the CMB+ operator, 
we solve the dependent F B ’s for (5.1) as
(x2x 0)(x4x 3x 2) (*4* 2*!) = {x l  + X4X3X2XQ) (X4X2XX) = (x^) + (X4X3X2X^  ) (X4X2X j).
The first result, x 2, and independent FBl9 -  x 5 generate a 4-cube x 5 x 2 = (lxxOxx). 
If the 4-cube is sufficient for system reconfiguration, we stop the algorithm. Other­
wise, we let the method generate more OS’s as: (x^ & qXqXx^ qx^  = x 4 x 2 x ^  + 
x 4 x 3 x 2 x0. Thus, the method also generates a 3-cube x 5 x 4 x0 = ( l lxxxl)  and 
a 2-cube jc5 x 3 x l x 0 = (1x0x11). The first generated OS (lxxOxx) is a local LOS.
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Figure 5.6. An Illustrating Example.
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In the following example, we show that algorithm LOS1 performs better than 
the Greedy approach given in reference [48]. For this example, the Greedy method 
does not generate a local LOS (its largest OS is a 3-cube). Our approach, on the 
other hand, generates more than one possible subcubes, including a LOS.
Example 5.6. Consider a 7-cube, v =  0000000, and faulty nodes, F 3> F 5’ F 9> F l&> 
F 36, and F 1 2 . The LOS1 generates dependent F B ^ s  as: j c ^ q ,  x 2x q , x 3x 0 , x 4X \ ,  
x$x2, and x&x3. The CMB+ operator computes
(* l*o) (*2x o) (x 3x o) (X4X 0  (x 5X2> (*6*7)
=  ( x ^ + x ^ x j x 0) (X3X0) (x4Xi )  (x5x 2) 0*^ *7).
Combining the term x 0 with the remaining four FBi ’s, we obtain x Gx 3 X;pc2 x 4x 1 
x 0, which represents eight 3-cubes (OxxxOOO), (xOxOxOO), (OOxxxOO), (xxOOOxO), 
(OxOxOxO), (xOOOxxO), (OOOxxxO), and (xxxOOOO). The results are not optimal. 
Nonetheless, if the 3-cubes have met the request for reconfiguring the hypercube, 
we stop here. Otherwise, the algorithm will search for the other possible subcubes. 
For this example, the algorithm generates a local LOS x 3 x ^ x l = (xxxOOOx).
5.3.2.4 Comparison with the Existing Techniques.
Reference [48] presents two heuristic distributed algorithms for LOS 
identification. However, the methods do not always obtain a local LOS. Further­
more, both techniques generate only one local LOS. Reference [18] provides two 
algorithms, A and B, which always obtain at least one local LOS. Identifying more 
than one LOS is preferable since the supervisory node may have more flexibility in 
reconfiguring the faulty system. Thus, the algorithms in [18] are better and more 
general than those given in [48]. Algorithm B is faster than algorithm A [18] and, 
thus, the performance of our algorithm LOS1 is compared with that of algorithm B.
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Both algorithms LOS1 and B generate at least one local LOS. From a local 
node and faulty nodes information, algorithms LOS1 and B obtain a set of non- 
redundant FDt ’s and a set of non-redundant reject regions R , respectively. Generat­
ing the set FD is bit implementable since an FDt is represented by symbols {0, 1}. 
On the other hand, a reject region is denoted by symbols {0, 1, x} and is more 
complex and slower to compute. Furthermore, redundancy checking for each FDt 
(discussed in Section S.3.2.7) is faster than that for the reject region. Obtaining the 
sum-of-products equivalents for FB and R is the most time consuming part of the 
algorithms LOS1 and B, respectively. Unfortunately, the methods used in both algo­
rithms are heavily data dependent which makes it impossible to compare them using 
formal time complexity analysis. Furthermore, reference [18] does not provide any 
benchmark faulty node sets for its results, which otherwise may be used for com­
paring the speed of the two algorithms. The computational performance of algo­
rithms LOS1 and B, however, depends on the number of Boolean product terms 
generated, so, we use the total number of the product terms in the two approaches 
as the parameter to compare their speeds. Note, this parameter is used for compar­
ing the performance of Boolean techniques for the network reliability problem 
[33,74,85,86], which is similar to generating the sum-of-products here. Refer to 
Section 3.2. In what follows, we first show that LOS1 is expected to produce fewer 
Boolean product terms than algorithm B. Then, we use some illustrating examples 
to support the result.
In Section 3.2, we have discussed the concepts of single-variable inversion 
(SVI) and multiple-variable inversion (MVI) which are extensively used in Boolean 
techniques for the network reliability problem [86]. References [74,85,86] have 
shown that Boolean techniques based on the MVI concept are faster and generate 
fewer SDP terms than SVI-based techniques. Generating the sum-of-products
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equivalent for FB in LOS1 and R in algorithm B, conceptually, is similar to the 
Boolean technique approach for the network reliability problem. The algorithm B 
utilizes the distributive law on Boolean expressions using the SVI notation. On the 
other hand, the CMB+ operator in LOS1 uses the new subcube notation to imple­
ment the MVI concept. Thus, LOS1 is expected to produce fewer terms and, hence, 
is faster than the algorithm B. Furthermore, when all FZ),- ’s belong to the indepen­
dent group, LOS1 solves the problem in polynomial time (in the number of faulty 
nodes). On the other hand, algorithm B does not solve this case as straightfor­
wardly. To illustrate algorithms LOS1 and B, we provide the following examples.
Example 5.7. Consider a local node (1000), and the two faulty nodes (0001) and 
(0110). Algorithm B generates reject regions R = x 3x0 + x 3x 2X]. Thus, P = R  = 
(x3+jr0) (x3+ x 2+ x l). Using distributive law and Boolean simplification, the algo­
rithm obtains three terms as x 3 + x 7 x 0 + x 2 x 0. On the other hand, LOS1 obtains 
FB = (x3x 0) (x 3x 2x {), and the CMB+ operator generates two terms x 3 + x 3x 2x l jc0. 
Note, both algorithms identify exactly the same subcubes, but with different nota­
tions.
Example 5.8. Consider a C7 with local node (0000000), and six faulty PE’s 
(0000011), (0000101), (0001001), (0010010), (0100100), and (1001000). Algorithm 
B generates eight operational subcubes denoted in eight Boolean terms as x 3x 2Xi +
+  * 5 * 3 *  1*0 +  * 6 * 5 *  1*0 +  * 4 *  3 * 2*0  +  * 6 * 4 * 2 * 0  +  * 5 * 4 * 3 * 0  +  *6*5*4*0>
On the other hand, LOS1 obtains the same subcubes, which are represented in more 
concise notations as x 3 x 2 x ^ q + x^ c3 x 5x 2 x 4x x x0.
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Example 5.9. In this example, the case for independent group is illustrated. Con­
sider a Cg with its local node v = (00000000) and four faulty nodes (00000011), 
(00001100), (00110000), and (11000000). Algorithm B obtains sixteen subcubes 
represented in sixteen Boolean terms as: X(,x4x 2Xq + JC7*4x2*o + * 6*5* 2*0 +
* 7* 5 *  2 * 0  +  * 6 * 4 *  3 * 0  +  * 7 * 4 *  3 * 0  +  * 6 * 5 *  3 * 0  +  * 7 * 5 *  3 * 0  +  * 6 *  4*  2 * 1  +  X - j X ^ ^ i  +
*6*5*2* 1 + x 1x 5x 2x i + * 6* 4* 3* i  + Xjx4x 3x i + Xflx5x 3x l + x-jX^x^Xy. On the 
other hand, the LOS1 generates the same sixteen subcubes represented by only one 
Boolean term x 2x 6 x 5x 4 x 3x 2 XiX0.
5.3.2.5 Efficient Centralized Approach
The algorithm LOS1 can also be used to identify the global LOS in an n-cube. 
To obtain the global LOS, one may run the algorithm LOS1 on every healthy node 
v, each of which generates local LOS(s). Then, the global LOS is obtained by 
selecting the largest local LOS. The approach, however, is not efficient since there 
are potentially 2n- r  healthy nodes in a Cn with r faulty nodes. To reduce the com­
putational time complexity of the approach, we select a certain number of healthy 
nodes that are expected to give the global LOS. Such selected nodes are called can­
didate nodes. In this section, we consider two different approaches for generating 
the candidate nodes:
1) Use the healthy n neighbors of each faulty node as the candidate nodes [18]. 
This approach uses 0(nr)  candidate nodes in Cn with r  faulty nodes.
2) When there is a pair of antipodal faulty nodes, select the neighbors of either one 
of the two faulty nodes as the candidate nodes. However, if all antipodal nodes 
of the faulty nodes are healthy, use the r  antipodal nodes as the candidate 
nodes. This approach uses O(r )  candidate nodes for a Cn with r  faulty nodes.
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Both methods 1) and 2) expect that the global LOS is generated from the can­
didate nodes. Approach 1) considers each candidate node as the border of the local 
LOS generated since if the cube includes the node beyond the border (a faulty 
node), the generated LOS is faulty. Approach 2), on the other hand, considers two 
different scenarios. The first scenario assumes that all the antipodals of the faulty 
nodes are healthy and selects them as the candidate nodes. Here, any of the healthy 
antipodal nodes are expected to obtain the global LOS since the faulty nodes are at 
the farthest distances from the candidate nodes. In the second scenario, the faulty 
nodes do not have all of their antipodal nodes healthy, i.e., there is at least one pair 
of antipodal faulty nodes. Note, two antipodal nodes are at the farthest distance 
from each other, and when the two nodes are faulty, they destroy all healthy 
(n-l)-cubes in an n-cube. Although approaches 1) and 2) do not always obtain glo­
bal LOS, we use empirical results to show that the approaches help generate global 
LOS with high probability for Cn with n faulty nodes. In what follows, the perfor­
mances of the two different sets of candidate nodes are compared using algorithm 
LOS1.
5.3.2.6 Experimental Results
For every randomly generated set of n faulty nodes in an n -cube, we obtain 
two sets of candidate nodes using approaches 1) and 2). Algorithm LOS1 is used on 
both sets to generate the local LOS from each candidate node. Then, the maximum 
sized local LOS is selected as a global LOS. For n = 4, 5, • • • ,16,  3,000 sets of 
n faulty nodes have been randomly generated, where each 1,000 sets have one of 
the following properties:
(1) Each set has no pair of antipodal faulty nodes.
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(2) Each set has only one pair of antipodal faulty nodes.
(3) No restrictions.
An exhaustive method was used to check the optimality and correctness of every 
local operational subcube (OS) generated. From about the 400,000 results, the 
obtained OS’s were found to be correct and optimal. Furthermore, the sizes of the 
global LOS’s generated using the two different sets of candidate nodes were found 
to be equal. Thus, approach 2) is better than approach 1) since the former produces 
fewer candidate nodes than the latter. A method given in [56] was used to verify 
the correctness of the global LOS’s generated, and two non global LOS’s were 
found out of 39,000 results. Although the proposed method does not always obtain 
global LOS’s, the technique is preferable (than the previous centralized techniques) 
since it is faster and generates the optimal results with very high probability.
S.3.2.7 Computational Complexity of LOS1
Consider a Cn with r  faulty nodes, and let v (F,-) be a local (faulty) node. We 
use bitwise xor  on v and F,- to obtain FD,-, and hence FB,-. Bitwise xor  is done in 
constant time, therefore, the FD, ’s are generated in 0 ( r ) steps. A redundant FDj 
with respect to FD,- is detected using a bitwise xor  and a bitwise o r  operation 
(Refer to a method discussed in Section 3.2). Considering r FD^s, redundancy
j .  /y  j\
checking is done on 1 + 2  + 3 +  • • • + r -1  = — — -  pairs of FD, and FDj,
&
and is completed in 0 { r 2) steps. Note, the cardinality ordering on the non- 
redundant FD,- ’s can be overlapped with the redundancy checking steps so that no 
extra cost is added on the time complexity.
The computational complexity of the CMB+ operator is heavily data depen­
dent, and, hence, we consider the best and the worst cases. The best case for the
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operator is when FD, FDj = 0 ,  for all i *  j .  Refering to Section 3.3.2, the 
FD,-’s can be viewed as forming an independent group (IG). The CMB+ operator 
for the IG case is completed in 0 ( r )  time. Therefore, LOS1 has 0 ( r 2) steps for the 
best case. For the worst case scenario, we use empirical results to show the largest 
number of times the CMB+ operator calls the DG function, and the largest number 
of times the while loop inside the function is executed. Note, the code in the while 
loop of the DG function is run in 0 ( n )  steps. Table 5.4 shows the maximum 
number of steps involved in the CMB+ operator for Cn with n faulty nodes, for 
n = 4, 5, • * • ,16.  The table shows that for the worst case, the CMB+ operator 
uses the DG function 0 ( n 2) times, and the function executes the while loop 0 ( n )  
times. Thus, for Cn with r faulty nodes, we conjecture that the expected time com­
plexity of algorithm LOS1 is no worse than 0 ( n 2r 2).
S.3.2.8 Polynomial Time Approach
The proposed algorithm LOS1 may also be used to generate local LOS(s) 
more efficiently by incorporating a greedy approach. This heuristic approach, how­
ever, requires the FB, ’s (the input) to be ordered to help the CMB+ operator pro­
duce LOS(s) with high probability. For this greedy technique, the CMB+ operator 
stops generating the remaining results once it has obtained the first local QS(s), and 
the local OS(s) is considered as the local LOS(s). Here, CMB+ calls function DG 
only p < n  times, where p denotes the number of dependent FB,'s. Thus, the 
heuristic approach is completed in 0 ( r 2) steps for Cn with r faulty nodes. In what 
follows, we describe how to order the FB,-’s. Note, this ordering is only performed 
once and is completed in polynomial time (in the order of the number of FB,- ’s).
A Boolean variable xj is defined to have a weight a  if there are a  dependent 
group FB, ’s that contain xj. An FB,- is said to have a degree (j if the maximum
Table 5.4.
The Experimental Results for Time Complexity of CMB+ Operator
Cn #DG calls #while loop used Total #steps
4 3 2 6
5 6 3 18
6 12 4 24
7 23 4 92
8 38 5 190
9 61 5 305
10 94 5 490
11 175 5 875
12 250 5 1250
13 371 6 2226
14 645 6 3870
15 930 6 5580
16 1558 6 9348
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weight of its variables is p. The non-redundant dependent FBt ’s are sorted based on 
their decreasing degrees. If two or more FBt ’s have the same degree, they are 
ordered following their increasing cardinality. However, if the same degree FBX ’s 
are of the same cardinality, they may be ordered randomly. This ordering makes the 
CMB+ generate local OS’s containing variables with larger weights.
Example 5.10. Consider FBV = * 2* 1*0, = * 3*2* 0* = *4*o> ^  =
* 5 * 4 . The variables *0, x x, x 2, * 3 , * 4 , and x 5 have weights 3, 1, 2, 1, 2, and 1, 
respectively, and the FBV FB2, FB3, and FB4 have degrees 3, 3, 3, and 2, respec­
tively. Thus, the FBt ’s are ordered as FB3, FBX, FB2, FB4.
We have used the method to obtain a global LOS of a Cn using n candidate 
nodes (refer to Section 5.3.2.S.). First, 3,000 sets of n -faulty nodes for n = 4, 5, 
• • • , 16 are randomly generated. Then, the heuristic algorithm is used to generate 
the local LOS’s from the candidate nodes, and the largest subcube is selected as the 
global LOS. We found that the heuristic method identifies global LOS’s more than 
99% of the time. Furthermore, the dimensions of generated OS’s (which are not 
LOS) are only one less than those of the optimal results. Since the method uses 
0 ( n )  local nodes, it is obvious that the algorithm takes 0 ( n 3) steps for generating 
global LOS (s) in a Cn with n faulty nodes.
5.3.3 Distributed Subcube Identification with Residual Nodes
In this section, we propose an algorithm called LOS2 which identifies SCK(v) 
from a node v and a set of residual nodes W. For each node i ,  vv; e  W,  the algo­
rithm generates an SDt . The SDt contains a set of dimensions that provide a path 
from nodes v to w-(. An SCk(v ) which includes node w; is generated when node v
is expanded towards all dimensional directions in SD, . Note, a K-cube of v has
K
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K
-
K
nodes which are 1 -distant, nodes which are 2-distant, • • • ,
2 K - i  _
are K-l-distant,
nodes which
node which is K-distant from node v . This property is stated in
the following lemma.
nodes, each of whichLemma 5.1. For i = 1, 2, • • • , k,  an SCk (v) contains
is i Hamming distance from node v .
Our proposed algorithm uses Lemma 5.1 to identify a local LOS. First, the 
algorithm computes each SDj by taking bitwise xor on the addresses of nodes v 
and vv(-. Here, an SDj is represented in bit notation and is interpreted by considering 
a "1" in a j lh  position as a dimensional direction j . Let I SDt I represent the 
number of l ’s in SDit and let Hk be the set of SD^s  with k dimensions, i.e., k  = 
I SDj I. The method, then, groups the SDj’s into Hk ’s, for k = 1, 2, • • • , Tj and 
r\ < n .  The algorithm searches for a local LOS using the SD,’s, starting from those 
in H^,  then those in H^_v  • • • , until a subcube is found. For each SDt in Hk , the
method checks if it has SDj’s in Hi as its subsets, for I = k -1 ,  • • • ,2, 1. If
all such subsets exist, the SDj is used to identify an SCk (v). Note, an SDj of set Hk 
represents a node wt that is k distant from v, and hence if the SDj has all the 
required subsets, it also denotes a k -subcube. The A:-subcube is obtained from the 
SDj by replacing a "1" in SD{ with an "x". To reduce the computational complexity 
of the algorithm, the size, k ,  of the subcube is computed so that the algorithm starts 
searching for the subcube from SDj's in H K. However, we conjecture that comput­
ing exact k is difficult, therefore a polynomial time method (in the number of work­
ing nodes) is used to obtain its upper bound, <fmax. The tfmax, in turn, is used to a
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priority remove nodes that are not in the subcube. In what follows, we provide lem­
mas which are used in our method. Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 compute the d max, while 
Lemma 5.4 further removes the unused nodes.
Lemma 5.2. For k ~  1, 2, • • • , « ,  and where co represents the first empty Hk ,
dm» S m ln ( [ lo g 2IWlJ ,«>-l ).
Lemma 5.3. For j  = 1, 2, • • • , k - 1, if IHj I < then d mm < k.
Proof: When I Hj I <
k
, £ -subcube does not exist. 
l / J  □
Lemma 5.4. Node is not in an SCK(v) if SDt<± SDj.
SDj e H\
Proof: Each node in an SCK(v) is reachable from node v through the dimensional 
directions in q
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Using Lemmas 5.1 through 5.4, we present the proposed algorithm LOS2.
Algorithm LOS2 I* Input: Set W  and node v, Output: SCK(v) */ 
begin
^max = generate_Hk (v, W); 
for (k = d max down to 1) begin 
for (SDj e Hk ) begin 
if (subcube (SDj, k))
Print the local LOS; /* We may stop the algorithm */
end;
end;
end.
Function generate_Hk computes S D j ' s, groups them into Hk ’&, for 
k = 1, 2, • • • , dmax, and returns the dmax. The subroutine utilizes Lemmas 5.2 
through 5.4 and is implemented as follows.
generate_Hk (v , W) 
begin
/* Implementing Lemma 5.2, and generating H f  s */
Sm** = [l0g2lw lj;
for (wt e W) begin 
SDj  = v ®  Wj; 
if (k = LSD, I £ <rma)
Put SDj in set Hk ;
end;
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for(& = 1 to d 'max) begin
if (Iff* I s  0)
d'max = k ~l>
end;
/* Lemma 5.3 implementation */ 
for (k = </max down to 2) begin 
for (/ = £-1 down to 1) begin
k
if (Iff,-1 < )
j
d' max = k —1,
end;
end;
/* Lemma 5.4 implementation */ 
S H =  U  5Dy.;
5D; e Hi 
for(all SDi ’s) begin 
if (SDi s£ ^ff)
Delete SD,;
end;
return (</'max); 
end;
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Function subcube is based on Lemma 5.1, and returns true if the SDt gives a 
subcube of size k. The function is implemented as follows.
subcube (SZ>;, k ) 
begin
for (j = k - l  down to 1) begin
k
if (there are less than 
return  (false);
subsets of SD{ *n Hj )
end;
return  (true); 
end;
In what follows, we provide some illustrating examples to show the salient 
features of the proposed algorithm LOS2.
Example 5.11. Consider a C4 with W  = { (0000), (0001), (0101), (0110), (0111), 
(1000), (1001) } and local node v = (0001). Since log2IW IJ = 2, H 3 is not gen­
erated, and function generate_Hk obtains
H i  = { (0001), (0100), (1000) },
H 2 = { (0110), (1001) }.
By Lemma 5.4, (0110) is deleted. Since (1001) has two subsets in H u (0001) and
(1000), the algorithm identifies a 2-subcube (xOOx).
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Example 5.12. For a C5, consider its eleven residual nodes: (00001), (01000),
(01001), (10000), (10001), (10100), (10101), (11000), (11001), (11100), and 
(11101). Also consider that a local node v = (10001). Function generateJHk 
creates
H i  =  { (00001), (00100), (01000), ( 10000) },
H 2 = { (00101), (01001), (01100), (11000) },
H 3 = { (01101), (11001) },
and d max = 3. Function subcube ((11001), 3) returns fa il  since there are only 2
3
(less than
I2
the LOS by executing function subcube ((01101), 3). The routine returns true since
) subsets of (11001) in H 2. Thus, the method continues searching for
3 3
there are and
2 k * 1
subsets of (01101) in H 2 and H h respectively. Thus, the 
algorithm identifies a 3-cube (lxxOx).
5.3.3.1 Computational Complexity of LOS2
Let m < 2" denote the total number of residual nodes in a hypercube Cn, and 
nij = \Hi I. The function generateJHk obtains SD j’s, groups them into H{’s, and 
computes d max. Note, the LOS2 utilizes a bit vector representation [4] for local 
node v and for the residual nodes w, ’s, and, hence, each SDj is computed in one 
xor instruction. Since I SDj I is computed in n steps, this phase needs Oimn) 
steps. The function implements Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 in 0 ( n 2) and 0 (m )  steps, 
respectively. Thus, generateJHk requires O (mn) steps. On the other hand, function
subcube takes 0 (M ldaa_l) steps, for Mx>y s  However, the total number of
i=x
function calls is data dependent. For the best case, we consider z?max = k, and, 
therefore, the function is called at most m K times. When d max is not tight, the total
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number of function subcube calls is O (MK dma)  times. Thus, the time complexity of 
the LOS2 is 0 (r |) , for ri = max
5 3 3 .2  Using LOS2 for a Centralized Approach
The algorithm LOS2 can also be used to generate the global LOS. The super­
visory node executes the algorithm and considers each residual node as a local 
node. This approach obtains a global LOS in O (r\m), which is comparable to 
0 (m 2n ) of the method presented in [79]. However, our method is preferable since 
the supervisory node can stop the algorithm once it produces the required sized sub­
cube. Furthermore, global LOS may be generated before the algorithm is executed 
for all possible local nodes, so, consequently, our proposed method is expected to 
obtain global LOS faster than the method in [79].
5.3.4 Conclusions
We have discussed methods for generating the largest operational subcubes for 
hypercubes with faulty components. The techniques can be categorized into central­
ized and distributed approaches. The distributed techniques for LOS identification 
are preferred over the centralized approaches since the former are more general and 
more efficient than the latter. Also, the distributed approach can be used to obtain 
the global LOS. Any of the methods need either faulty or residual component infor­
mation. We have presented a distributed technique LOS1 that requires faulty com­
ponent information, and a distributed algorithm LOS2 which needs residual node 
information. Both techniques always generate optimal results. For Cn with n faulty 
nodes, LOS1 is empirically shown to run in polynomial time in the order of cube 
dimension. On the other hand, LOS2 obtains both local and global LOS’s in poly­
nomial time in the order of the number of the residual nodes and the cube
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dimension. Thus, LOS1 (LOS2) is used when the hypercube has less (more) faulty 
nodes than residual nodes.
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Directions
This research has been carried out to obtain improved methods for the proba­
bilistic and deterministic reliability evaluation of the hypercube architecture. Vari­
ous reliability measures, namely, network-connected (NCF), 2-connected (2CF), 
task-based (TBF) and subcube (SF) functionalities are considered for both models. 
We have attempted to solve exact measures for the probabilistic model. An efficient 
algorithm, called CAREL, is presented and used to help compute various exact reli­
ability measures. CAREL evaluates the probabilistic NCF measure for a hypercube 
in time polynomial in the number of spanning trees of the cube. We have used the 
shelling orderings property of the hypercube topology to obtain the result. However, 
the number of spanning trees in a hypercube increases exponentially in the order of 
the cube dimension. Even though CAREL has been succesfully utilized for analyz­
ing various distributed network reliability parameters, it fails to effectively evaluate 
the probabilistic measures for large hypercubes. Thus, we are motivated to look for 
efficient methods for computing the lower and upper bounds on the reliability meas­
ures.
Since no known polynomial time algorithms exist for exact computation of 
probabilistic measures for the hypercube, this dissertation has presented algorithms 
to compute lower bounds under node and/or link failures. The resulting bounds can 
be computed at least as efficiently as bounds obtained by previous methods, and the
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new bounds are tighter, hence closer to exact, than earlier bounds. We have 
presented polynomial-time algorithms to improve bounds on NCF, 2CF, and TBF 
reliability metrics. The dissertation has improved mainly the lower bounds on the 
probabilistic measures. The lower bound is appealing since it gives an indicator that 
the system is at least this reliable. Even though the upper bound measure is not as 
favorable as the lower bound, it provides a better insight on the system reliability 
compared to that of the approximation approach. An upper bound result gives an 
optimistic analysis on the system reliability and is a tool to check for the correct­
ness of the approximation value. Furthermore, when the lower and upper bounds are 
tight, it is unnecessary to generate the exact results. Thus, better approaches to 
improve both lower and upper bounds on reliability measures are of significant 
value. In this dissertation, we have proposed efficient techniques to compute tighter 
lower bounds on NCF and 2CF measures for the hypercube than those obtained by 
existing techniques. For the 2CF measure, our approach considers both node and 
link failures. Further work on computing tighter upper bounds on these reliability 
measures may improve our understanding on reliability aspects of the hypercube 
architecture. We have also proposed an efficient method to compute an upper bound 
on TBF measure which is better than existing approaches in terms of time complex­
ity and the computed results. The existing methods generate only approximate 
results. A lower bound on this task-based measure, however, is left for future work. 
Another area in which work remains is to compute bounds on the probabilistic 
measures for the cube that account for dependence between component failures. A 
possible approach is to use the shock model, as was done by Trahan et al. [25] for 
multistage interconnection networks.
In this dissertation, we have discussed the deterministic model for reliability 
measures in hypercube. Various measures for this model are described. One
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measure, reliable broadcasting, is a deterministic model with the NCF criterion. For 
a Cn, the existing reliable broadcasting techniques tolerate only up to n - 1 faulty 
components. This limitation is due to the topological property of the hypercube. 
(The node connectivity of an n -cube is n.) However, in case the faulty com­
ponents do not isolate any healthy node, broadcasting in the faulty hypercube is 
feasible even when there are more than n -1  faulty components. When the com­
ponent failures are statistically independent, it is less likely that n -1  faulty com­
ponents disconnect a node. Thus, implementing the forbidden fault set concept (dis­
cussed in Section 5.2) on reliable broadcasting will give a better practical result.
We have proposed two efficient distributed techniques to identify the largest 
operational subcubes in a faulty hypercube. The proposed methods are shown to be 
more efficient than existing methods. One of the proposed methods, LOS1, uses 
faulty node information for its input; it is also shown empirically to run in time 
polynomial in the order of the number of faulty nodes when there are up to n failed 
nodes. Furthermore, LOS1 produces more than one possible result, which gives the 
supervisory processor more flexibility in reconfiguring the system. The method can 
be used either exhaustively or heuristically. When LOS1 is used in the former case, 
it always generates local LOS(s). Heuristic LOS1, on the other hand, is shown 
experimentally to generate optimal results 99% of the time. Note that the heuristic 
LOS1 is a polynomial-time algorithm (in the order of the number of faulty nodes). 
The second proposed method, LOS2, generates a local LOS from the residual 
nodes. This method has a time complexity of 0(m n), where m is the number of 
available nodes. Both LOS1 and LOS2 can also be used as centralized approaches 
to generate the global LOS’s. The distributed techniques for LOS identification are 
more efficient and more general than the centralized approaches.
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The performability issue of the hypercube system is an equally important topic 
and presents a unified approach for the performance and reliability measures of the 
system. For a hypercube working in degraded mode, performability provides a 
deeper insight. This issue for the hypercube architecture has not received much 
attention. So, research should be done on the performability of a hypercube with the 
NCF, 2CF, TBF, and SF measures.
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Appendix A 
Proving Correctness of CAREL
The CAREL uses four operators, namely COM, RED, CMB, and GEN to 
transform minimal path (or cut) identifiers into an equivalent exclusive and mutually 
disjoint (e.m.d.) expression. The COM operator defines conditional events E j ’s for 
an Ft , while RED removes redundant E j ’s to produce minimal conditional event 
(MCE). The operation CMB combines MCE to generate disjointing terms (DT’s). 
The DT’s are mutually disjoint. Moreover, the Ft and its DT’s (refer to GEN 
operator) form expression which is disjoint with all other terms in Equation (3.1). In 
what follows, we show that the CAREL always generates e.m.d. terms (DT’s) for 
an Ff .
Section 3.3.2 describes COM operator. A conditional event Ej considers ‘ex’ 
elements of Fj which are not present in F ,. To represent Ej down (refer to Section
3.3.1), our notations use -a1 in the positions of the variable [here the index I  is 
equal to the position of the first variable in Ej]. Considering CAREL (Section
3.4.1), it is obvious that COM obtains all possible E j’s for an F,.
Lemma A.I. Assume two conditional events Ej and Ek of F,-. If Ej c  Ek , then Ek 
is redundant. q
The RED operator implements Lemma A.l, and is performed for all (Ej, Ek ) 
pairs. Note, the RED defined in Section 3.3.2 checks out x x  = x ,  and x (x y ) = x 
type of redundancies. The non-redundant E j ’s form MCE. Besides removing
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redundancies, the RED operator partitions the MCE into IG’s and DG’s (refer to 
Section 3.4.2). Thus, the RED speeds up the computation time of the CAREL. The 
CMB operator for independent group (IG) uses x * y = x  y  iteratively. As is obvi­
ous from Theorem A.l (discussed later), Jc * y is a special case of Xp  * X p. Here, 
we assume that no common elements are present with x  and y. [jc and y are 
independent.] The CMB operator for dependent group (DG) utilizes lemmas and 
theorems mentioned below.
Definition. An Xt represents an term which could be an MCE Eh  or the one pro­
duced during CMB operation. For notational convenience, consider X f  = Xt (Xi ), 
when c = 1 (0).
Lemma A.2. Assume T \ , T \ ,  • • • , T{ represent k - partitions of X{. Then,
(Ti n  • • • T[y, C=1
(T\ ,  T\ r 2, ■ • • ,  t \ t 2 • • • T U n y ,  c=o
Proof: For c = 1, the result is obvious. With c = 0, De-Morgan’s complementation 
law is rewritten so that the list of Tj’s is collectively exhaustive. □
Theorem A.I. Consider I ,  L (J, K ) as 2-partitions of Xt (Xj). We have :
Xp * Xp  = ( I L f  ( J K f  .
The terms (IL)Ci ( J K p  is
a) XpXp;  if Xi and Xj  are independent.
b) A ; otherwise, i.e., L = J . Thus, L(=J) represents a common term between 
Xj and X j .
For various combinations of c(- and cy, A is obtained as -
i) Case 1. [c,- = c;  = 1]. A = I J  K.
ii) Case 2. [c; = 1(0), c 2 = 0(1)].
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_ J  0 ;  I , K  = 0
A ~ [ / Ci 7 K Cj; I , K  * 0
iii) Case 3. [q = Cj =0]. A = (7, I  J  K)
Proof: For Xt Xj = 0 ,  Xp  * Xp  = Xp Xp  is straightforward. Use Lemma A.2 
to show the results in Cases 1 through 3. With c{ = cj = 1 and L = J , Case 1 is
obvious. For ct = 1, cj = 0, Xp * Xp  is (7 7 ) (JK) or (/ J)  (J , J  K).  A result 
(J, J  I)  (JK) follows similarly when ct = 0, cj = 1. Thus, Case 2 of the theorem is
proved. For c,- =Cj = 0, Xp * X p  = (77) (JK). Using Lemma A.2, we interpret this 
result as (J, J  I)  (J, J  K)  which after applying a Boolean identity [20] produces 
(J, J  7 K).  n
Lemma A.3. Note, X * 0  = 0  * X  = 0 ,  where 0  is a null set, and X  represents 
any term.
Proof: Using Theorem A .l, the proof is obvious. □
Theorem A.2. For Z j, X 2, X 3, the CMB operator produces -
X x X 2 * X 3 = G F (H, H  7 J ) ,
where G,F (I,H)  represent 2-partitions for X t (X2), and F , 77, 7 are 3-partitions 
for X3.
Proof: Note, Z x X 2 is a term obtained considering Xp * X p  in Theorem A.l and 
represent mutually independent terms i.e., X 1 and X 2 will have no term in common. 
Using Lemma A.l, (Xl X 2 * X 3) is shown to be equal to (G F IH FHJ). Theorem 
A.2 is proved after applying Lemma A.2. □
From Theorems A.l and A.2, it is clear that if we CMB k number of X,-’s, we gen­
erate a term of the type X p  X 22 • • • Xp.  An iterative application of these 
theorems solves -
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(X^ 1 X44 X55 • • • X** * CXc22 X33) as ( • • • (X^1 * X22) * X33 * • • • ) * XACt 
Note, a CMB obtains e.m.d. terms [we have called them as DT’s].
Finally, GEN combines the Ff with the disjointing terms DT’s. The operator 
utilizes five out of twelve possible combinations for (-P7, 0, 1) alphabets and is 
demonstrated to be complete (refer to the text). Hence, the algorithm CAREL is 
proved to be correct.
Appendix B 
Proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2
Since we consider only shortest paths from PE 0 to PE 2”- l ,  each path is 
described by a list of n distinct integers from {0, 1, • • • , n -1}. In the following, 
when we refer to paths, we are discussing only paths of this type. For a path A, let 
A (/) denote the the i th element in the path description, for 0 < i < n -1 .
Definition. An m-prefix of a path is the ordered list of the first m positions in the 
path. (For a path A , this is positions A (0), A (1), • • • , A (m-1).) An m-prefix set 
of a path is the (unordered) set of elements in its m-prefix.
Observe that if, for some m , two paths A and B have the same m-prefix set, 
then the paths share a common PE at distance m . If, in addition, A (m) = B(m),  
then the paths share a common CE. This observation leads to the following lemmas. 
Lemma B.l. Two paths A and B share a PE if and only if there exists an m, 
where 0 < m < n -1 , such that the m-prefix set of A equals the m-prefix set of B . 
Lemma B.2. Two paths A and B share a CE if and only if either (i) A (0) = B (0) 
or (ii) there exists an m, where 1 < m < n -1 , such that the m-prefix set of A 
equals the m-prefix set of B and A (m) = B(m).
From Algorithm PG, note that we can describe a path P{ • as shown below. 
This description will be useful in our proofs of the properties. Let 
f l i p ( x x, x 2, • • • , xk_lt xk ) = (xk, xk_x, • • • , x 2, Let <x>n denote x  modulo 
n. For i = 1,
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P I J  ~  ( j  1) *  <j > n> * <\ /  2 > n , (B.l)
and for 2 <,i < a ,
p i j  = O’" 1). (<*+/-l>„, • • • , < /—3>„), f l i p i j ,  • • • , <i+j-2>n), <j-2>n. (B. 2)
With such descriptions, the m-prefix set for j  where 1 < m < n - i  is
(B.3)
and the m-prefix set where n - i+ l < m < n —l is
(B.4)
In this appendix, we will first prove Lemma 4.2, then Lemma 4.1. We follow 
this order because the proofs for the properties for Lemma 4.1 (both PE’s and CE’s, 
smaller a ) will follow closely after the proofs for the properties for Lemma 4.2 
(CE’s only, larger a).
Proof for Lemma 4.2 :
Property LI. Paths P,- y- and Pi t are CE disjoint, for j  *  I.
Proof: Property LI is implied by Property L3, proved below, for i = k . q
Property L2. Paths P ;j and Pk j  have O'+l) common CE’s, for i < k.
Proof: Consider i= 1 first. By Equations (B.l) and (B.2), P ij(O ) = Pkj(0)  = j - 1, 
so by Lemma B.l, the paths have at least this one CE in common.
We next establish that no m exists, where 2 < m < n - 2, such that the m-prefix 
sets of P 1j  and Pkj  are equal. For 2 < m < n - k , the m-prefix set of P ly- is {jf-1, 
<7>«* * ’ '  * < j + m - 2 > n }  and the m-prefix set of Pkj  is {y'-l, < k + j -  1>W, • • • , 
<^+y+m-3>n }. Since k *  1, these sets cannot be equal. For n -k + l  < m <n-2, the
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m-prefix set of P Xj  is {7—1, <j>n , • • • , <j+m-2>„ } and the m-prefix set of Pkj  
is { j - l ,  < j-m -l> n, ■ • • , < /-3 > „ }. Since m < n - 1, these sets also cannot be 
equal.
The (n-l)-prefix  sets of the two paths are equal, however, and P 1j { n - l )  = 
Pkj ( n - 1) = <j-2>n, so the paths share this CE, and P lj  and Pk j  have exactly 
two common CE’s.
Now consider 2 < i < n - 2. Clearly, P, y(0) = Pkj i 0), so by Lemma B.2, the 
paths have at least this one CE in common.
We next establish that there is no m,  where 2 < m < n - i - 1, such that the m- 
prefix sets of P, j  and Pk j  are equal. Then we establish that the (n-i)-prefix sets of 
Pi j  and Pk j  are equal and that Pi,jig) = Pkj ig )  for n - i  <g  < n -1 . Thus, y 
and Pkj  have exactly (i+1) common CE’s, for i < k.
For 2 < m  < n - k ,  the m-prefix set of Pt j  is { j - l ,  < i+ j-l> n, • • • ,
<i+j+m - 3>„} and the m-prefix set of Pkj  is { j - l ,  < k+ j-l> n, • • • ,
<k+j+m-3>n }. Since i & k , these sets cannot be equal. For n -k + l < m < n - i - 1 ,  
the m-prefix set of Pt j  is { j—1, < i+ j-1>„, • • • , <i+j+m—3>„} and the m-prefix 
set of Pkj  is { j - l ,  < j - m - l>n , • • • , <j-3>n }. Since m < n - i ,  these sets can not 
be equal.
The (n-i)-prefix  set of j  is equal to the (n-i)-prefix set of Pk j .  (See Equa­
tion (B.4) and recall that i < k.) For n - i  < g < n -  2, Pi j i g )  = Pk j ig )  = 
< j-g -2> n. For g = n -1 , Ptj i n - 1) = Pkj i g )  = <j-2>n. Therefore, the last i 
CE’s in Pi j  and Pk j  are common, giving a total of i+ l common CE’s. j-j
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Property L3. Paths Pt j  and Pk l  are CE disjoint, for j  *  I.
Proof: We will establish for j  *  I that Pf / (0) * Pk l (0) and that no m exists such 
that Pitj  and Pk l have equal m-prefix sets. Assume without loss of generality that 
i < k. Consequently, 1 < i < k <  n -2  and 1 <j ,  I <n .
Our proof will be organized into five cases based on the value of m . The cases 
are as follows: m = 1, m = 2, 3 < m < n - k ,  n -k + l < m < n —i , and
n -i+ 1  < m < n -1 . The reason for the last three cases is that we characterize m- 
prefix sets for Piy- in one way for I <, m < n - i  and in another way for 
n - i+ l  < m < n -1 ; similarly, we characterize m-prefix sets for Pk i  in one way for 
1 < m < n -k  and in another way for n -k + l < m < n -1 . (See Equations (B.3) 
and (B.4).) For Cases 1, 3, 4, and 5, we prove that for no m in the given range can 
Pi j  and Pk i have equal m-prefix sets. For Case 2, we show that, even though equal 
2-prefix sets are possible, that the paths do not have the third CE in common.
Case 1: m = 1. Since j  & I, P, j(0 ) = j — 1 *  Pkj (0) = 1-1.
Case 2: m =2. For this case we will show that either the 2-prefix sets of the 
paths are not equal or, if they are equal, then the paths do not share the following 
CE. The 2-prefix sets are as follows: the 2-prefix set for P(- j  is { j - l ,  < i+ j-l> n }, 
and the 2-prefix set for Pk l is { / - l ,  <& +/-l>„}. Since j  *  I, the only way the two 
sets can be equal is if j - l  = <k+l-l>n and l - l  = < i+ j-  1>M. This implies <j>„ = 
<k+l>n and <1 >n = <i+j>n.
First, we assume that j , k & n . Because j  = <k+l>„, then either (i) j  = k+l 
or (ii) j  = k + l-n , and because I = <i+j>n, then either (iii) I = i+j or (iv) / -
i+ j-n . For the 2-prefix sets to be equal, one of (i) or (ii) and one of (iii) or (iv)
must be true. Suppose (i) is true, that is j  = k+l. Then (iii) cannot hold, as it 
implies i+k = 0. If (iv) holds, then n = i+k. In this case, we show that P| ; (2) *
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Pk [ (2) to prove that the third CE’s are not common. Pk l (2) = <k+l>n = <j>n * 
P i j (2) = <i+j>n. Suppose now that (ii) is true. If (iii) holds, then n = i+k and by 
the above argument, the third CE’s are not common. If (iv) holds, then i+k = 2n, 
but i , k  < a  = n -2 , so this cannot occur. Therefore, if j ,  k & n , then the paths do 
not have a common third CE.
Now let 7 = n . In this case, <k+l>„ = 0 and </>„ = <i>n, so k+i = n. For 
other values of i and k , no equal 2-prefix is possible. For such values of i and k, 
P ij (2) = <i>n * Pk,i(2) = <k+i>n , so the paths do not have a common third CE if 
j  = n . The case for k = n is similar.
To prove the remaining cases, we will be trying to establish conditions under 
which two sets X  and Y are equal, in which the sets have the form:
X  = {<*!>„, oc2>„, <x2+\>n , <x2+2>n, • • • , <x2+m-2>n },
Y  =  { l > n  > <y 2 > n  > <)> 2+ l > n  - 2+2>n > * * ' » <^2+W ~2>w },
* <yh , and IXI = \Y I < 3.
Lemma B.3. If X  = Y,  then either (i) <Xi>„ = < r2- l >„ and <y i>„ = <y2+m-l>„ 
or (ii) <*!>„ = <x2+m—l>n and <y i>„ = <y2-l>„ must be true.
Case 3: 3 < m < n - k .  For this range of m,  the m-prefix sets are as follows. 
m-prefix set for P i y : { j - l ,  <i+j- \> n , • • • , <i+j+m-3>„ } 
m-prefix set for Pk l : {/—l, < k+ l-1>„, • • • , <k+l+m-3>„ }
For these two sets to be equal, then by Lemma B.2, either (i) <j>„ = 
<i+j-l>„ and < /- 2>„ = <k+l+m-3>n or (ii) <l>„ = < k+ l-1>„ and <j-2>n = 
<i+j+m -3>w. For (i), if <1-2>n = <k+l+m-3>n, then < k+ m -1>„ = 0, so m = 
n -^+ 1 , but this is not possible by the range on m. For (ii), if <j-2>n = 
<i+j+m-3>n, then <i+m-l>„ = 0, so m = n - i+ l ,  but this is not possible by the
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range on m. By Lemma B.2, no m exists such that 2 < m < n - k  and the m-prefix 
sets are equal.
Case 4: n -k + l < m < n - i .  For this range of m, the m-prefix sets are as fol­
lows.
m-prefix set for P{j : [ j - 1, < i+ J-l> n , • • • , <i+j+m-3>n }
m-prefix set for Pk l : { /- l ,  < l-m -l> „ , • • • , < / - 3>„ }
For these two sets to be equal, then by Lemma B.2, either (i) <j>n = <i+j-2>n
and < / - 2>n = <1-3>n or (ii) </>„ = < l-m -l> n and <j-2>n = <i+j+m-3>„. For
(i), clearly </-2>„ * <l-3>„, so (i) cannot hold. For (ii), if <j-2>„ = 
<i+j+m-3>n , then <i+m-\>n = 0 and m = n - i +1, but this is not possible by the 
range on m. By Lemma B.3, no m exists such that n -k + l < m < n - i  and the m- 
prefix sets are equal.
Case 5: n —i+1 < m < n — 1. For this range of m, the m-prefix sets are as fol­
lows.
m-prefix set for Pt j : { j—1, < j - m -  1>W, • • • , <j-3>„ }
m-prefix set for Pk l : { /- l ,  < l-m -1>„, • • • , < / - 3>„ }
For these two sets to be equal, then by Lemma B.2, either (i) <j>n = < j - m - 1>„ 
and <l-2>n = <l-3>„ or (ii) </>„ = < l-m -\> n and <j-2>n -  <j  -3>n . For (i),
clearly <l-2>n * <l-3>„, and for (ii), clearly <j-2>„ * <j-3>n. By Lemma B.3,
no m exists such that n - i+ l < m < n - 1 and the m-prefix sets are equal.
Combining the above arguments, we find that paths Pt j  and Pk l  are CE dis­
joint for j  *  I. □
Proof for Lemma 4.1 :
The primary differences between Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 are that in the
former case, a  = y - 1  and the properties relate to both PE’s and CE’s, while in
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the latter case, a  = n -2  and the properties relate only to CE’s. Consequently, the 
proofs for the properties for Lemma 4.1 will be based on those for Lemma 4.2. 
Property N l. Paths Pf j  and Pi t are PE and CE disjoint, for j  * I.
Proof: Property N l is implied by Property N3, proved below, for i = k. q
Property N2. Paths Pt j  and Pk j  have (i+1) common PE’s and CE’s, for i < k. 
Proof: By Property L2 of Lemma 4.2, the paths have (i+ l) common CE’s. Observe 
from the proof of Property L2 of Lemma 4.2 above that the paths have exactly i+l 
values of m for which equal m-prefix sets exist. By Lemma B .l, the paths also have 
(i+ l) common PE’s. q
Property N3. Paths P,- j  and Pk i are PE and CE disjoint, for j  *  I.
Proof: The proof for Property L3 of Lemma 4.2 above was partitioned into five 
cases. In Cases 1, 3, 4, and 5, we proved that no m in the given ranges exists such 
that the paths have equal m-prefix sets. Since a  for Lemma 4.1 is smaller than a  for 
Lemma 4.2, this fact is also true for Lemma 4.1. It was only in Case 2 (m = 2 ) that 
it was possible for any equal 2-prefix sets to exist. We establish that no equal 2- 
prefix sets exist for a  = \n l2 - l ] . In Case 2, the only circumstances in which equal 
2-prefix sets were possible were when i+k = n . For Lemma 4.1, 
i , k  < a  = \n/2 —1"|, so no values of i and k exist for which i+k = n . Combining 
all cases, no value of m exists for which P{ j  and Pk l have equal m-prefix sets, so 
by Lemmas B.l and B.2, the paths are PE and CE disjoint. q
The following three properties apply to group G a+l for cases in which n is 
even. Observe that a+1 = n/2.
Property N4. Paths Pn/2j  and Pn /2,i are PE and CE disjoint, for j  * I.
Proof: Property N4 is implied by Property N6, proved below, for i -  n 12. [-]
Property N5. Paths Pt j  and Pn/2j  have (f'+l) common PE’s and CE’s, for i < n/2.
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Proof: Same as proof for Property N2. □
Property N6. Paths y and Pn/2<i are PE and CE disjoint, for j  * I.
Proof: As for Property N3, this proof largely follows the proof of Property L3.
Consider the proof of Property L3 with k = n/2. In Cases 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
proof, no m in the given ranges exists such that the paths have equal m-prefix sets. 
Since a  for Lemma 4.1 is smaller than a  for Lemma 4.2, this fact is also true for 
Lemma 4.1. It was only in Case 2 (m = 2 )  that it was possible for any equal 2- 
prefix sets to exist.
In Case 2, the only circumstances in which equal 2-prefix sets were possible 
were when i+k = n . For Property N6, this can occur when i = k = x  = n il .  Con­
sider paths Pn/2j  and P„/2i/, where 1 < j ,  I < n/2 and j  *  I. As described in the 
proof of Property L3, for the 2-prefix sets to be equal, one of (i) j  = n/2 +1 or (ii) 
j  = n/2  + l-n  = / -n /2  and one of (iii) I = n/2 +j or (iv) I -  n/2 + j-n  = j - n / 2  
must be true. Since 1 < j ,  I < n/2, none of (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) can be true, so 
equal 2-prefix sets are not possible.
Combining all cases, no value of m exists for which P{ j  and Pk<[ have equal 
m-prefix sets, so by Lemmas B. 1 and B.2, the paths are PE and CE disjoint. n
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